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It was in my ¯rst year as an undergraduate student that I took the game theory course
of Stef Tijs. According to the course description, this should not be a problem, since
knowledge from other courses was not required. This was reassuring: as a ¯rst year
undergraduate student, I still had an abundant lack of previous knowledge from other
courses. The fact that I was surrounded by students in their third year and up, for
whom this course was originally intended, did not temper my enthusiasm. Neither did
the frequent use of correspondences, ¯xed point theorems, duality theory and other rather
advanced mathematical tools, although I did learn that `No previous knowledge required'
really meant: `No previous knowledge required, other than all this mathematical stu®
we have been trying to teach you in the compulsory courses during your ¯rst three, four
years as an undergraduate'. It was hard work, but I was succesful in the exam and have
been fascinated by game theory ever since. I thank Stef Tijs for his stimulating way of
teaching game theory and for his support over the years.
Peter Borm has been closely involved in my work. I am very grateful to him for his
support and the discussions we had, many of them outside the scope of work.
I also want to thank the co-authors with whom I worked on chapters in this thesis,
including Henk Norde, Dries Vermeulen, Maurice Koster, Hans Reijnierse, and Lina
Mallozzi. I especially want to mention the collaboration with Edward Droste and Michael
Kosfeld and the many discussions we had on bounded rationality.
Several colleagues have noticed my particular way of writing. One comment1 on style,
in particular on the use of personal pronouns. It is inconvenient, in referring to generic
players, to continuously use `he/she'. Moreover, formally, at the level of abstraction of
this thesis, a player is neither a male nor a female, but an element i of a player set N.
The gender, hair color, shoe size, and weight of this player i 2 N are of no concern in
the models considered in this thesis. In cases where such matters are of concern, they
should be modelled explicitly. A certain female player and I played a Battle of the Sexes
about the use of gender labels. The outcome was that we both accepted the validity of
the other person's arguments, but in no way saw our own arguments refuted. In the end,
I decided to use male pronouns, which is equally incorrect as using female pronouns, but
shorter.
1Well, two: footnotes should be avoided at all costs.
iii Prologue
During the work on my thesis, I had the opportunity to do research at several foreign
universities. I was a guest twice at the Department of Statistics and Operations Research
at the University of Vigo, Spain. In addition to the work we did there, I am grateful
for the hospitality I received, the friendship, and the time they took to show me around
Galicia. Estela S¶ anchez Rodr¶ ³guez, Gloria Fiestras Janeiro, Gustavo Berganti~ nos Cid,
Ignacio Garc¶ ³a Jurado, thank you very much! I am particularly pleased that Ignacio also
joined my Ph.D. committee.
I very much enjoyed the joint work I did with Anne van den Nouweland, another
member of the thesis committee, part of which took place during my stay at the Univer-
sity of Oregon (USA). Anne and Ron Croonenberg made it a pleasant time.
The spring semester of 1999 I spent in Sweden as a guest at the Department of Eco-
nomics of Stockholm University. My thanks to Martin Dufwenberg for this opportunity.
It was a productive period. During my stay I ¯nished three papers, including joint work
with So¯a Grahn and Martin Dufwenberg. Moreover, the ¯rst part of my thesis was
written there. Spring in Sweden in no way implies the absence of snow. I have particu-
larly good memories of a barbecue where all participants, even though it took place in
the middle of May, were wearing a full winter out¯t, including gloves, scarf, and cap.
I also want to express my gratitude to the other members of the thesis committee,
Dov Monderer and Peter Wakker, for the time and e®ort they spent on my thesis.
Finally, I want to thank my parents and Peter for their support and encouragement
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Introduction to Part I
1.1 Games
Game theory is a mathematical theory that designs and uses tools to study interaction
between decision makers. This thesis mainly deals with noncooperative or strategic
games, games in which the involved players cannot make binding agreements. Suppose
that two classes in a school are working on a project and have to decide where to get
their information. This can be either via the school library or their computer lab which
gives access to the Internet.
If both classes decide to use the library, people are getting in each other's way and
the required books will be hard to get hold of. In this case, each of the classes gets only
half the information it needs. If both classes occupy the computer lab, network facilities
will slow down due to crowding, but each class will be able to retrieve sixty percent of the
necessary information. If one of the classes goes to the library and the other class goes
to the computer lab, the library class will ¯nd only eighty percent of the information
(due to some of the necessary books being lent), whereas the computer class will ¯nd all
information it needs.
A schematic way to represent this situation is given in Figure 1.1: there are two






Figure 1.1: The information game
use the Internet. The numbers in the corresponding cells give the payo®s of the game,
the percentage of information that the ¯rst, respectively the second class obtains. For
34 Introduction to Part I
instance, if class 1 goes to the library and class 2 to the computer lab, class 1 gets eighty
percent of the necessary information and class 2 gets all necessary information.
The basic assumptions are that the two classes simultaneously and independently
have to choose where to search for information and that each class tries to maximize its
amount of information. But this is hard: the right thing to do depends on the choice
of the opponent. The best thing to do is to go where the other class is not. Thus, the
strategy pro¯les (Library, Internet) and (Internet, Library) where one class goes to the
library and the other class goes to the computer lab are in some sense `stable': each
class chooses the best option given the choice of the other class. Such a strategy pro¯le,
where each player chooses a best strategy given the strategy choices of the other players,
is a Nash equilibrium.
But not each game has a Nash equilibrium of this type. Consider the Matching






Figure 1.2: Matching Pennies
show either heads or tails. If both show heads or both show tails, the penny of player
2 goes to player 1, otherwise the penny of player 1 goes to player 2. No matter what
strategy pair is chosen, there will always be a player with an incentive to deviate.
1.2 Pure and mixed Nash equilibria
The absence of Nash equilibria as described above is usually solved by introducing a
larger strategy space: instead of just choosing one of the (pure) strategies, a player may
choose each of his pure strategies with a certain probability, a so-called mixed strategy.
Assume that in the Matching Pennies game the ¯rst player shows heads with probability
p and the second player with probability q. Then the expected payo® to player 1 is
pq¡p(1¡q)¡(1¡p)q+(1¡p)(1¡q) = (2p¡1)(2q¡1); the expected payo® to player 2
is (1¡2p)(2q¡1). If player 2 chooses heads with probability smaller than 1
2, then player
1's best response is to choose tails (with probability one). However, if player 2 chooses
heads with probability equal to 1
2 (assuming that it is a fair coin, one might say that he
throws the penny and shows the side it comes down on), then player 1's expected payo®
will be zero whatever he does: he is indi®erent between all probability distributions over
heads and tails. For higher probabilities (q > 1
2), the unique best response is to show
heads. A similar reasoning holds for the second player, so the unique Nash equilibriumPotential games 5
of this game, i.e., the unique pair of mixed strategies in which each player chooses a best
response against the strategy of his opponent, is the strategy pair in which p = q = 1
2.
The game that arises if each player in a strategic game, with ¯nitely many players
and each player having ¯nitely many pure strategies, is allowed to choose a probability
distribution over his pure strategy set is called the mixed extension of the strategic game.
Nash (1950a, 1951) established the existence of equilibria in mixed extensions of ¯nite
strategic games.
The use of mixed strategies can be motivated in several ways and is valid in many
situations. Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Section 3.2), for instance, give a detailed
discussion of interpretations of mixed strategies, including critical comments. Equilibria
in pure strategies, however, are particularly appealing. They are simple and allowing
mixed strategies does not provide the players with opportunities for pro¯table deviation:
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is also an equilibrium in the mixed extension of a ¯nite
strategic game. The simplicity argument applies to other games than mixed extensions
of ¯nite strategic games as well. If players have an in¯nite set of pure strategies it
is relatively uncommon to consider the additional complication of allowing players to
choose probability measures over these strategies. Moreover, it is natural to consider
pure-strategy equilibria in one-shot games: only pure strategies can be observed as
outcomes of these games. This motivates the search for games possessing pure-strategy
Nash equilibria.
1.3 Potential games
The ¯rst part of this thesis, consisting of chapters 2 through 9, is concerned with a
special tool for detecting games with pure-strategy Nash equilibria: so-called potential
functions. Recall the game in Figure 1.1 and consider the real-valued function P on the






Figure 1.3: A potential function
unilaterally deviating player exactly matches the change in the function P. For instance,
if player 2 deviates from (Library, Library) to (Library, Internet) his payo® increases by
100 ¡ 50 = 50 and the function P increases by 180 ¡ 130 = 50. The function P is
therefore called an exact potential of the information game in Figure 1.1. Abstracting
from irrelevant information | namely how unilateral deviations a®ect the payo®s to6 Introduction to Part I
players other than the deviating player | this potential function provides the necessary
information for the computation of the (pure) Nash equilibria: both (Library, Internet)
and (Internet, Library) are pure Nash equilibria, since every unilateral deviation from
these strategy pro¯les decreases the value of the potential function.
Thus, a potential function is an economical way to summarize the information con-
cerning pure Nash equilibria into a single function. Moreover, every ¯nite game with
a potential function has an equilibrium in pure strategies: since the strategy space is
¯nite, the potential achieves its maximum at a certain pure-strategy pro¯le. This must
be a Nash equilibrium. If not, a player could bene¯t from deviating; but by de¯nition,
the potential function would then increase as well, contradicting the assumption that it
achieved its maximum.
Although potential functions already appeared implicitly in several earlier papers
(Rosenthal, 1973, Slade, 1994), Monderer and Shapley (1996) were the ¯rst to formally
de¯ne several classes of potential games. The ¯rst part of this thesis studies potential
games in detail.
One of its main focuses is on the structure of several types of potential games: what
are necessary and su±cient conditions for a certain type of potential function to exist?
This topic is taken up in chapters 2, 5, 7, and 9. The relation between these chapters is
that in all cases it turns out that a certain condition on cycles in the strategy space is
of key importance.
Having derived the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in ¯nite potential
games, the question arises whether in¯nite potential games have pure-strategy Nash
equilibria as well. This matter is studied in chapter 8; it turns out that such games are
less well-behaved than hoped for. In in¯nite games the existence of a potential function
is of little help to establish existence results.
Applications of potential games are given in chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6. In chapters 2 and
3 the focus is on congestion games, games where players choose facilities from a common
set and costs for using these facilities depend only on the number of simultaneous users.
Chapter 4 studies a production process that takes place in di®erent stages; costs of the
production departments depend only on production techniques chosen by earlier depart-
ments and departments operating in the same stage. This chapter extends the notion of
potential games to a speci¯c class of extensive form games with incomplete information.
Chapter 6 deals with the question whether or not players in a noncooperative game in
which they contribute to the ¯nancing of a collection of public goods can be motivated
to act in the interest of social welfare | measured through the utilitarian welfare func-
tion | rather than their own payo®s. A building rule is derived which speci¯es for each
pro¯le of contributions the set of public goods that is built. It is shown that this building
rule makes the noncooperative game strategically equivalent to a potential game where
the utilitarian welfare function is a potential.Preliminaries 7
1.4 Preliminaries
This section contains several de¯nitions and matters of notation. Some mathematical
maturity of the reader is assumed. Theorems and de¯nitions that are of central concern
will be stated where necessary in the chapters themselves; the reader is assumed to
be familiar with other (mainly standard game theoretic and topological) notions. The
books by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) and Myerson (1991) provide a good background
reading in game theory; Aliprantis and Border (1994) provide many of the mathematical
notions that readers with interest in mathematics and economics will need.
A (strategic) game is a tuple G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni, where
² N is a nonempty, ¯nite set of players;
² each player i 2 N has a nonempty set Xi of pure strategies;
² each player i 2 N has a payo® function ui :
Q
j2N Xj ! I R specifying for each
strategy pro¯le x = (xj)j2N 2
Q
j2N Xj player i's payo® ui(x) 2 I R.
The player set of a game is assumed to be ¯nite throughout this thesis. A game is ¯nite
if, moreover, each player i 2 N has a ¯nite set Xi of pure strategies.
Conventional game theoretic notation is used. For instance: X =
Q
j2N Xj denotes
the set of strategy pro¯les. Let i 2 N. X¡i =
Q
j2Nnfig Xj denotes the set of strategy
pro¯les of i's opponents. Let S µ N. XS =
Q
j2S Xj denotes the set of strategy pro¯les
of players in S. With a slight abuse of notation strategy pro¯les x = (xj)j2N 2 X will
be denoted by (xi;x¡i) or (xS;xNnS) if the strategy choice of player i or of the set of
players S needs stressing.
The set of probability distributions over a ¯nite set A is denoted ¢(A):




The mixed extension of a ¯nite game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni allows each player i 2 N












i.e., the payo® to a mixed strategy pro¯le is simply the expected payo®. A pure strategy
xi 2 Xi can be identi¯ed with the mixed strategy that assigns probability one to xi.
A pure-strategy pro¯le x 2 X is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game G if players
cannot bene¯t from unilateral deviation:
8i 2 N;8yi 2 Xi : ui(x) > = ui(yi;x¡i):8 Introduction to Part I
Similarly, a mixed-strategy pro¯le ¾ = (¾j)j2N 2
Q
j2N ¢(Xj) is a (mixed-strategy) Nash
equilibrium of the game G if
8i 2 N;8yi 2 Xi : ui(¾) > = ui(yi;¾¡i):
Notice that attention can be restricted to deviations to pure strategies due to the mul-
tilinearity of the payo® functions. The set of Nash equilibria of a game G is denoted
NE(G).
In Part I of this thesis, mixed strategies are not taken into account. In
that case, NE(G) stands for the set of pure Nash equilibria.
A transferable utility game or TU-game for ease of notation is a tuple (N;v) consisting
of a ¯nite, nonempty set N of players and a characteristic function v : 2N ! I R attaching
to each coalition S µ N its value v(S) 2 I R. By assumption v(;) = 0.
For a ¯nite set A, the number of elements of A is denoted by jAj. Let A and B be
two sets. A µ B denotes weak set inclusion, A ½ B denotes proper set inclusion:
A µ B , 8a 2 A : a 2 B
A ½ B , (A µ B and A 6= B)
The set of functions from A to B is denoted BA. A binary relation on a set A is a subset
of A £ A, i.e., a set of ordered pairs (a;b) with a;b 2 A. The collection of all subsets of
A is denoted 2A. For instance, if M and N are sets, then (2M)N is the set of functions
that assign a subset of M to each element of N.
Summation over the empty set yields zero. The in¯mum of the empty set equals
in¯nity: inf(;) = 1.
Some speci¯c sets:
I N = f1;2;3;:::g set of positive integers
I N0 = I N [ f0g set of nonnegative integers
Z set of integers
Q set of rationals
I R set of reals
I R+ = [0;1) set of nonnegative reals
I R++ = (0;1) set of positive reals
The symbol / indicates the end of de¯nitions, remarks, and examples. The symbol 2
indicates the end of a proof.Chapter 2
Exact Potential Games
2.1 Introduction
Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduced several classes of potential games. A common
feature of these classes is the existence of a real-valued function on the strategy space that
incorporates information about the strategic possibilities of all players simultaneously.
This chapter reviews results concerning exact potential games. Exact potential games
are de¯ned in Section 2.2. Two characterizations of exact potential games are provided.
The purpose of Section 2.3 is to describe the congestion model of Rosenthal (1973) and
to establish an isomorphism between the class of exact potential games and the class of
Rosenthal's congestion games.
2.2 Exact potential games
This section de¯nes exact potential games, surveys some simple results, and provides
two characterizations of exact potential games.
De¯nition 2.1 A strategic game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is an exact potential game
if there exists a function P : X ! I R such that for all i 2 N, for all x¡i 2 X¡i, and all
xi;yi 2 Xi:
ui(xi;x¡i) ¡ ui(yi;x¡i) = P(xi;x¡i) ¡ P(yi;x¡i):
The function P is called an (exact) potential (function) for G. /
In other words, a strategic game is an exact potential game if there exists a real-valued
function on the strategy space which exactly measures the di®erence in the payo® that
accrues to a player if he unilaterally deviates.
Example 2.2 In the Prisoner's Dilemma game of Figure 2.1, two suspects of a crime
are put into separate cells. If both confess (strategy c), each will be sentenced to 3 years
in prison. If exactly one of them confesses, he will be freed and used as a witness against




Figure 2.1: Prisoner's Dilemma
the other person, who will be sentenced to 4 years in prison. If both do not confess
(strategy d), they will both be punished for a minor o®ense and spend 1 year in jail.
Payo®s are represented by 4, minus the number of years spent in prison. This is an exact
potential game. An exact potential function is given by P(c;c) = 5;P(c;d) = P(d;c) =
4;P(d;d) = 3. /
The de¯nition of an exact potential game immediately implies
Proposition 2.3 If G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni has an exact potential P, then the Nash
equilibria of G and hN;(Xi)i2N;(P)i2Ni, i.e., the game obtained by replacing each payo®
function by the potential P, coincide.
An important implication is the following result.
Proposition 2.4 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a ¯nite exact potential game. Then
G has at least one (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let P be an exact potential for G. Since X is ¯nite, argmaxx2X P(x) is a
nonempty set. Clearly, all elements in this set are pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 2
Facchini et al. (1997) provide a characterization of exact potential games by splitting
them up into coordination games and dummy games.
De¯nition 2.5 A game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is a
² coordination game if there exists a function u : X ! I R such that ui = u for all
i 2 N;
² dummy game if for all i 2 N and all x¡i 2 X¡i there exists a k 2 I R such that
ui(xi;x¡i) = k for all xi 2 Xi.
/
In a coordination game, players pursue the same goal, re°ected by the identical payo®
functions. In a dummy game, a player's payo® does not depend on his own strategy.
Theorem 2.6 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a strategic game. G is an exact potential
game if and only if there exist functions (ci)i2N and (di)i2N such that
² ui = ci + di for all i 2 N,Exact potential games 11
² hN;(Xi)i2N;(ci)i2Ni is a coordination game, and
² hN;(Xi)i2N;(di)i2Ni is a dummy game.
Proof. The `if'-part is obvious: the payo® function of the coordination game is an exact
potential function of G. To prove the `only if'-part, let P be an exact potential for G. For
all i 2 N, ui = P + (ui ¡ P). Clearly, hN;(Xi)i2N;(P)i2Ni is a coordination game. Let
i 2 N;x¡i 2 X¡i, and xi;yi 2 Xi. Then ui(xi;x¡i)¡ui(yi;x¡i) = P(xi;x¡i)¡P(yi;x¡i)
implies ui(xi;x¡i)¡P(xi;x¡i) = ui(yi;x¡i)¡P(yi;x¡i). Consequently, hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui¡
P)i2Ni is a dummy game. 2
Facchini et al. (1997) proceed to derive from this theorem the dimension of the linear
space of ¯nite exact potential games. Let N = f1;:::;ng, n 2 I N, be a ¯xed player set
and X =
Q
i2N Xi a ¯xed strategy space. Let mi = jXij 2 I N be the cardinality of player
i's strategy set. The set of strategic games with player set N and strategy space X is
denoted ¡N;X and is clearly isomorphic to the linear space (I R
N)X of functions from X to
I R
N. A game in ¡N;X can be identi¯ed with an n-dimensional vector of payo® functions
u = (u1;:::;un). Addition and scalar multiplication on ¡N;X is then de¯ned by using the







the subset of coordination, dummy, and exact potential games, respectively. These are all























i2N mi, since it su±ces to specify one real number for every x 2 X in a
coordination game, and dim(¡
N;X







it su±ces, in dummy games, to specify for each player i 2 N a payo® for each element in




D ). Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡N;X be
both a dummy game and a coordination game. Then there exists a function u : X ! I R
such that ui = u for each player i 2 N. The dummy property implies that for each x =
(x1;:::;xn);y = (y1;:::;yn) 2 X: u(x) = u(y1;x2;x3;:::;xn) = u(y1;y2;x3;:::;xn) =




D ) = dim(I R) = 1. This ¯nishes the proof of











The following result shows that the di®erence between two exact potential functions of
a game is a constant function.
Proposition 2.8 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a game with exact potential functions
P and Q. Then P ¡ Q is a constant function.
Proof. Let i 2 N. By Theorem 2.6, ui ¡ Q and ui ¡ P do not depend on the strategy
choice of player i. Hence (P ¡Q) = (ui¡Q)¡(ui¡P) does not depend on the strategy
choice of player i. This holds for every player i 2 N: (P ¡ Q) is a constant function. 212 Exact Potential Games
Proposition 2.8 implies that the set of strategy pro¯les maximizing a potential function
of an exact potential game does not depend on the particular potential function that
is chosen. Potential-maximizing strategies were used in the proof of Proposition 2.4 to
show that ¯nite exact potential games have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. The potential
maximizer, formally de¯ned for an exact potential game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni as
PM(G) = fx 2 X j x 2 argmax
y2X P(y) for some potential function P of Gg
can therefore act as an equilibrium re¯nement tool. See Monderer and Shapley (1996).
Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) provide an axiomatic approach to potential-maximizing
strategies.
Remark 2.9 In a more general setting, Balder (1997) considers games with additively
coupled payo®s. A game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni has additively coupled payo®s if for each
pair (i;j) 2 N £N there exists a function vi;j : Xj ! I R such that each player i's payo®
function decomposes as




De¯ne P : X ! I R by P : x 7!
P
i2N vi;i(xi). Then (ui ¡ P) : x 7!
P
j2Nnfig(vi;j(xj) ¡
vj;j(xj)) does not depend on the strategy choice of player i, proving that a game with
additively coupled payo®s is an exact potential game with potential P. /
Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a game. A path in the strategy space X is a sequence
° = (x1;x2;:::) of elements xk 2 X such that for all k = 1;2;::: the strategy com-
binations xk and xk+1 di®er in exactly one, say the i(k)-th, coordinate. A ¯nite path
° = (x1;:::;xk) is called closed or a cycle if x1 = xk. It is a simple closed path if it is
closed and apart from the initial and the terminal point of the path all strategy com-
binations are di®erent: for all l;m 2 f1;:::;k ¡ 1g;l 6= m : xl 6= xm. The number of
distinct strategy combinations in a simple closed path is called the length of the path.
Let u = (ui)i2N be the vector of payo® functions and ° = (x1;:::;xk) be a ¯nite path.
De¯ne I(°;u) =
Pk¡1
m=1 [ui(m)(xm+1) ¡ ui(m)(xm)], where i(m) is the unique deviating




These concepts will be illustrated in an example.
Example 2.10 Consider the two-player game given below. An exact potential for this




((T;L);(B;R)) is not a path, since the consecutive elements di®er in both coordinates.
° = ((T;L);(T;R);(B;R);(B;L);(T;L)) is a path, which is also closed and simple. Its
length is 4. Notice that I(°;u) = (3 ¡ 2) + (4 ¡ 2) + (5 ¡ 6) + (0 ¡ 2) = 0. /Exact potential games 13
The following characterization of exact potential games was given by Monderer and
Shapley (1996). It shows that it is no coincidence that the game in the example above
is an exact potential game and that the payo® di®erences over the closed path sum to
zero.
Theorem 2.11 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a game. The following claims are
equivalent:
(a) G is an exact potential game;
(b) I(°;u) = 0 for all closed paths °;
(c) I(°;u) = 0 for all simple closed paths °;
(d) I(°;u) = 0 for all simple closed paths ° of length 4.
Proof.
(a) ) (b) Let P be an exact potential of G and ° = (x1;:::;xk) a closed path. Then
I(°;u) = I(°;P) = P(xk) ¡ P(x1) = 0.
(b) ) (a) Fix x 2 X and take P(x) = 0. Let y 2 X;y 6= x, and let ° = (x1;:::;xk) be
a path from x to y: x1 = x;xk = y. De¯ne P(y) = I(°;u). To show that this yields an
exact potential for G, one needs to show that P is well-de¯ned and that the conditions
of De¯nition 2.1 hold.
Let °0 = (y1;:::;ym) be any other path from x to y. For P to be well-de¯ned, P(y)
should equal I(°0;u). This follows from the fact that °00 = (x1;:::;xk;ym¡1;:::;y1) is a
closed path (from x to y via ° and back by reversing °0) and I(°00;u) = I(°;u)¡I(°0;u) =
0.
To check that P is indeed an exact potential, let i 2 N;x¡i 2 X¡i, and yi;zi 2
Xi;yi 6= zi. Let ° = (y1;:::;yk) be a path from x to y = (yi;x¡i) and °0 = (z1;:::;zm)
a path from x to z = (zi;x¡i). Remains to show that P(y) ¡ P(z) = ui(y) ¡ ui(z).
Consider the closed path °00 = (y1;:::;yk¡1;yk;zm;zm¡1;:::;z1). By assumption, 0 =
I(°00;u) = I(°;u) + ui(z) ¡ ui(y) ¡ I(°0;u) = P(y) + ui(z) ¡ ui(y) ¡ P(z).
(b) ) (c) ) (d) Trivial.
(d) ) (b) Assume I(°;u) = 0 for all simple closed paths of length 4. Suppose there
is a closed path ° = (x1;:::;xk) such that I(°;u) 6= 0. W.l.o.g. ° has minimal length
( > = 5) among all closed paths with this property. Since i(1) deviates at the ¯rst step
and x1 = xk, there must be another step m with i(m) = i(1). By minimality, i(1)
does not make two consecutive deviations: m 2 f3;:::;k ¡ 1g. De¯ne the closed path
¹ = (x1;:::;xm¡1;ym;xm+1;:::;xk) in such a way that the deviations of players i(m¡1)









i if i = i(m) = i(1);
x
m¡1
i otherwise.14 Exact Potential Games
The simple closed path º = (xm¡1;xm;xm+1;ym;xm¡1) of length 4 satis¯es I(º;u) = 0,
so I(°;u) = I(¹;u), but in the closed path ¹ player i(1) deviates one step earlier than
in °. Continuing in this way one ¯nds a closed path ¿ of the same length as ° with
I(°;u) = I(¿;u) 6= 0 in which i(1) deviates in two consecutive steps, contradicting the
minimality assumption on °. 2
2.3 Rosenthal's congestion model
In a congestion model, players use several facilities | also called machines or (primary)
factors | from a common pool. The costs or bene¯ts that a player derives from the
use of a facility are, possibly among other factors, determined by the number of users of
a facility. The purpose of this section is to describe the congestion model of Rosenthal
(1973). In his model, each player chooses a subset of facilities. The bene¯t associated
with each facility is a function only of the number of players using it. The payo® to
a player is the sum of the bene¯ts associated with each facility in his strategy choice,
given the choices of the other players. By constructing an exact potential function for
such congestion games, the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria can be established.
Moreover, Monderer and Shapley (1996) showed that every ¯nite exact potential game
is isomorphic to a congestion game. Their proof is rather complex. In this section we
present a di®erent proof which is shorter and in our opinion more intuitive. In fact,
we use the decomposition of exact potential games into dummy games and coordination
games stated in Theorem 2.6 to decompose the problem into two subproblems. It is
shown that each coordination game and each dummy game is isomorphic to a congestion
game.
Rosenthal (1973) de¯nes a congestion model as a tuple hN;M;(Xi)i2N;(cj)j2Mi,
where
² N = f1;:::;ng is the set of players;
² M is the ¯nite set of facilities, machines, or factors;
² For each player i 2 N, his collection of pure strategies Xi is a ¯nite family of
subsets of M;
² For each facility j 2 M, cj : f1;:::;ng ! I R is the cost function of facility j, with
cj(r);r 2 f1;:::;ng, the costs to each of the users of machine j if there is a total
of r users.
This gives rise to a congestion game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni where N and (Xi)i2N are
as above and for i 2 N, ui : X ! I R is de¯ned thus: for each x = (x1;:::;xn) 2 X,
and each j 2 M, let nj(x) = jfi 2 N : j 2 xigj be the number of users of machine j if
the players choose x. Then ui(x) = ¡
P
j2xi cj(nj(x)). This de¯nition implies that eachRosenthal's congestion model 15
player pays for the facilities he uses, with costs depending only on the number of users
of the facility. It is usually assumed that costs are an increasing function of the number
of users. This, however, is not necessary to prove the existence of an equilibrium. Notice
that cost functions can achieve negative values, representing bene¯ts of using a facility.
The main result from Rosenthal's paper, formulated in terms of exact potentials, is
given in the next proposition. Its proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Proposition 2.12 Let hN;M;(Xi)i2N;(cj)j2Mi be a congestion model and G its con-
gestion game. Then G is an exact potential game. A potential function is given by







Since the game is ¯nite, it has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni and H = hN;(Yi)i2N;(vi)i2Ni be two strategic games with
identical player set N. G and H are isomorphic if for all i 2 N there exists a bijection
'i : Xi ! Yi such that
ui(x1;:::;xn) = vi('1(x1);:::;'n(xn)) for all (x1;:::;xn) 2 X:
A congestion game where the machines have non-zero costs only if all players use it as
part of their strategy choice is clearly a coordination game. Also, each coordination
game can be expressed in this form, as shown in the proof of the next theorem.
Theorem 2.13 Each ¯nite coordination game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
Proof. Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(u)i2Ni be a ¯nite n-player coordination game in which
each player has payo® function u. Introduce for each x 2 X a di®erent machine m(x).
De¯ne the congestion model hN;M;(Yi)i2N;(cj)j2Mi with M = [x2X fm(x)g, for each






¡u(x) if r = n
0 otherwise
For each x 2 X: \i2Nfi(xi) = fm(x)g, so the game corresponding to this congestion
model is isomorphic to G (where the isomorphisms map xi to fi(xi)). 2
The proof is illustrated with a simple example.
Example 2.14 Consider the coordination game in Figure 2.2a. For each strategy pro¯le
we introduce a machine as in Figure 2.2b. These are the machines that we want to be











Figure 2.2: A coordination game
each player in a certain row (column) all machines mentioned in this row (column). For
instance, the second strategy of the row player will correspond with choosing machine
set fC;Dg. Now indeed, if both players play their second strategy, machine D is used
by both players and all other machines have one or zero users. De¯ning the costs of D
in case of two simultaneous users to be ¡3 and in case of less users zero, we obtain the
payo® (3;3) in the lower righthand corner of Figure 2.2c. Similar reasoning applies to
the other cells. /
Consider a congestion game in which costs for a facility are non-zero only if it is used by
a single player. If for each player, given the strategy choices of the other players, it holds
that his costs arise from using one and the same facility, irrespective of his own strategy
choice, we have a dummy game. Also, as shown in the next theorem, each dummy game
is isomorphic to a congestion game with this property.
Theorem 2.15 Each ¯nite dummy game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
Proof. Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a ¯nite n-player dummy game. Introduce for
each i 2 N and each x¡i 2 X¡i a di®erent machine m(x¡i). De¯ne the congestion
model hN;M;(Yi)i2N;(cj)j2Mi with M = [i2N [x¡i2X¡i fm(x¡i)g, for each i 2 N:
Yi = fgi(xi) j xi 2 Xig where
gi(xi) = fm(x¡i) j x¡i 2 X¡ig
[ fm(y¡j) j j 2 N n fig and y¡j 2 X¡j is such that yi 6= xig;





¡ui(xi;x¡i) if r = 1 (with xi 2 Xi arbitrary)
0 otherwise
For each i 2 N, x¡i 2 X¡i, and xi 2 Xi: i is the unique user of m(x¡i) in (gj(xj))j2N
and all other machines in gi(xi) have more than one user. Why? Let i 2 N, x¡i 2 X¡i,
and xi 2 Xi. Then m(x¡i) 2 gi(xi) and for each j 2 N n fig: m(x¡i) = 2 gj(xj), so i is
indeed the unique user of m(x¡i) in (gj(xj))j2N. Let m 2 gi(xi);m 6= m(x¡i).
² If m = m(y¡i) for some y¡i 2 X¡i, then y¡i 6= x¡i implies that yj 6= xj for some
j 2 N n fig, so m = m(y¡i) 2 gj(xj).Rosenthal's congestion model 17
² If m = m(y¡j) for some j 2 N n fig and y¡j 2 X¡j with yi 6= xi, then m =
m(y¡j) 2 gj(xj).
In both cases m has more than one user. So the game corresponding to this congestion
model is isomorphic to G (where the isomorphisms map xi to gi(xi)). 2











Figure 2.3: A dummy game
Example 2.16 Consider the dummy game in Figure 2.3a. Introduce a di®erent machine
for each pro¯le of opponent strategies as in Figure 2.3b. Include a machine m(x¡i) in
each player's strategy, except for those strategies of players j 6= i playing according
to the pro¯le x¡i for which this machine was introduced. For instance, facility ® was
introduced for the ¯rst column of player 2; then ® is part of every strategy, except for
the ¯rst column of player 2. This yields the strategies as in Figure 2.3c. De¯ne costs for
multiple users equal to zero. No matter what player 1 does, if his opponent chooses his
second strategy, the costs to player 1 can be attributed to machine ¯. Assign costs ¡1 to
a single user of this facility. Similar reasoning for the other payo®s yields the isomorphic
congestion game in Figure 2.3c. /
In the previous two theorems it was shown that coordination and dummy games are
isomorphic to congestion games. Using the decomposition of Theorem 2.6 we obtain
that every exact potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
Theorem 2.17 Every ¯nite exact potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
Proof. Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a ¯nite exact potential game. Split it into
a coordination game and a dummy game as in Theorem 2.6 and take their isomorphic
congestion games as in Theorems 2.13 and 2.15. W.l.o.g., take their machine sets disjoint.
Construct a congestion game isomorphic to G by taking the union of the two machine
sets, cost functions as in Theorems 2.13 and 2.15, and strategy sets Yi = ffi(xi)[gi(xi) j
xi 2 Xig. 2
Example 2.18 The exact potential game in Example 2.10 is the sum of the coordination
game from Example 2.14 and the dummy game from Example 2.16. Combining the two
isomorphic congestion games from these examples yields a congestion game isomorphic




fA;Cg [ f¯;°;±g fB;Dg [ f®;°;±g
fA;Bg [ f®;¯;±g 0+0,0+2 1+1,1+2
fC;Dg [ f®;¯;°g 2+0,2+3 3+1,3+3
b
Figure 2.4: Exact potential game and isomorphic congestion gameChapter 3
Strong Nash Equilibria and the
Potential Maximizer
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter it was shown that the existence of pure Nash equilibria in Rosen-
thal's congestion games could be established through the construction of a potential
function. Milchtaich (1996) and Quint and Shubik (1994) considered di®erent classes of
congestion games which in general do not admit a potential function, but were still able
to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997),
considering the same model as Milchtaich, have even shown the existence of a strong
Nash equilibrium.
Combining features from the congestion models mentioned above, this chapter, which
is based on Borm et al. (1997), introduces a class of congestion games with several
interesting properties. In particular, it will be shown that for each game in this class the
set of strong Nash equilibria is nonempty and coincides with the set of Nash equilibria
and the set of potential-maximizing strategies. Similar results can be found in Holzman
and Law-Yone (1997).
The situation considered in this chapter can be used to model, for example, the
foraging behavior of a population of identical bees in a ¯eld of °owers. In deciding which
°ower to visit, each insect will take into account the quantity of nectar available and the
number of bees already on the °ower, because, as is intuitively clear, the more crowded
the source of nectar, the less food is available per capita. In economics this kind of
problems is studied in the literature on local public goods, where it is common to speak
about \anonymous crowding" (cf. Wooders, 1989) to describe the negative externality
arising from the presence of more than one user of the same facility. Another example is
the problem faced by a set of unemployed workers who have to decide where to emigrate
to get a job. The attraction of di®erent countries depends on the conditions of the
local labor market and, on the other hand, a crowding out e®ect reduces the appeal of
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emigrating.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we investigate the various models
mentioned above, clarifying the similarities and di®erences among them. After that we
de¯ne a class of games which possess a strong Nash equilibrium and at the same time
admit an exact potential function. In Section 3.3 we analyze the geometric properties of
this class of games, showing that it can be represented by a ¯nitely generated cone. In
Section 3.4 we state our main theorems concerning the coincidence of equilibrium sets,
where the representation of each game as an element of a cone is used. Attention is
focused on the computation of the potential. The section is concluded with comments
on strictly strong equilibria. Implications of relaxing some of the assumptions underlying
the congestion e®ect are discussed in Section 3.5.
3.2 Congestion games
The games introduced by Milchtaich (1996), Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1997) and
Quint and Shubik (1994) are rather similar, in the sense that the utility functions of
the players are characterized by a \congestion e®ect". The various classes of games we
are going to discuss are identi¯ed by means of di®erent sets of properties concerning the
structure of the strategic interaction. In particular, Konishi et al. (1997) impose the
following assumptions (P1){(P4) on a game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni.
(P1) There exists a ¯nite set F such that Xi = F for all players i 2 N.
The set F is called the \facility set" and a strategy for player i is choosing an element
of F.
(P2) For each strategy pro¯le x 2 X and all players i;j 2 N: if xi 6= xj and x0
j 2 Xj is
such that xi 6= x0
j, then ui(xj;x¡j) = ui(x0
j;x¡j).
Konishi et al. (1997) call this assumption independence of irrelevant choices and the
meaning is that for each player i 2 N and each strategy pro¯le x the utility of i will not
be altered if the set of players that choose the same facility as player i is not modi¯ed.
Let x 2 X;f 2 F. Denote by nf(x) the number of users of facility f in the strategy
pro¯le x. Then the third property can be stated as follows:
(P3) For each player i 2 N and all strategy pro¯les x;y 2 X with xi = yi: if nf(x) =
nf(y) for all f 2 F, then ui(x) = ui(y).
This anonymity condition re°ects the idea that the payo® of player i depends on the
number of players choosing the facilities, rather than on their identity. The fourth
assumption, called partial rivalry, states that each player i would not regret that other
players, choosing the same facility, would select another one. Formally:Congestion games 21
(P4) For each player i 2 N, each strategy pro¯le x 2 X, each player j 6= i such that
xj = xi and each x0
j 6= xi: ui(xj;x¡j) < = ui(x0
j;x¡j).
Although Milchtaich (1996) introduces his model in a slightly di®erent way, the resulting
class of games is the same. More speci¯cally Milchtaich (1996) introduces the conditions
(P1), (P4), and the following assumption:
(P2') For each player i 2 N and all strategy pro¯les x;y with xi = yi = f: if nf(x) =
nf(y), then ui(x) = ui(y).
In other words the utility of player i depends only on the number of users of the facility
that i has chosen. Assuming (P1), it is straightforward to prove that (P2') implies both
(P2) and (P3). The converse implication is also true.
Lemma 3.1 Any game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni satisfying (P1), (P2), and (P3) sat-
is¯es (P2').
Proof. Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni satisfy (P1), (P2), and (P3). Let i 2 N, x;y 2 X
such that xi = yi = f and assume that nf(x) = nf(y). If jFj = 1, (P2') follows directly.
Otherwise, from repeated use of (P2), we know that for a ¯xed g 6= xi, ui(xi;x¡i) =
ui(xi;x0







xi if xj = xi;
g otherwise,
and that ui(xi;y¡i) = ui(xi;y0







xi if yj = xi;
g otherwise.
Notice that for each h 2 F, nh(xi;x0
¡i) = nh(xi;y0
¡i). So (P3) implies ui(xi;x0
¡i) =
ui(xi;y0
¡i). Therefore, ui(xi;x¡i) = ui(xi;x0
¡i) = ui(xi;y0
¡i) = ui(yi;y¡i). 2
Konishi et al. (1997) and Milchtaich (1996) independently proved the following
Theorem 3.2 Each game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni satisfying (P1), (P2), (P3) and (P4),
possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Recall that, given a game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni, a strategy pro¯le x is called a strong
Nash equilibrium if for every S µ N and all strategy pro¯les yS 2 ¦i2SXi, there is at
least one player i 2 S such that ui(yS;x¡S) < = ui(x). The set of strong Nash equilibria of
a game G is denoted by SNE(G). In general, the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium
is not guaranteed, but Konishi et al. (1997) show22 Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maximizer
Theorem 3.3 For each game satisfying (P1), (P2) (P3) and (P4), the set of strong
Nash equilibria is nonempty.
Finally, we mention the model introduced by Quint and Shubik (1994), where the as-
sumption that all players have the same set of facilities (as stated by (P1)) is relaxed.
(P1') There exists a ¯nite set F such that Xi µ F for all players i 2 N.
Assuming that (P1') holds, it is still easy to see that (P2') implies (P2) and (P3). But
the analogon of Lemma 3.1 does not hold.
Example 3.4 Take N = f1;2;3g, F = fa;b;cg and strategy sets X1 = fa;bg, X2 =
fag, X3 = fa;cg. This game satis¯es (P1'). Assumption (P3) imposes no additional
requirements and (P2) requires that u1(b;a;a) = u1(b;a;c) and u3(a;a;c) = u3(b;a;c).
This does not imply u2(a;a;c) = u2(b;a;a), which is required by (P2'). /
Quint and Shubik (1994) are able to show
Theorem 3.5 All strategic games satisfying (P1'), (P2') and (P4) possess a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Games in the classes considered so far not necessarily admit a potential function. Con-
sider now the following cross-symmetry condition, which states that the payo®s on a
certain facility are player-independent, provided that the number of users is the same.
(P5) For all strategy pro¯les x;y 2 X and all players i;j 2 N: if xi = yj = f and
nf(x) = nf(y), then ui(x) = uj(y).
Notice that (P5) together with (P1) implies (P2'), and thus (P2) and (P3). Moreover,
(P1) and (P5) guarantee the existence of a potential.
Theorem 3.6 Each game satisfying (P1) and (P5) is an exact potential game.
Proof. Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni satisfy (P1) and (P5). Let i;j 2 N;i 6= j;x¡fi;jg 2
X¡fi;jg;xi;yi 2 Xi;xi 6= yi;xj;yj 2 Xj;xj 6= yj. For notational convenience, de¯ne for
k 2 fi;jg the function vk : Xi £ Xj ! I R with vk(ai;bj) = uk(ai;bj;x¡fi;jg) for all
(ai;bj) 2 Xi £ Xj. According to the cycle characterization of exact potential games in
Theorem 2.11, it su±ces to show that
[vi(yi;xj) ¡ vi(xi;xj)] + [vj(yi;yj) ¡ vj(yi;xj)] +
[vi(xi;yj) ¡ vi(yi;yj)] + [vj(xi;xj) ¡ vj(xi;yj)]
(3.1)
equals zero. We consider three cases:On the structure of the class C 23
² If there are two di®erent machines in fxi;yi;xj;yjg, then without loss of generality
xi = xj = f and yi = yj = g. By axiom (P5):
vi(xi;xj) = vi(f;f) = vj(f;f) = vj(xi;xj);
vi(yi;yj) = vi(g;g) = vj(g;g) = vj(yi;yj);
vi(yi;xj) = vi(g;f) = vj(f;g) = vj(xi;yj);
vi(xi;yj) = vi(f;g) = vj(g;f) = vj(yi;xj):
Substituting this in (3.1) indeed yields 0.
² If there are three di®erent machines in fxi;yi;xj;yjg, then without loss of generality
xi = xj = f and yi 6= yj;yi 6= f;yj 6= f. By axiom (P5):
vi(xi;xj) = vi(f;f) = vj(f;f) = vj(xi;xj);
vi(xi;yj) = vi(f;yj) = vj(yi;f) = vj(yi;xj);
vi(yi;xj) = vi(yi;yj);
vj(yi;yj) = vj(xi;yj):
Substituting this in (3.1) indeed yields 0.





Substituting this in (3.1) indeed yields 0. 2
The proof does not change if (P1') is substituted for (P1).
As can be seen in the Prisoner's Dilemma in Example 2.2, exact potential games
do not in general possess a strong Nash equilibrium. This chapter's focus is on games
that admit an exact potential and have strong Nash equilibria. Therefore, attention is
restricted to the class C of congestion games satisfying not only (P1) and (P5), but also
(P4). So
C = fG = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni j G satis¯es (P1), (P4), and (P5)g:
3.3 On the structure of the class C
In the previous section we have de¯ned the class C. Now we will analyze its structure.
For n 2 I N, let C(n) denote the class of games G 2 C with n players. It will be shown
that each game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 C(n) can be identi¯ed with a ¯nite set of24 Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maximizer
vectors in I R
n
+, and that the subclass C(F;n), consisting of all games in C(n) with ¯xed
facility set F, is a ¯nitely generated cone in (I R
n
+)F. The vector notation of the games
simpli¯es the proofs of the theorems on strong equilibria and the potential maximizer
presented in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
Fix a number n 2 I N, a ¯nite facility set F and let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2
C(F;n). For any f 2 F and x;y 2 X such that nf(x) = nf(y), we have by (P5):
if there are i;j 2 N such that xi = yj = f, then ui(x) = uj(y).
This shows that for all f 2 F there exists a function wf : f1;:::;ng ! I R such that for all
x 2 X, if xi = f, then ui(x) = wf(nf(x)). This function is to be interpreted as the utility
assigned to each player using this facility, given a certain number of users of this same
facility. From (P4), we have for each f 2 F and t 2 f1;:::;n¡1g that wf(t) > = wf(t+1).
For convenience and without loss of generality we assume that wf(t) > = 0 for all f 2 F;t 2
f1;:::;ng. This means that the game G 2 C(F;n) is described by jFj vectors of the
form (wf(1);:::;wf(n));f 2 F, each in the set V = fv = (v1;:::;vn) 2 I R
n
+ j vt > = vt+1
for all t 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1gg.
Proposition 3.7 The set V is a ¯nitely generated cone in I R
n
+. The extreme directions of
V are the vectors b1;b2;:::;bn with bi = (1;1;1;1
| {z }
i times
;0;:::;0). Furthermore, dim(V ) = n.
Proof. The vectors b1 = (1;0;0;:::;0), bi = (1;1;1;1
| {z }
i times
;0;:::;0),..., bn = (1;1;1;1;:::;1)
are elements of V and each vector v 2 V can be uniquely written as a nonnegative
















So Bn is the n£n matrix whose i-th row is bi. Since det(Bn) = 1, the equation ®Bn = v
has exactly one solution. Clearly, ® is nonnegative because of the decreasingness property
of v. The set V is therefore the cone C(Bn) where C(Bn) := f®Bn j ® 2 I R
n
+g.
The extreme directions of the cone C(Bn) are the vectors bi, i 2 f1;:::;ng. This cone
has furthermore the property that its dimension is the number of extreme directions. In
other words we have that dim C(Bn) = rank(Bn) = n. 2
Essentially we proved
Corollary 3.8 The class of games C(F;n) can be identi¯ed with a cone in (I R
n
+)F and
dim(C(F;n)) = jFj £ n.Strong Nash equilibria and the potential maximizer 25
In the next example we consider an extreme game of C(F;n), i.e., a game with facility
set F such that wf is an extreme direction in the cone V for each f 2 F.
Example 3.9 Let G be a game in C(ff;gg;4) such that wf = (1;0;0;0) and wg =
(1;1;0;0). Nash equilibria are either those strategy pro¯les in which one of the players
chooses f and the other three g, or those in which both facilities are chosen by two
players. These situations will be depicted
( 1 ;0;0;0)
(1;1; 0 ;0)
for the ¯rst case and
(1; 0 ;0;0)
(1; 1 ;0;0)
for the second one, where the numbers in the square boxes indicate the payo® received by
each player choosing this facility. Notice furthermore that the players are interchangeable
as suggested by the cross-symmetry condition (P5). One easily checks that all Nash
equilibria are strong. /
3.4 Strong Nash equilibria and the potential maxi-
mizer
In this section it is shown that on the class C, the set of Nash equilibria, strong Nash
equilibria, and potential maximizers coincide:
Theorem 3.10 On the class C of games, SNE = NE = PM.
A proof of this result is given in parts. Recall that for any strategic game G, SNE(G) µ
NE(G) and that for any exact potential game G, PM(G) µ NE(G). It therefore su±ces
to prove the following propositions.
Proposition 3.11 For each game G 2 C, NE(G) µ SNE(G).
Proposition 3.12 For each game G 2 C, NE(G) µ PM(G).
The proofs are based on the structure of the class of games described in the previous
section. We assume n 2 I N and a ¯nite facility set F to be ¯xed. Each game G 2 C(F;n)
is given by a collection of vectors
((wf(1);:::;wf(n)))f2F:26 Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maximizer
Proof. [Proposition 3.11]. Let G 2 C (F;n) be given by ((wf(1);:::;wf(n)))f2F and
let x 2 NE(G). Suppose S µ N can strictly improve the payo® for all its members by
switching to a strategy combination yS 2 F S. Call the resulting strategy combination
y = (yS;xNnS). If nf(y) > nf(x) for some f 2 F, a player i 2 S exists such that
yi = f and xi = g;g 6= f. This implies wf(nf(x) + 1) > = wf(nf(y)) > wg(ng(x)), which
contradicts the fact that x is a Nash equilibrium. So nf(x) = nf(y) for all f 2 F.
Therefore every player in S chooses a new facility already chosen by a member of S
and obtains a higher utility. Among the utilities assigned to members of S there is a
maximum, since S is ¯nite. Any player in S rewarded with this maximum cannot get
more in the new con¯guration. Hence a contradiction arises. Every Nash equilibrium is
strong. 2
Based on a switching argument the next lemma shows the similarities in utilities for
di®erent Nash equilibria.
Lemma 3.13 Let G 2 C(F;n) be determined by ((wf(1);:::;wf(n)))f2F and let x and
y be Nash equilibria of G. For all f;g 2 F such that nf(x) < nf(y) and ng(y) < ng(x),
and for all l 2 fnf(x) + 1;:::;nf(y)g and m 2 fng(y) + 1;:::;ng(x)g it holds that
wf(l) = wf(nf(y)) = wg(ng(x)) = wg(m):
Proof. Let f;g 2 F and l;m be as described in the lemma. Both x and y are
Nash equilibria, so wf(nf(y)) > = wg(ng(y) + 1) > = wg(m) > = wg(ng(x)) > = wf(nf(x) +
1) > = wf(l) > = wf(nf(y)). 2
Our next proposition speci¯es a potential function for a game in C(F;n).
Proposition 3.14 Let the game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 C(F;n) be determined by







Then P is an exact potential of G.
Proof. Let i 2 N;f;g 2 Xi µ F;f 6= g;x¡i 2 X¡i. For notational convenience, write
x = (f;x¡i) and y = (g;x¡i). Notice that nf(x) = nf(y) + 1, ng(x) = ng(y) ¡ 1, andStrong Nash equilibria and the potential maximizer 27
nh(x) = nh(y) for h 2 F n ff;gg. By de¯nition:
























= wf(nf(x)) ¡ wg(ng(y))
= ui(x) ¡ ui(y):
2
Remark 3.15 Let a game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni satisfy (P1') and (P5). Assumption
(P5) again implies that for each f 2 F there exists a function wf : f1;:::;ng ! I R such
that for all x 2 X, if xi = f, then ui(x) = wf(nf(x)). An exact potential for G can then
be constructed as in Proposition 3.14. /
To compute the potential of Proposition 3.14 it is necessary to add the utilities of the
used facilities up to the number of users. This means that in each vector wf all the ¯rst
nf(x) numbers are added.
As a consequence it is clear that by n times consecutively choosing the facilities with
highest remaining numbers, from left on, in the set of vectors f(wf(1);:::;wf(n))gf2F a
potential maximizing pro¯le is found. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.16 Let G 2 C(ff;gg;4) such that
wf = (4;3;2;1)
wg = (5;2;1;0)
In the ¯rst step we take the ¯rst cell in wg, in the second step the ¯rst cell in wf, in the
third step the second cell of wf and, ¯nally, in the fourth step either the third cell of wf
or the second cell of wg. Consequently, the potential maximizing strategy combinations
are those x 2 F N with nf(x) = 3, ng(x) = 1 and those with nf(x) = 2, ng(x) = 2. Notice
that for these x, P(x) = 14 and that all Nash equilibria are potential maximizing. /
Proof. [Proposition 3.12] Let G 2 C(F;n) be determined by ((wf(1);:::;wf(n)))f2F.
It su±ces to show that P(x) = P(y) if x is a Nash equilibrium and y a potential
maximizing strategy combination. Let x 2 NE(G) and y 2 PM(G). Facilities f 2 F
such that nf(x) = nf(y) add as much to P(x) as to P(y). Furthermore, by Lemma
3.13, if nf(x) < nf(y) and ng(y) < ng(x) for certain f;g 2 F then wf(l) = wf(nf(y)) =28 Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maximizer
wg(ng(x)) = wg(m) for all l 2 fnf(x)+1;:::;nf(y)g and m 2 fng(y)+1;:::;ng(x)g. The
total contribution of the facilities in the set ff 2 F j nf(x) 6= nf(y)g to the potentials
P(x) and P(y) is apparently the same. 2
In the last part of this section we consider strictly strong Nash equilibria. Recall that
given a game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni, a strategy pro¯le x 2 X is a strictly strong Nash equi-
librium if for all coalitions S µ N and strategy combinations yS 2
Q
i2S Xi; ui(yS;xNnS) =
ui(x) for all i 2 S or ui(yS;xNnS) < ui(x) for at least one i 2 S. The following example
illustrates that the properties of C do not guarantee the existence of strictly strong Nash
equilibria.
Example 3.17 Consider the game G 2 C(ff;gg;3) with wf;wg given by
wf = (4; 2 ;0),
wg = ( 3 ;2;1),
where the squared numbers depict a strong Nash equilibrium payo®. If the two players
choosing f agree that one of them switches to g and the other one sticks to f, the utility
will still be 2 for the switching one but increases from 2 to 4 for the remaining player.
A similar argument holds for the other type of strong Nash equilibria given by
wf = ( 4 ;2;0)
wg = (3; 2 ;1)
Since these are the only two types of strong Nash equilibria, and neither of them is
strictly strong, strictly strong Nash equilibria do not exist. /
3.5 Extensions of the model
The class C is characterized by properties (P1), (P4), and (P5). It is obvious that
relaxation of those properties will have consequences on the result presented in Section
3.4.
First of all, the classes of congestion games of Quint and Shubik (1994), Milchtaich
(1996), and Konishi et al. (1997) without (P5) not necessarily admit an exact potential.
Secondly, consider the class CP of strategic games which satisfy the properties (P1)
and (P5). Each n person game G in CP is a potential game and can be represented by
a collection of arbitrary vectors ((wf(1);:::;wf(n)))f2F 2 (I R
n)F. It is obvious that not
every game G 2 CP has a strong Nash equilibrium. For instance, the Prisoner's Dilemma
in Example 2.2 is an element of CP with F = fc;dg, wc = (4;1) and wd = (0;3), but does
not have a strong Nash equilibrium. But even the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium
for a game G 2 CP does not guarantee that each Nash equilibrium is strong too, nor that
a strong equilibrium is a potential maximizer. The next example gives a game G 2 CP
such that ; 6= SNE(G) ½ NE(G) and SNE(G) \ PM(G) = ;.Extensions of the model 29
Example 3.18 Let G 2 CP(ff;gg;3) with
wf = (4;0; 5 )
wg = (4;2;0)
The unique strong Nash equilibrium in which all three players chooses facility f is in-
dicated. By Remark 3.15, the potential can be computed as in Proposition 3.14. The
maximal potential arises at the non strong equilibria which are given by
wf = ( 4 ;0;5)
wg = (4; 2 ;0)
/
Finally, consider the class of strategic games C0 satisfying (P1'),(P4), and (P5). Similarly
to Proposition 3.11 one can show
Theorem 3.19 For every game G 2 C0, NE(G) = SNE(G).
In this class of games, however, the set of potential maximizing strategy combinations
need not coincide with the set of Nash equilibria, as can be seen in the following example.
Example 3.20 Consider the game G 2 C0(ff;g;hg;5) in which three players have strat-
egy set ff;hg and two fg;hg. The payo® vectors are
wf = (4;2; 1 ;¡;¡)
wg = ( 3 ;2;¡;¡;¡)
wh = ( 2 ;1;1;0;0)
where the squared numbers depict a Nash equilibrium payo®. It represents strategy
combinations in which the three players with strategy set ff;hg all play f. Consider
now the equilibrium in which two of those three play f and the other plays h.
wf = (4; 2 ;1;¡;¡)
wg = (3; 2 ;¡;¡;¡)
wh = ( 2 ;1;1;0;0)
The potential can be computed as in Proposition 3.14 (see Remark 3.15). For the ¯rst
type of equilibrium in this example, the potential value equals 4 + 2 + 1 + 3 + 2 = 12,
which is less than 4 + 2 + 3 + 2 + 2 = 13, the potential value associated to the second




In recent years there has been a growing e®ort in the study of speci¯c, practically rele-
vant classes of noncooperative games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Several
instances of congestion situations with pure Nash equilibria were considered in previous
chapters.
The purpose of the present chapter, based on Voorneveld, Tijs, and Mallozzi (1998), is
to describe sequential production games, a type of production games that is motivated
by production situations in practice. In a sequential production game, raw materials
are transformed into a product. The value of the product depends on the activities
performed on the raw materials and is divided equally over the production departments.
The production consists of several stages. In each stage, production departments observe
the production techniques chosen in the earlier stages and simultaneously perform some
activities on the intermediate product (or on the raw materials, if we look at the ¯rst
stage). The fact that within a stage departments simultaneously and independently
choose a production technique introduces imperfect information into the game. Since
the state of the intermediate product strongly depends on the production techniques
or activities conducted during the preceding stages, the production departments incur
set-up and production costs depending on the previous stages and | of course | on the
production strategies of the departments simultaneously performing their activities.
The model is introduced by means of a practical example, based on the processing
of rough diamonds. The use of diamond essentially falls into two categories. First of
all, properly processed diamond as loose gemstones or part of jewelry has an ornamental
function. Secondly, since diamond is the hardest naturally occurring substance, it has
an important industrial application: it forms part of cutting and sawing tools, as well as
drilling equipment, for instance in mining industry.
3132 Sequential Production Situations and Potentials
In this simpli¯ed example, production takes place in two stages and is conducted
by three departments. During the ¯rst stage, department 1 decides whether a unit of
diamond is used for ornamental or industrial purposes, strategies O and I, respectively.
In the second stage, two departments simultaneously perform an activity. In case
the unit of diamond was designated for ornamental use, it has to be faceted (cutting
°at facets over the entire surface of the stone, usually in a highly symmetrical pattern)
and polished to a mirror-like ¯nish to aid light re°ection from the surface of the stone
or refraction of light through the stone. This is done by department 2, which can use
modern equipment to do this (action M), or do the job mostly by relatively old machinery
(action O). During the faceting and polishing, department 3 takes care of cooling and
lubricating. Department 3 can decide to use high or low quality products to do this,
actions Hi and Lo, respectively.
In case the unit of diamond was designated for industrial use, the second department
pulverizes the diamond to produce diamond grit for saw blades. Using the modern action
(M) produces grit with a higher mesh (i.e., ¯ner grid, more adequate for precision work)
than the old machinery (O). During this process, department 3 takes care of removing
debris, again by choosing either high or low quality measures.
The ¯rst department operates at negligible costs. In the second stage, departments
2 and 3 incur set-up costs depending on whether processing takes places for ornamental
or industrial purposes. These set-up costs are given in Figure 4.1. Given the industrial
Purpose Set-up dept.2 Set-up dept.3
I 1 1
O 2 3
Figure 4.1: Set-up costs
or ornamental purpose decided on in the ¯rst stage and the technique (either Hi or Lo)
chosen by the third department, the operating costs of department 2 are given in Figure
4.2, with a similar speci¯cation of the production costs of department 3. Finally, Figure
Purpose, tech. Prod. costs





Purpose, tech. Prod. costs





Figure 4.2: Production costs
4.3 speci¯es the value of the end product as a function of the production techniques.
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Figure 4.4: The diamond game34 Sequential Production Situations and Potentials
departments and subtracting the costs, one obtains the extensive form game in Figure
4.4, where w.l.o.g. department 2 moves before department 3, but department 3 does
not observe the choice of department 2, thus capturing the fact that these departments
operate in the same stage and hence only observe the action taken in stage 1: histories
(I;M) and (I;O) are in one information set, just like histories (O;M) and (O;O).
For instance, if the production pro¯le is (I;M;Hi), each department receives one
third of 27. Department 1 incurs no costs, so the payo® to this department equals
9. Department 2 incurs set-up costs 1 and production costs 1, so the payo® to this
department equals 9 ¡1¡1 = 7. Similarly, department 3 has payo® 9 ¡1¡2 = 6 since
its set-up costs are 1 and its processing costs are 2.
Sequential production situations give rise to a special class of extensive form games
with imperfect information, since players at a certain stage observe the production tech-
niques chosen in previous stages, but not those of the departments in the same and later
stages. Thus, in general, the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria is not guaran-
teed. In the diamond game of Figure 4.4, however, there are several. We show that this
is no coincidence and that these games are closely related to exact potential games. A
more formal description of the model is provided in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 contains the
results. Section 4.4 concludes with remarks concerning extensions of the model.
4.2 Model
This section contains a formal description of the model. The games arising from sequen-
tial production situations are hierarchical games.
De¯nition 4.1 A hierarchical game is an extensive form game described by a tuple
H = hN = (N1;:::;Nm);(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni. Adopting a slight abuse of notation, the
¯nite player set N is an ordered partition (N1;:::;Nm). The number m 2 I N denotes
the number of stages of the game. For k 2 f1;:::;mg, Nk denotes the set of players
operating at stage k. Each player i 2 N has a ¯nite set Ai of actions containing at least
two elements and a payo® function ui :
Q
j2N Aj ! I R. The game is played in such a way
that for each stage k 2 f1;:::;mg, the players in Nk observe only the action choices of
the players in N1 [ ¢¢¢ [ Nk¡1 operating in the previous stages and then simultaneously
and independently choose an action. /
Notice that a hierarchical game is a speci¯c type of extensive form game with imperfect
information. The players in N1, operating in the ¯rst stage, make no observations prior
to simultaneously and independently choosing their action. The players in N2, operating
in the second stage, observe the actions of the players in N1 and then simultaneously and
independently choose their actions, thus having no information about the action choices
of the other players in the same stage and the players in later stages. The same reasoning
applies to later stages of the game. Strategic games are a special case, since they canModel 35
be modelled by a hierarchical game with only one stage: all players simultaneously and
independently make a strategy choice.
The players are assumed to be numbered from 1 through jNj; players with a low
number play in early stages, i.e., if i 2 Nk;j 2 Nl, and i < j, then k < = l.
The following notation is used. The predecessors Pr(i) of a player i 2 N are those
players operating at an earlier stage than i:
8k 2 f1;:::;mg;8i 2 Nk : Pr(i) := [l2f1;:::;mg;l<k Nl:
The colleagues C(i) of a player i 2 N are those players operating at the same stage as
player i:
8k 2 f1;:::;mg;8i 2 Nk : C(i) := Nk n fig:
The followers F(i) of a player i 2 N are those players operating at a later stage than
player i:
8k 2 f1;:::;mg;8i 2 Nk : F(i) := [l2f1;:::;mg;l>k Nl:
For instance, in the diamond game of Figure 4.4, the player set N = f1;2;3g is described
by the ordered partition (N1;N2) with N1 = f1g and N2 = f2;3g. Department 1 has
no predecessors, no colleagues, and followers 2 and 3. Department 2 has predecessor 1,
colleague 3, and no followers.
De¯nition 4.2 A sequential production situation is a tuple
hN = (N1;:::;Nm);(Ai)i2N;½;(ci)i2Ni;
where the set N of production departments or players is described by an ordered partition
(N1;:::;Nm). The number m 2 I N denotes the number of production stages. Each player
i 2 N has a ¯nite set Ai of production techniques (containing at least two elements).
The function ½ :
Q
i2N Ai ! I R speci¯es for each production pro¯le a = (ai)i2N 2
Q
i2N Ai
the value ½(a) of the end product. Each player i 2 N has a cost function ci denoting the
set-up and operating costs of this player. This cost function depends on the predecessors
(set-up) and colleagues (operating) (if any), i.e.,
8i 2 N : ci :
Q
j2Pr(i)[C(i) Aj ! I R:
Production takes place in such a way that for each stage k 2 f1;:::;mg, the players in
Nk observe only the production techniques of the players in N1 [ ¢¢¢ [ Nk¡1 operating
in the previous stages and then simultaneously and independently choose a production
technique. /
Remark 4.3 The de¯nition of ci for players i 2 N1 in the ¯rst stage deserves special
attention. In this case, the set of predecessors Pr(i) of i is empty by de¯nition, so ci is a
function only of i's colleagues. If this set also happens to be empty, i.e., if there is only
one department i in the ¯rst stage, we allow ci 2 I R to be an arbitrary constant. /36 Sequential Production Situations and Potentials
Remark 4.4 Two main assumptions underlie the production process captured by a
sequential production situation. In this remark, some motivation for these assumptions
is provided.
² The ¯rst assumption is that the departments within a production stage indepen-
dently and simultaneously choose a production technique. Many modern ¯rms
are decentralized: departments act as autonomous units with their own decision
power. In such environments this assumption seems reasonable.
² The second assumption is that the production costs of a production department do
not depend on its own technique. This is equivalent with stating that a production
department has ¯xed costs given the state of the intermediate product and the
production techniques of the colleagues.
/
Given a sequential production situation and assuming for now that the value of the
end product is split equally over the departments or players (for a relaxation of this
assumption, see Section 4), one can easily de¯ne its associated hierarchical game.
De¯nition 4.5 Let hN = (N1;:::;Nm);(Ai)i2N;½;(ci)i2Ni be a sequential production
situation. The associated sequential production game is the hierarchical game hN =








jNj½(a) ¡ ci if i 2 N1 and C(i) = ;
1
jNj½(a) ¡ ci((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i)) otherwise
That is, the payo® to a production department is an equal share of the value of the end
product minus the costs it incurs. /
Let H = hN = (N1;:::;Nm);(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a hierarchical game. The normal-
ization of H is de¯ned | in the usual way | to be the strategic game N(H) =
hN;(Si)i2N;(Ui)i2Ni, where the strategy space Si of player i 2 N prescribes an ac-
tion choice in every contingency that a player may be called upon to act and the payo®
function associates to each strategy pro¯le the payo® in the outcome of the hierarchical





Ai if i 2 N1;
f¾i j ¾i :
Q
j2Pr(i) Aj ! Aig if i 2 Nk;k > = 2:









¾i 2 Ai if i 2 N1;
¾i((rj(¾))j2Pr(i)) if i 2 Nk;k > = 2:Results 37
Player i's payo® function Ui assigns to every strategy pro¯le ¾ = (¾i)i2N 2
Q
i2N Si the
payo® associated with the outcome realized by ¾: Ui(¾) = ui(r(¾)).
For instance, in the strategic game corresponding to the diamond game of Figure
4.4, player 1 has two strategies: S1 = A1 = fI;Og. Player 2 has 4 strategies: S2 =
f(M;M);(M;O);(O;O);(O;M)g, where the ¯rst coordinate speci¯es the action choice
if player 1 chose I and the second coordinate speci¯es the action choice if player 1 chose O.
Similarly, the strategy space of player 3 equals f(Hi;Hi);(Hi;Lo);(Lo;Lo);(Lo;Hi)g.
The strategic game is given in Figure 4.5.
(Hi;Hi) (Hi;Lo) (Lo;Hi) (Lo;Lo)
(M;M) 9,7,6 9,7,6 5,3,2 5,3,2
(M;O) 9,7,6 9,7,6 5,3,2 5,3,2
(O;M) 9,7,7 9,7,7 4,2,2 4,2,2
(O;O) 9,7,7 9,7,7 4,2,2 4,2,2
Department 1 plays I
(Hi;Hi) (Hi;Lo) (Lo;Hi) (Lo;Lo)
(M;M) 7,3,3 6,1,2 7,3,3 6,1,2
(M;O) 10,6,4 6,1,0 10,6,4 6,1,0
(O;M) 7,3,3 6,1,2 7,3,3 6,1,2
(O;O) 10,6,4 6,1,0 10,6,4 6,1,0
Department 1 plays O
Figure 4.5: The normalization of the diamond game
Some matters of notation. In the normalization of a hierarchical game, the strategy
\always choose ai" is denoted ai. Furthermore, conventional game theoretic notation is
used. For instance, S :=
Q
j2N Sj denotes the set of strategy pro¯les for all players in N,
S¡i :=
Q
j2Nnfig Sj denotes the set of strategy pro¯les of i's opponents. Similar notation
is adopted for elements of these sets: ¾ 2 S;¾¡i 2 S¡i, and for pro¯les of actions, rather
than strategies.
4.3 Results
In this section the sequential production games are related to exact potential games
introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996). Hierarchical potential games are de¯ned
and, analogous to the isomorphism between congestion games µ a la Rosenthal (1973) and
exact potential games (see Theorem 2.17), it is shown that not only every sequential
production game is a hierarchical potential game, but conversely, every hierarchical po-
tential game can be seen as a well-chosen sequential production game. This result has an38 Sequential Production Situations and Potentials
important implication: sequential production games have pure-strategy equilibria. So-
called potential-maximizing strategies, introduced in Monderer and Shapley (1996) and
studied in more detail by Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996), form an interesting equilibrium
re¯nement and are studied for this class of games.
First, recall the de¯nition of exact potential games:
De¯nition 4.6 A strategic game G = hN;(Si)i2N;(Ui)i2Ni is an exact potential game
if there exists a function P :
Q
i2N Si ! I R such that for each player i 2 N, each pro¯le
¾¡i 2
Q
j2Nnfig Sj of strategies of the opponents, and each pair of strategies ¾i;¿i 2 Si of
player i:
Ui(¾i;¾¡i) ¡ Ui(¿i;¾¡i) = P(¾i;¾¡i) ¡ P(¿i;¾¡i);
i.e., if the change in the payo® to a unilaterally deviating player is equal to the change
in the value of the function P. P is called an (exact) potential of the game. /
It is easy to see that the set of Nash equilibria of the game G coincides with the set
of Nash equilibria of the game hN;(Si)i2N;(P)i2Ni with all payo® functions replaced by
the potential function P. Finite exact potential games consequently have pure-strategy
Nash equilibria: the potential P achieves a maximum over the ¯nite set
Q
i2N Si, which
is easily seen to be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (Proposition 2.4).
Theorem 2.6 showed that a game is an exact potential game if and only if there exists
a real-valued function P on the strategy space such that for each player i, the di®erence
between his payo® and the function P does not depend on the strategy choice of player
i himself. That is, an exact potential game can be seen as the `sum' of a coordination
game, in which the payo® to all players is given by the function P, and a dummy game,
in which the payo® to a player is independent of his own strategy choice. This result is
used later, so we summarize it in a lemma.
Lemma 4.7 A strategic game G = hN;(Si)i2N;(Ui)i2Ni is an exact potential game if
and only if there exists a function P :
Q
i2N Si ! I R and for each player i 2 N a function
Di :
Q
j2Nnfig Sj ! I R such that
8i 2 N;8¾ 2
Y
j2N
Sj : Ui(¾) ¡ P(¾) = Di(¾¡i):
The function P in Lemma 4.7 is easily seen to be an exact potential of the game.
If the normalization of a hierarchical game is a potential game, then the potential
depends on the realized outcome, but not on the strategies leading to this outcome:
Lemma 4.8 Let H be a hierarchical game. If its normalization N(H) is an exact poten-
tial game with potential function P, and ¾;¿ are strategy pro¯les such that r(¾) = r(¿),
then P(¾) = P(¿).
Proof. If r(¾) = r(¿) = (aj)j2N, then ¾i = ¿i for all i 2 N1 and for players i 2 Nk;k > = 2,
¾i and ¿i di®er only in their behavior o® the play path (aj)j2N. Thus, the payo® inResults 39
N(H) to deviating players along the path from ¾ = (¾1;:::;¾n) to (¿1;¾2;:::;¾n) to ...
to (¿1;:::;¿n¡1;¾n) to ¿ = (¿1;:::;¿n) does not change. Hence P(¾) = P(¿). 2
De¯nition 4.9 A hierarchical game H = hN = (N1;:::;Nm);(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is called
a hierarchical potential game if there exist functions p :
Q
j2N Aj ! I R and (di)i2N with
8i 2 N : di :
Y
j2Pr(i)[C(i)
Aj ! I R;
or di 2 I R if i 2 N1 and C(i) = ; (Analogous to Remark 4.3.), such that for each player







p(a) + di if i 2 N1 and C(i) = ;;
p(a) + di((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i)) otherwise.
The function p is called a potential for H. /
The reason for this de¯nition is the following:
Theorem 4.10 A hierarchical game H = hN = (N1;:::;Nm);(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is a
hierarchical potential game if and only if its normalization N(H) = hN;(Si)i2N;(Ui)i2Ni
is an exact potential game.
Proof. If H is a hierarchical potential game with p;(di)i2N as in De¯nition 4.9, then by
de¯nition of the normalized game one has that for each ¾ 2
Q
i2N Si:
Ui(¾) = ui(r(¾)) = p(r(¾)) + di((rj(¾))j2Pr(i)[C(i)):
Lemma 4.7 implies that N(H) is an exact potential game.
To prove the converse, assume N(H) is an exact potential game with potential P.
We have to show the existence of functions p and (di)i2N as in De¯nition 4.9. For each
a 2
Q
i2N Ai, recall that ai 2 Si is the strategy in which player i always chooses ai.
Denote a = (ai)i2N. De¯ne p(a) = P(a). The de¯nition of the functions (di)i2N is split
up into two cases.
Case 1: i 2 Nm. Lemma 4.7 implies the existence of a function Di :
Q
j2Nnfig Sj ! I R
such that Ui(¾) = P(¾) + Di(¾¡i) for each ¾ 2
Q
j2N Sj. De¯ne for each a¡i 2 A¡i:
di(a¡i) = Di(a¡i). Then, for each a 2
Q
j2N Aj, ui(a) = Ui(a) = P(a) + Di(a¡i) =
p(a) + di(a¡i) = p(a) + di((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i)).
Case 2: i 2 Nk;k < m. To prove the existence of di as in De¯nition 4.9, it su±ces
to show that ui ¡ p does not depend on the actions chosen by player i himself and i's
followers, since we can then take di equal to this di®erence. Formally, it is shown that
for all a 2 A and (bj)j2F(i)[fig 2
Q
j2F(i)[fig Aj:
ui(a) ¡ p(a) = ui((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);(bj)j2F(i)[fig) ¡ p((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);(bj)j2F(i)[fig): (4.1)40 Sequential Production Situations and Potentials
Let a 2 A and (bj)j2F(i)[fig 2
Q
j2F(i)[fig Aj.
Case 2A: Suppose ai 6= bi. De¯ne
² ¾i = ai and ¿i = bi,
² for each player j 2 Pr(i) [ C(i) : ¾j = aj,
² for j 2 F(i), let ¾j be the strategy that always chooses bj, unless the history is
(ak)k2Pr(j), in which case j chooses aj.
Notice that r(¾i;¾¡i) = a;r(¿i;¾¡i) = ((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);(bj)j2F(i)[fig). By Lemma 4.7:
Ui(¾) ¡ P(¾) = Ui(¿i;¾¡i) ¡ P(¿i;¾¡i). By Lemma 4.8: P(´) = P(¿) if r(´) = r(¿).
Hence
ui(a) ¡ p(a) = ui(r(¾i;¾¡i)) ¡ p(r(¾i;¾¡i))
= Ui(¾i;¾¡i) ¡ P(a)
= Ui(¾i;¾¡i) ¡ P(¾i;¾¡i)
= Ui(¿i;¾¡i) ¡ P(¿i;¾¡i)
= Ui(¿i;¾¡i) ¡ P((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);(bj)j2F(i)[fig)
= ui(r(¿i;¾¡i)) ¡ p((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);(bj)j2F(i)[fig)
= ui((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);(bj)j2F(i)[fig) ¡ p((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);(bj)j2F(i)[fig)
which proves that (4.1) holds if bi 6= ai.
Case 2B: Suppose ai = bi. By assumption (cf. De¯nition 4.1), Ai contains at least two
elements. Let ci 2 Ai with ci 6= ai. Applying the result of case 2A twice yields:
ui(a) ¡ p(a) = ui((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);ci;(bj)j2F(i)) ¡ p((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);ci;(bj)j2F(i))
= ui((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);bi;(bj)j2F(i)) ¡ p((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);bi;(bj)j2F(i))
= ui((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);(bj)j2F(i)[fig) ¡ p((aj)j2Pr(i)[C(i);(bj)j2F(i)[fig);
which proves that (4.1) holds if bi = ai. 2Results 41
The assumption in De¯nition 4.1 that each player i 2 N has an action set Ai containing
at least two elements is relatively innocent: players having to make a choice from a
singleton set of options are not extremely interesting. Notice, however, that in the proof
above we explicitly made use of this assumption. In fact, the following example shows
that the `if'-part of Theorem 4.10 breaks down if some of the players have only one action.
Example 4.11 Consider the extensive form game in Figure 4.6 where player 1 has
only one action S and player 2 in the next stage chooses either L or R. Payo®s are
u1(S;L) = 2;u1(S;R) = 1;u2(S;L) = u2(S;R) = 0. Its normalization is clearly an exact
potential game. But p : fSg £ fL;Rg ! I R;d1 2 I R, and d2 : fSg ! I R as in De¯nition
4.9 would have to satisfy the following inconsistent system of linear equations:
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
u1(S;L) = p(S;L) + d1
u1(S;R) = p(S;R) + d1
u2(S;L) = p(S;L) + d2(S)
u2(S;R) = p(S;R) + d2(S)
The last two equations imply that p has to be a constant function. But then u1 ¡ p
depends on the action choice of player 2. In hierarchical potential games, the di®erence
between the payo® function and a potential was assumed to be independent of the action
choices of followers. /
The following theorem relates hierarchical games and sequential production games.
Theorem 4.12 Every sequential production game is a hierarchical potential game. For
every hierarchical potential game there is a sequential production situation that induces
this game.




di = ¡ci for each i 2 N:
Conversely, consider a hierarchical potential game hN = (N1;:::;Nm);(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni
with p and (di)i2N as in De¯nition 4.9. Then the sequential production situation hN =
(N1;:::;Nm);(Ai)i2N;½;(ci)i2Ni with
½ = jNjp;


























Figure 4.6: Player 1 has only one action
induces exactly the same game. 2
Notice that a potential of a sequential production game equals the value function ½
divided by the number of players.
After de¯ning hierarchical games we observed that every ¯nite strategic game can be
seen an a hierarchical game with only one stage. The theorem above establishes that
every exact potential game is essentially a hierarchical potential game or a sequential
production game.
It follows from the remark after the de¯nition of potential games that every hier-
archical potential game and thus every sequential production game has a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium. One can even extend this result to subgame-perfect equilibria, as is
done below.
Subgames of imperfect information games are de¯ned as usual. In hierarchical games,
this implies that the game itself is a subgame, and that for each number k of stages,
each pro¯le of actions of the players in the ¯rst k stages induces a subgame. Formally,
De¯nition 4.13 Let H = hN = (N1;:::;Nm);(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a hierarchical game.
Then H itself is a subgame and, moreover, for each k 2 f1;:::;m ¡ 1g and each pro¯le
or history h = (ai)i2N1[:::[Nk 2
Q
i2N1[:::[Nk Ai, the subgame H(h) is the hierarchical
game hN(h) = (Nk+1;:::;Nm);(Ai)i2N(h);(~ ui)i2N(h)i with ~ ui(¢) = ui(h;¢) for each player
i 2 N(h). /
For instance, the subgame H(I) that arises if department 1 chooses action I in theResults 43
diamond game is given in Figure 4.7. Realize that since the remaining departments both
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Figure 4.7: The subgame H(I) of the diamond game
Corollary 4.14 Every subgame of a hierarchical potential game is a hierarchical poten-
tial game.
This corollary can be proven either directly, using De¯nition 4.9, or indirectly, using
Theorem 4.10. The details are left to the reader. Notice that if p is a potential of the
hierarchical game H, then for each subgame H(h), the function ~ p with ~ p(¢) = p(h;¢) is
a potential for the subgame H(h).
Recall that a strategy pro¯le ¾ in the normalized game N(H) is a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium if it induces a Nash equilibrium in each subgame, i.e., if behavior outside
the play path is also credible. For instance, (O;(O;O);(Hi;Hi)) is a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium of the diamond game, but (O;(M;O);(Lo;Hi)) is not, since in the
subgame H(I) of Figure 4.7 player 3 would rather play Hi than Lo.
Potential-maximizing strategies form a re¯nement of the Nash equilibrium concept
in strategic games with a potential. This re¯nement was introduced by Monderer and
Shapley (1996). It was studied axiomatically in Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) and
used in Voorneveld (1997) to derive equilibrium existence results in in¯nite games. In
hierarchical potential games H the notion of potential maximizing strategies can be44 Sequential Production Situations and Potentials
extended to subgame potential-maximizing strategies, being those strategy pro¯les ¾ in
the normalization N(H) that select actions maximizing the potential in every subgame.
Corollary 4.14 guarantees that subgame potential-maximizers are well-de¯ned.
The next theorem establishes one of the main results of this chapter: hierarchical
potential games, and in particular sequential production games, have subgame perfect
Nash equilibria in pure strategies, despite the presence of imperfect information.
Theorem 4.15 Let H be a hierarchical potential game and N(H) its normalization.
² N(H) has a subgame potential maximizing strategy pro¯le in pure strategies;
² each such pure-strategy subgame potential-maximizing pro¯le is a pure-strategy
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium;
² not every pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is a pure-strategy subgame
potential maximizer.
Proof. The proof of the ¯rst claim proceeds by induction on the number of stages of the
game and closely mimics the existence proof of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in standard
perfect information games. It is therefore left to the reader.
Strategies maximizing the potential of a subgame are easily seen to be Nash equilib-
rium strategies for the subgame by using De¯nition 4.9: the only di®erence between ui
and the potential p is a function di not depending on the choices of player i. This proves
the second claim.
The ¯nal claim already follows from the insights in potential games in strategic form.
Consider the single stage hierarchical potential game H with player set N = N1 = f1;2g,
action sets A1 = A2 = f®;¯g, potential p : A1 £ A2 ! I R with p(®;®) = 2;p(®;¯) =
p(¯;®) = 0;p(¯;¯) = 1 and with d1 : A2 ! I R and d2 : A1 ! I R equal to the zero




Figure 4.8: (¯;¯) subgame perfect, not potential maximizing.
a pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (there is only one subgame, namely
the game itself), but not potential maximizing. 2
In the diamond game of Figure 4.4, the pure strategy subgame potential maximizers
are (O;(M;O);(Hi;Hi)) and (O;(O;O);(Hi;Hi)). The pro¯le (O;(M;O);(Lo;Hi)) is
potential maximizing, but does not select a potential maximizing outcome in the subgame
H(I).Conclusions and extensions of the model 45
4.4 Conclusions and extensions of the model
Practical situations can sometimes be studied using game theoretic tools. The topic of
this chapter has been the study of an important type of production problems in which
production takes place in several stages. These problems were modeled as sequential
production games, a speci¯c class of extensive form games with imperfect information.
These games were related to potential games. In fact, it was shown that the class of
sequential production games coincides with the class of hierarchical potential games (cf.
Theorem 4.12).
Firms seeking the help from game theorists want clear-cut recommendations. Exten-
sive form games with incomplete information typically do not have pure-strategy equilib-
ria, which makes it hard to provide such easily adoptable recommendations. A signi¯cant
feature of sequential production games is the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria. Using subgame potential-maximizing pro¯les, we were able to identify
a subset of these equilibria.
In De¯nition 4.5, payo®s to departments in a sequential production game were de-
termined by giving each department an equal share of the value of the end product and
then subtracting the costs. A possible extension of the model is to consider unequal divi-
sion of the value over the departments. Introduce a vector (wi)i2N of weights satisfying
wi > = 0 for each department i and such that
P
i2N wi = 1. The payo® functions ui in
De¯nition 4.5 can then be changed to ui = wi½ ¡ ci.
Such unequal splitting of the value of the end product might be reasonable in the
following sequential production situation. Students of a graduate school, the `raw mate-
rials', receive an education in three `production stages': there are preliminary or refresher
courses in the ¯rst stage, the core courses in the second stage, and specialized courses
in the third stage. The value of the `end product', the PhD student successfully ¯nish-
ing the three stages, is usually considered to be the result of the specialized, advanced
courses, to a lesser degree of the core courses, and hardly of the preliminary and refresher
courses. In this teaching example, it appears reasonable to measure the contribution to
the end product in such a way that a larger weight is assigned to lecturers teaching more
advanced material.
Making the necessary modi¯cations, the main results of this chapter still hold for
sequential production games with unequal splitting of the value over the production
departments. In particular, pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria still exist.
The class of games generated in this way is closely related to weighted potential
games, a class of ordinal potential games introduced in Monderer and Shapley (1996).
Ordinal potential games were characterized in Voorneveld and Norde (1997). For another
practical class of ordinal potential games, refer to Voorneveld, Koster, and Reijnierse
(1998), Chapter 6 in this thesis, who consider schemes to ¯nance public goods in a
voluntary contribution game.46 Sequential Production Situations and PotentialsChapter 5
Ordinal Potential Games
5.1 Introduction
Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduced several classes of potential games. Exact po-
tential games were studied in the previous three chapters. As an example of an exact
potential game, consider the two-person game with its exact potential function in Figure







Figure 5.1: An exact potential game
changes in payo® to deviating players along a cycle sum to zero, where a cycle in the
strategy space is a closed sequence of strategy combinations in which players unilaterally
deviate from one point to the next. Exact potential games are therefore extremely sen-
sitive to small changes in the payo® functions: the slightest perturbation of payo®s can
make this cycle property break down. In the next chapters we therefore look at more
general classes of potential games in which not the precise change in payo® to a unilat-
erally deviating player matters, but rather the direction of the change in payo®. This









Figure 5.2: An ordinal potential game
an ordinal potential game. It is obtained from Figure 5.1 by changing u1(T;R) from ¡1
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to 0. Consider the function in Figure 5.2b and notice that the sign of the change in the
payo® to a unilaterally deviating player exactly matches the sign of the corresponding
change in this function. For instance, if the second player deviates from (T;L) to (T;R),
his payo® increases, just like the function in Figure 5.2b. Since deviating from (T;R)
to (B;R) does not change player 1's payo®, the value of the function remains the same.
For this reason, the function in Figure 5.2b is called an ordinal potential of the game.
Monderer and Shapley do not give a characterization of ordinal potential games. The
class of ¯nite ordinal potential games was characterized in Voorneveld (1996) through
the absence of weak improvement cycles, i.e., cycles along which a unilaterally deviating
player never incurs a lower payo® and at least one such player increases his payo®. The
necessity of this condition is immediate, since a potential function would never decrease
along a weak improvement cycle, but increases at least once. This gives a contradiction,
because a cycle ends up where it started. Proving su±ciency is harder. In this chapter,
a modi¯ed version of Voorneveld and Norde (1997), the general class of ordinal potential
games is characterized. It turns out that countable ordinal potential games are still
characterized by the absence of weak improvement cycles, but that for uncountable
ordinal potential games an additional order condition on the strategy space is required.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: In Section 5.2 ordinal potential games
are de¯ned; some of its properties are studied. In Section 5.3 we provide a full char-
acterization of ordinal potential games. In Section 5.4 we indicate that the absence of
weak improvement cycles characterizes ordinal potential games with a countable strat-
egy space, but not necessarily ordinal potential games in which the strategy space is
uncountable.
5.2 Ordinal potential games
In this section we de¯ne ordinal potential games and study some of its properties.
De¯nition 5.1 A strategic game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is an ordinal potential game
if there exists a function P : X ! I R such that
8i 2 N;8x¡i 2 X¡i;8xi;yi 2 Xi : ui(xi;x¡i) > ui(yi;x¡i) , P(xi;x¡i) > P(yi;x¡i):
The function P is called an (ordinal) potential of the game G. /
In other words, if P is an ordinal potential function for G, the sign of the change in
payo® to a unilaterally deviating player matches the sign of the change in the value of
P.
Again, it is easy to see that strategy pro¯les maximizing an ordinal potential function
of the game yield Nash equilibria and that | as a consequence | ¯nite ordinal potential
games have pure Nash equilibria. As opposed to exact potential games, however, the
strategy pro¯les that maximize an ordinal potential function do depend on the particularOrdinal potential games 49
potential function that is chosen. Consider for instance the two-player game in Figure




Figure 5.3: Potential maximizers
as a potential, (B;R) is the potential maximizing strategy, if u2 is chosen, it is (T;L).
Notice that every order-preserving transformation of an ordinal potential function is
again an ordinal potential function of the game.
The set of exact potential games, given a ¯xed set of players and strategy space, was
seen to be a vector space. The set of ordinal potential games is not as well-behaved.













Figure 5.4: Set of ordinal potential games: not closed under addition
potential game with potential P(T;L) = 0;P(T;R) = 3;P(B;L) = 1;P(B;R) = 2. The
game in Figure 5.4b is an ordinal potential game with potential Q(T;L) = 3;P(T;R) =
2;P(B;L) = 0;P(B;R) = 1. The sum of these games is the game in Figure 5.4c,
which is not an ordinal potential game. Suppose it had an ordinal potential function U.
Then it would have to satisfy U(T;L) > U(T;R) > U(B;R) > U(B;L) > U(T;L), a
contradiction.
A subset of the set of ordinal potential games is the set of weighted potential games.
De¯nition 5.2 A strategic game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is a weighted potential game
if there exists a function P : X ! I R and a vector (wi)i2N of positive numbers such that
8i 2 N;8x¡i 2 X¡i;8xi;yi 2 Xi : ui(xi;x¡i) ¡ ui(yi;x¡i) = wi[P(xi;x¡i) ¡ P(yi;x¡i)]:
The function P is called a (weighted) potential of the game G. /
Without going into details, it is not di±cult to see that weighted potential games | like
exact potential games | can be decomposed into a dummy game and a coordination-type
game.
Proposition 5.3 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a strategic game. G is a weighted
potential game if and only if there exist positive numbers (wi)i2N, functions (ci)i2N and
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² ui = wici + di for all i 2 N,
² hN;(Xi)i2N;(ci)i2Ni is a coordination game, and
² hN;(Xi)i2N;(di)i2Ni is a dummy game.
5.3 Characterization of ordinal potential games
This section contains a characterization of ordinal potential games. Similar to Theorem
2.11, it is shown that a particular requirement on cycles in the strategy space plays a
central role.
Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a strategic game. Recall that a path in the strategy
space X is a sequence (x1;x2;:::) of elements xk 2 X such that for all k = 1;2;::: the
strategy combinations xk and xk+1 di®er in exactly one, say the i(k)-th, coordinate. A
path is non-deteriorating if ui(k)(xk) < = ui(k)(xk+1) for all k = 1;2;:::. Non-deteriorating
paths have restrictions only on consecutive strategy pro¯les, so by de¯nition the trivial
path (x1) consisting of a single strategy pro¯le x1 2 X is non-deteriorating. A ¯nite
path (x1;:::;xm) is called a weak improvement cycle if it is non-deteriorating, x1 = xm,
and ui(k)(xk) < ui(k)(xk+1) for some k 2 f1;:::;m ¡ 1g.
De¯ne a binary relation ¢ on the strategy space X as follows: x ¢ y if there exists
a non-deteriorating path from x to y. Notice that x ¢ x for each x 2 X, since (x) is a
non-deteriorating path from x to x. The binary relation ¼ on X is de¯ned by x ¼ y if
x ¢ y and y ¢ x.
By checking re°exivity, symmetry, and transitivity, one sees that the binary relation
¼ is an equivalence relation. Denote the equivalence class of x 2 X with respect to ¼
by [x], i.e., [x] = fy 2 X j y ¼ xg, and de¯ne a binary relation Á on the set X¼ of
equivalence classes as follows: [x] Á [y] if [x] 6= [y] and x¢y. To show that this relation
is well-de¯ned, observe that the choice of representatives in the equivalence classes is of
no concern:
8x; ~ x;y; ~ y 2 X with x ¼ ~ x and y ¼ ~ y : x ¢ y , ~ x ¢ ~ y:
Notice, moreover, that the relation Á on X¼ is irre°exive and transitive. The equivalence
relation ¼ plays an important role in the characterization of ordinal potential games.
A tuple (A;Á) consisting of a set A and an irre°exive and transitive binary relation
Á is properly ordered if there exists a function F : A ! I R that preserves the order Á:
8x;y 2 A : x Á y ) F(x) < F(y):
Properly ordered sets are a key topic of study in utility theory. Not every tuple (A;Á)
with Á irre°exive and transitive is properly ordered. A familiar example is the lexico-
graphic order on I R
2. See, e.g., Fishburn (1979) for more details. However, if the set A
is countable, i.e. if A is ¯nite or if there exists a bijection between A and I N, then (A;Á)
is properly ordered. The proof of this lemma is based on Bridges (1983).Characterization of ordinal potential games 51
Lemma 5.4 Let A be a countable set and Á a binary relation on A that is irre°exive
and transitive. Then (A;Á) is properly ordered.
Proof. Since A is countable, we can label its elements and write A = fx1;x2;:::g. Let
¿ denote the transitive closure of Á, i.e., x ¿ y i® there exist ¯nitely many (at least
two) elements y1;:::;yn of A such that y1 = x;yn = y and y1 Á ::: Á yn.
For each x 2 A, let S(x) = fn 2 I N j xn ¿ xg and de¯ne F(x) =
P
n2S(x) 2¡n. To
see that F preserves the order Á, let x;y 2 A;x Á y. Then S(x) µ S(y). Moreover,
x 2 S(y), but x = 2 S(x) since Á is irre°exive and transitive, ruling out the possibility
that x ¿ x. So S(x) ½ S(y), which implies F(x) < F(y). 2
Example 5.10 in Section 5.4 provides a game in which (X¼;Á) is not properly ordered. A
su±cient condition for an uncountable set (A;Á) to be properly ordered is the existence
of a countable subset B of A such that if x Á z;x 62 B;z 62 B, there exists a y 2 B such
that x Á y;y Á z. Such a set B is Á-order dense in A.
Lemma 5.5 Let A be a set and Á a binary relation on A that is irre°exive and transitive.
If there exists a countable subset of A that is Á-order dense in A, then (A;Á) is properly
ordered.
Proof. This is a corollary of Theorem 3.2 in Fishburn (1979). 2
The following theorem characterizes ordinal potential games.
Theorem 5.6 A strategic game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is an ordinal potential game
if and only if the following two conditions are satis¯ed:
1. X contains no weak improvement cycles;
2. (X¼;Á) is properly ordered.
Proof.
()): Assume P is an ordinal potential for G. Suppose that (x1;:::;xm) is a weak
improvement cycle. By de¯nition, ui(k)(xk) < = ui(k)(xk+1) for all k 2 f1;:::;m¡1g with
strict inequality for at least one such k. But then P(xk) < = P(xk+1) for all and strict
inequality for at least one k 2 f1;:::;m ¡ 1g, implying P(x1) < P(xm) = P(x1), a
contradiction. So X contains no weak improvement cycles.
De¯ne F : X¼ ! I R by taking for all [x] 2 X¼ : F([x]) = P(x). To see that F is
well-de¯ned, let y;z 2 [x]. Since y ¼ z there is a non-deteriorating path from y to z
and vice versa. But since the game has no weak improvement cycles, all changes in the
payo® to the deviating players along these paths must be zero: P(y) = P(z).
Now take [x];[y] 2 X¼ with [x] Á [y]. Since x ¢ y, there is a non-deteriorating
path from x to y, so P(x) < = P(y). Moreover, since x and y are in di®erent equivalence
classes, some player must have gained from deviating along this path: P(x) < P(y).
Hence F([x]) < F([y]).52 Ordinal Potential Games
((): Assume that the two conditions hold. Since (X¼;Á) is properly ordered, there
exists a function F : X¼ ! I R that preserves the order Á. De¯ne P : X ! I R by
P(x) = F([x]) for all x 2 X. Let i 2 N, x¡i 2 X¡i, and xi;yi 2 Xi.
² If ui(xi;x¡i)¡ui(yi;x¡i) > 0, then (yi;x¡i)¢(xi;x¡i), and by the absence of weak
improvement cycles: not (xi;x¡i) ¢ (yi;x¡i). Hence [(yi;x¡i)] Á [(xi;x¡i)], which
implies P(xi;x¡i) ¡ P(yi;x¡i) = F([(xi;x¡i)]) ¡ F([(yi;x¡i)]) > 0.
² If P(xi;x¡i)¡P(yi;x¡i) > 0, then [(xi;x¡i)] 6= [(yi;x¡i)], so ui(xi;x¡i) 6= ui(yi;x¡i).
If ui(xi;x¡i) < ui(yi;x¡i), then (xi;x¡i)¢(yi;x¡i), and hence [(xi;x¡i)] Á [(yi;x¡i)].
But then P(xi;x¡i) ¡ P(yi;x¡i) = F([(xi;x¡i)]) ¡ F([(yi;x¡i)]) < 0, a contradic-
tion. Hence ui(xi;x¡i) ¡ ui(yi;x¡i) > 0.
Conclude that P is an ordinal potential for the game G. 2
The ¯rst condition in Theorem 5.6 involving cycles closely resembles the characterization
of exact potential games in Theorem 2.11: a strategic game is an exact potential game
if and only if the payo® changes to deviating players along a cycle sum to zero. In
fact, in exact potential games it su±ces to look at cycles involving only four deviations.
The next example indicates that the absence of weak improvement cycles involving four
deviations only is not su±cient to characterize ordinal potential games.
Example 5.7 Suppose P is an ordinal potential of the game below. Then P has to
satisfy: P(T;L) > P(T;R) = P(M;R) = P(M;M) = P(B;M) = P(B;L) = P(T;L),
which is clearly impossible: this is not an ordinal potential game. Finiteness of the
strategy space and Lemma 5.4 imply that the order condition is satis¯ed. Moreover,
there exist no weak improvement cycles involving exactly four deviations. /
L M R
T 0,1 1,2 0,0
M 1,1 0,0 0,0
B 0,0 0,0 1,1
5.4 Countable and uncountable games
Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 give su±cient conditions for (X¼;Á) to be properly ordered. A
consequence of Lemma 5.4 is that a game G with a countable strategy space X is an
ordinal potential game if and only if it contains no weak improvement cycles. The
strategy space X is countable if the set N of players is ¯nite and every player i 2 N has
a countable set Xi of strategies.
Theorem 5.8 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a strategic game. If X is countable, then
G is an ordinal potential game if and only if X contains no weak improvement cycles.Countable and uncountable games 53
Proof. If X is countable, X¼ is countable. According to Lemma 5.4, (X¼;Á) is properly
ordered, so the result now follows from Theorem 5.6. 2
Theorem 5.8 generalizes the analogous result from Voorneveld (1996) for ¯nite games.
A consequence of Lemma 5.5 is that if (X¼;Á) contains a countable Á-order dense
subset, then the absence of weak improvement cycles is once again enough to characterize
ordinal potential games.
Theorem 5.9 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a strategic game. If (X¼;Á) contains
a countable Á-order dense subset, then G is an ordinal potential game if and only if X
contains no weak improvement cycles.
Proof. By Lemma 5.5, (X¼;Á) is properly ordered. The result follows from Theorem
5.6. 2
This section is concluded with two examples of games with uncountable strategy spaces.
The ¯rst is an example of a game in which no weak improvement cycles exist, but which
is not an ordinal potential game since (X¼;Á) is not properly ordered. The second
example is the only example in this thesis of a game with an in¯nite number of players;
it shows that a Prisoner's Dilemma game with countably many players is an ordinal
potential game.






x if y 2 Q
¡x if y 62 Q
and u2(x;y) = y for all (x;y) 2 f0;1g £ I R.
This game has no weak improvement cycles, since every weak improvement cycle
trivially has to include deviations by at least two players. But if the second player
deviates once and improves his payo®, he has to return to his initial strategy eventually,
thereby reducing his payo®.
This game nevertheless is not an ordinal potential game. Suppose, to the contrary,
that P is an ordinal potential for G. We show that this implies the existence of an injec-
tive function f from the uncountable set I R n Q to the countable set Q, a contradiction.
For each y 2 I R n Q, u1(0;y) = 0 > ¡1 = u1(1;y), so P(0;y) > P(1;y). Fix
f(y) 2 [P(1;y);P(0;y)] \ Q. In order to show that f : I R n Q ! Q is injective, let














Since f(x) 2 [P(1;x);P(0;x)] and f(z) 2 [P(1;z);P(0;z)], it follows that f(x) < f(z).
So f is injective, a contradiction. /54 Ordinal Potential Games
Finally, as an example of an ordinal potential game with an uncountable strategy space,
let us extend the Prisoner's Dilemma of Example 2.2 to a possibly in¯nite but countable
number of players. Consider a game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni, where
² N µ I N;
² 8i 2 N : Xi = f0;1g;
² 1 is a dominant strategy for every player:
8i 2 N;8x¡i 2 X¡i : ui(1;x¡i) > ui(0;x¡i);
² Every player is better o® in (0;:::;0) where all players choose the 0 strategy than
in the Nash equilibrium (1;:::;1) where all players choose the 1 strategy:
8i 2 N : ui(0;:::;0) > ui(1;:::;1):
If N µ I N is in¯nite, f0;1gN is not countable. Yet, this game is an ordinal potential
game | a result that is implicit in Basu (1994).
Proposition 5.11 The game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni as described above is an ordinal
potential game.






Let i 2 N;x¡i 2 X¡i. Then ui(1;x¡i) > ui(0;x¡i) by de¯nition. Also P(1;x¡i) ¡
P(0;x¡i) = 2¡i > 0. Hence P is an ordinal potential for G. 2Chapter 6
Voluntary Contribution to Multiple
Facilities; A Class of Ordinal
Potential Games
6.1 Introduction
The object of this chapter, which is based on Voorneveld, Koster, and Reijnierse (1998),
is to study games arising from a class of problems in which players make private con-
tributions for the eventual funding of a collection of facilities, or | as we call them |
machines. The machines are considered public goods: once a machine has been built,
all players can use it. Speci¯cally, in the contribution problem there are ¯nitely many
players. Each of these players is interested in a subset of the ¯nite set of machines.
Realization of these machines is necessary for him to derive a bene¯t: only if a superset
of them is realized, he receives a reward. Associated with each machine are its costs.
We focus on two decision making processes, di®ering in the possibilities for cooperation.
In the cooperative situation | in presence of the possibility to enforce general agree-
ment | we focus on the naturally related cooperative TU-game, the realization game.
The game is determined by associating to each coalition of players the aggregate pro¯ts
that it is capable of generating itself independent from the others, just by making an
optimal choice between the feasible combinations of machines.
In the noncooperative mode, i.e., in absence of the possibility to make binding agree-
ments, an additional component, the realization scheme, determines the strategic con-
tribution game. The players are assumed to submit a contribution independently of the
other players, and given the pro¯le of contributions the realization scheme determines
which machines are realized, and consequently also the individual payo®s. The strategy
space of each player is his set of possible contributions. This set is taken to be the
interval from zero (inclusive) to a player's reward (exclusive), meaning that each player
contributes a nonnegative amount, but strictly less than his reward. The payo® function
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of a player is a player's reward if all machines he is interested in are realized, minus his
contribution.
Up to now, not much has been said about the realization function: after all contri-
butions have been made, what machines will be built? In fact, many possible realization
functions come to mind. But considering that the players behave noncooperatively to
subsidize public goods, it is of obvious signi¯cance to investigate whether a realization
scheme can be de¯ned that induces the contributors to play the contribution game |
perhaps without them being aware of it | in the interest of the collective player set. In
this chapter, a simple measure of collective welfare is used: the sum of the individual
player's payo® functions, often referred to as the classical utilitarian collective welfare
function (cf. Moulin, 1988).
It is indeed possible to de¯ne a realization scheme in such a way that the contribution
game is best-response equivalent with a coordination game in which each contributor's
payo® is the utilitarian welfare function. In terms of Monderer and Shapley (1996),
this realization scheme makes the contribution game an ordinal potential game, where
one of the ordinal potential functions is the utilitarian welfare function. The realization
scheme takes into account that each contributor is willing to pay only for machines
he is interested in and that the money allocated to a machine is never more than its
costs. Remaining contributions in excess of the costs of the realized machines go to
waste. Under these restrictions, there may still be several ways to allocate as much of
the contributions as possible to the machines. Our realization scheme builds only those
machines that are completely ¯nanced by each such maximal allocation. The realization
scheme uses maximal °ows and minimum cuts in certain °ow networks.
The existence of Nash equilibria of the contribution game is established and several of
its properties are studied. In a Nash equilibrium, a player makes a positive contribution
only if all machines he is interested in are realized. Moreover, the contributions in a
Nash equilibrium exactly su±ce to pay for the machines of the players making a positive
contribution, so no money goes to waste.
Now that it has been established that the players at least implicitly act in the interest
of utilitarian welfare and that the game has a nonempty collection of Nash equilibria,
one can derive that there is a Nash equilibrium maximizing utilitarian welfare. Hence,
single players have no incentive to deviate since the pro¯le is a Nash equilibrium, and
the entire player set has no incentive to deviate since the pro¯le maximizes utilitarian
welfare. But one can show more. Such strategy pro¯les are in fact strong Nash equilibria
of the contribution game: there is no coalition of players with an incentive to deviate
from a strategy pro¯le maximizing utilitarian welfare.
In particular this means that each strong Nash equilibrium de¯nes a pre-imputation
of the cooperative realization game, and | as will be shown | it determines a core
element. There exists a strong relation between the concept of the core and the concept
of strong Nash equilibrium: there is a 1-1 correspondence between the set of strong Nash
equilibria of the contribution game and the payo®s in the core except those that giveModel 57
zero payo® to non-null players.
Summarizing, by choosing a particular realization scheme, one can guarantee that
the players of a noncooperative contribution game act in common interest, in the sense
that maximizing a player's payo® function given the strategy pro¯le of his opponents is
equivalent with maximizing utilitarian welfare given the strategy pro¯le of his opponents.
Not only do the players act in common interest, but there exist pro¯les maximizing
utilitarian welfare, which turn out to be strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game
and core elements of the realization game.
6.2 Model
In this section the model is speci¯ed and some preliminary results are provided. A
realization problem is represented by a tuple
G = hN;M;m 2 (2
M)
N;! 2 I R
N




² N is the nonempty, ¯nite set of players;
² M is the nonempty, ¯nite set of public goods or machines;
² m = (mi)i2N 2 (2M)N speci¯es the set of machines required by each player: player
i 2 N needs the machines in mi µ M;mi 6= ;;
² ! = (!i)i2N 2 I R
N
++ speci¯es the reward to each player i 2 N if (a superset of) all
machines in mi are realized;
² c = (cj)j2M 2 I R
M
++ speci¯es for each machine j 2 M the costs cj to provide this
machine.
The machines are considered to be public goods: once a machine has been built, all
players can make use of it. Each realization problem corresponds to a TU-game in a
natural way. The value of a coalition of players S µ N is the total of net bene¯ts
that it is able to collect by building the right combination of machines. That is, the
cooperative realization game associated with a realization problem G = hN;M;m;!;ci is














; for all S µ N:
Example 6.1 Let G = hN;M;m;!;ci be the realization problem with N = f1;2;3g,
M = fp;q;rg, m1 = fpg;m2 = fp;qg;m3 = fq;rg, ! = (10;10;20), and c = (9;5;10).
The values of the di®erent coalitions of the corresponding 3-player cooperative realization
game (N;vG) are listed in Figure 6.1 /58 Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Facilities; A Class of Ordinal Potential Games
S ; f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g N
vG(S) 0 1 0 5 6 6 6 16
Figure 6.1: The values for vG.
Some additional notation: for S µ N write !(S) =
P
i2S !i and mS = [i2S mi.
Theorem 6.2 The cooperative realization game (N;vG) is convex, i.e. for every i 2
N;S ½ T µ Nnfig:
vG(T [ fig) ¡ vG(T) > = vG(S [ fig) ¡ vG(S):
Proof. Let Si µ S [ fig be such that vG(S [ fig) = !(Si) ¡ c(mSi) and let T0 µ T be
such that vG(T) = !(T0) ¡ c(mT0). Then:
vG(T [ fig) ¡ vG(T) > = f!(T0 [ Si) ¡ c(mT0[Si)g ¡ f!(T0) ¡ c(mT0)g
= !(Si) ¡ !(Si \ T0) ¡ c(mSi) + c(mSi \ mT0)
= vG(S [ fig) ¡ f!(Si \ T0) ¡ c(mSi\T0)g
> = vG(S [ fig) ¡ vG(S):
2
The convexity of cooperative realization games expresses that there is an incentive for
the players to cooperate. Given the cooperation of the grand coalition the problem of
allocating vG(N) over the individual players remains. A preferable allocation is stable
in the sense that no coalition of players has an incentive to split o®. The corresponding
solution concept for TU-games incorporating this collective rationality principle is the
core.
De¯nition 6.3 The core C(N;v) of a TU-game (N;v) consists of all vectors x 2 I R
N
satisfying the following conditions:
(i)
P
i2S xi > = v(S) for all S µ N
(ii)
P
i2N xi = v(N):
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Condition (ii) combines the feasibility requirement
P
i2N xi < = v(N) with the rationality
constraint for the grand coalition,
P
i2N xi > = v(N). It is common to refer to (ii) as
e±ciency; it assures that all pro¯ts of cooperation are allocated. A well-known relation
between the convexity of games and the existence of core elements is the following:
Theorem 6.4 (Shapley, 1971) If (N;v) is convex, then C(N;v) 6= ;.
This means that C(N;vG) 6= ; for each realization problem G.
The values vG(S) can be calculated in polynomial time by determining minimal cuts of
certain °ow networks that are de¯ned subsequently. For S µ N construct a °ow network
¡S as follows. ¡S has a node set V consisting of a source, a sink, S, and mS = [i2S mi.
The nodes are called So, Si, node(i) (i 2 S), and node(j) (j 2 mS). ¡S has arc set A
consisting of directed arcs. For each player i 2 S there is an arc arc(i) from the source
So to player i's node node(i) with capacity cap(i) = !i. When machine j 2 mS is an
element of mi, there is an arc arc(ij) from node(i) to node(j) with a capacity strictly
larger than the individual bene¯ts !i, say for instance cap(ij) = !i+1. For each machine
j 2 mS there is an arc arc(j) from node(j) to the sink Si with capacity cap(j) = cj.
Example 6.5 The °ow network ¡N corresponding to the realization problem in Exam-
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Figure 6.2: A °ow network
Theorem 6.9 shows that the construction of precisely those machines that appear in
some minimum cut of ¡S maximizes the aggregate payo®s for coalition S. De¯nitions
concerning °ows and cuts in a °ow network (V;A) with a source and a sink are brie°y
reviewed. For a more detailed study, see for instance Rockafellar (1984). A °ow is60 Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Facilities; A Class of Ordinal Potential Games
a function f : A ! I R such that for each directed arc (i;j) from node i to node j,
f(i;j) 2 [0;cap(i;j)], and °ow is conserved at every node, except possibly at the source
and the sink. One can understand a °ow as an amount of water transported from the
source, through the network, to the sink, without °ooding the arcs. A cut is a set of
arcs such that each positive °ow from source to sink uses at least one of these arcs.
Intuitively, it is called a cut because removal of the arcs in a cut would disconnect
all possible channels for a positive °ow. The maximal amount of °ow in a network
¡ = (V;A) is denoted max °ow(¡). The capacity of a cut is the sum of the capacities
of the arcs in this cut. A cut is minimal if there is no cut in the network with a smaller
capacity. The capacity of a minimum cut of ¡ is denoted min cut(¡). The following
results are often used.
Lemma 6.6 In a network ¡ = (V;A),
1. max °ow(¡) = min cut(¡).
2. an arc is used to full capacity in each maximal °ow if and only if it is contained in
some minimum cut.
The ¯rst part of the lemma is the famous max °ow-min cut theorem of Ford and Fulkerson
(1956). The proof of the second part is straightforward: an arc is used to full capacity
in each maximal °ow if and only if reducing its capacity reduces the value of the °ow,
if and only if the arc is in some minimum cut. Consider a °ow network ¡S arising from
a realization problem G. Notice that the capacity of an arc arc(ij) with i 2 S;j 2 mS
is chosen so large, that arcs of this type are never in a minimum cut of ¡S. Thus, for







. With a slight abuse of notation, this cut C is denoted
(S0;T) with S0 µ S;T µ mS. The set of minimum cuts of a °ow network ¡S is denoted
MC(¡S).
The following example illustrates these de¯nitions.
Example 6.7 Consider a °ow network similar to that in the previous example. Let
!1 = 10;!2 = 6;!3 = 8, and take cp = 9;cq = 5;cr = 10. This gives the °ow network
in Figure 6.3. The capacities of intermediary arcs are considered to be high and are
omitted for notational convenience.
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Figure 6.3: Illustrating °ows and cuts













There is one minimum cut, namely C = (S;T) with S = f3g and T = fp;qg. Notice
that the maximal amount of °ow from source to sink equals 22, which is exactly the
capacity of the cut (S;T). /
Lemma 6.8 Let G be a realization problem and ¡S the corresponding °ow network for
a coalition of players S. If C1 = (S1;T1) and C2 = (S2;T2) are minimum cuts of ¡S,
then so are C3 = (S1 \ S2;T1 [ T2) and C4 = (S1 [ S2;T1 \ T2).
Proof. Each directed path from source to sink is uniquely described by a pair (i;j)
with i 2 S and j 2 mi. By de¯nition of a cut, for each such path (i;j) either i 2 Sk or
j 2 Tk (k = 1;2). It follows easily that i 2 S1 \ S2 or j 2 T1 [ T2 and that i 2 S1 [ S262 Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Facilities; A Class of Ordinal Potential Games







































Since both C1 and C2 are minimum cuts, C3 and C4 are minimum cuts. 2
Theorem 6.9 Let G = hN;M;m;!;ci be a realization problem and (N;vG) the corre-








Proof. Every cut of ¡S that is minimal w.r.t. set inclusion is of the form (fi 2 S j mi 6µ





























































































In the cooperative model for realizing a set of machines, as discussed in the previous
section, a collective of players is able to decide upon the optimal set of machines to be
constructed. This section formulates the realization problem as a contribution problem
where no binding agreements can be made and the di®erent players have to decide
individually how much they want to spend on having their machines realized. After
the individual contributions have been made, an independent arbitrator is supposed to
decide upon the machinery to buy. This task involves a lot of ambiguity, since in general
a pro¯le of contributions can be associated with more than one feasible set of machines.
Therefore the arbitrator makes use of a decision rule, a so-called realization scheme. A
realization scheme maps each pro¯le of contributions to an a®ordable combination of
machines. A realization problem G = hN;M;m 2 (2M)N;! 2 I R
N
++;c 2 I R
M
++i together
with a realization scheme R is called a contribution problem and is denoted
C = hN;M;m 2 (2
M)
N;! 2 I R
N
++;c 2 I R
M
++;Ri:
The arbitration procedure is not a black box: before the players make their bids known
to the arbitrator the realization scheme is publicly announced.
It makes sense to require from the arbitrator that he puts forward a \reasonable"
realization scheme. For instance, it may be perceived as \unfair" if the arbitrator decides
to use the contribution of a player to buy other machines than he is interested in,
especially if these are machines for zero contributors. Also the realization scheme should
give the players the right incentives. Those players who pro¯t a lot by having the
desired set of machines should be pushed to contribute. The realization scheme de¯ned
in this section combines a number of desirable features in this respect. The formal
de¯nition requires some additional work. First we formally de¯ne the strategic game
that corresponds to the above noncooperative setting.
The contribution problem C = hN;M;m 2 (2M)N;! 2 I R
N
++;c 2 I R
M
++;Ri induces
a contribution game G(C) = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni, where the strategy space of player
i 2 N, the set of possible contributions, is Xi = [0;!i). The realization scheme R :
Q
i2N Xi ! 2M speci¯es for each pro¯le of contributions of the players which machines are






¡xi if mi 6µ R(x)
!i ¡ xi if mi µ R(x):
That is: he gets his reward !i only if all of his machines are realized and his contribution
xi causes disutility.
By taking Xi = [0;!i), it is assumed that each player i 2 N contributes a nonnegative
amount, but strictly less than his reward !i. This is not a very restrictive assumption: it
makes no sense to contribute more than the bene¯t you can derive from the realization64 Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Facilities; A Class of Ordinal Potential Games
of your machines and contributing !i is weakly dominated by contributing 0. A di®erent
approach | not in°uencing the results in the present chapter | would be to endow each
player i 2 N with an initial amount ei 2 I R+ of money such that ei < !i and to take
Xi = [0;ei]. This approach is not taken in this chapter.
The promised realization scheme R is inspired by the techniques that were used to
¯nd the values of the characteristic function of the realization problem. We de¯ne in a
similar way a °ow network ¡(x) for each pro¯le x 2 X of contributions. ¡(x) has a node
set V consisting of a source, a sink, N, and M. The nodes are called So, Si, node(i)
(i 2 N), and node(j) (j 2 M). ¡(x) has arc set A consisting of directed arcs. For each
player i 2 N there is an arc arc(i) from the source So to player i's node node(i) with
capacity cap(i) = xi. When machine j 2 M is an element of mi, there is an arc arc(ij)
from node(i) to node(j) with a capacity strictly larger than any possible contribution by
player i, for instance cap(ij) = !i+1. For each machine j 2 M there is an arc arc(j) from
node(j) to the sink Si with capacity cap(j) = cj. Notice that the underlying network
(V;A) is the same for each ¡(x); only the capacities of the player arcs are di®erent.
Example 6.10 In a contribution problem with player set N = f1;2;3g, machine set
M = fp;q;rg, and m1 = fpg;m2 = fp;qg;m3 = fq;rg, the °ow network ¡(x) given
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Figure 6.4: The °ow network ¡(x)
Recall the de¯nitions concerning °ows and cuts in a °ow network (V;A) with a source
and a sink. Take a °ow network ¡(x) arising from some contribution problem C. The
set of minimum cuts of ¡(x) will be denoted by MC(x). Notice that the capacity of an
arc arc(ij) with i 2 N;j 2 M is chosen so large, that arcs of this type are never in a
minimum cut of ¡(x). Thus, for every minimum cut C 2 MC(x) there exist S µ N and
T µ M such that C = (S;T).Contribution games are ordinal potential games 65
What insight does the °ow network ¡(x) de¯ned above give us in the problem under
consideration? Given the constraints that each player i 2 N is willing to contribute only
to the cost of machines in his desired set mi and the money allocated to a machine does
not exceed its costs, a maximal °ow f describes exactly
² how much of the total contribution
P
i2N xi can be used for the provision of the
machines, namely max °ow(¡(x)),
² which machines can be ¯nanced using this particular maximal °ow, namely those
with arcs used to maximum capacity, and
² who contributes how much to the costs of these machines in the maximal °ow f:
player i contributes to machine j the amount of °ow through arc(ij), f(arc(ij)).
Since selecting a particular maximal °ow would strongly favor some of the players, the
realization scheme R is de¯ned as follows: in a contribution problem C, for each pro¯le
x 2 X of contributions the set R(x) of realized machines equals the set of machines used
to maximal capacity by each maximal °ow in ¡(x). By Lemma 6.6.2, this is equivalent
with stating that a machine is realized if and only if it is contained in some minimum








Many of the proofs use the fact that for each x 2 X there exists a minimum cut (S;T)
in ¡(x) such that R(x) = T. This result follows immediately from the next lemma.
Lemma 6.11 Let C be a contribution problem, x 2 X a pro¯le of contributions, and
¡(x) the corresponding °ow network. If C1 = (S1;T1) and C2 = (S2;T2) are minimum
cuts, then C3 = (S1 \ S2;T1 [ T2) and C4 = (S1 [ S2;T1 \ T2) are also minimum cuts.
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 6.8. 2
The realization scheme R uses personalized contributions, i.e., each individual contribu-
tion xi is used for machines in mi. No player is subsidizing others at the cost of the
realization of his own plan. The next sections will also show that in equilibrium the
players together act on behalf of the desires of the society of players by maximizing
utilitarian welfare.
6.4 Contribution games are ordinal potential games
Applications of potential games to economic situations were mentioned in Chapters 2,
3, and 4. In this section, contribution games are shown to be ordinal potential games.
Since every order-preserving transformation of an ordinal potential function is again an
ordinal potential function, it follows that an ordinal potential game has in¯nitely many66 Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Facilities; A Class of Ordinal Potential Games
di®erent potential functions (whereas for exact potential games the potential function
was determined up to an additive constant; see Proposition 2.8). It will be shown that
one of the potential functions of a contribution game is the classical utilitarian collective
welfare function, de¯ned as the sum of the individual players' utility functions. See
Moulin (1988) for a survey of this and other welfare functions.
Theorem 6.12 Let G(C) = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a contribution game. The utilitar-
ian welfare function U : X ! I R de¯ned by U =
P
i2N ui is an ordinal potential of
G(C).
Proof. Let i 2 N, x¡i 2 X¡i, and xi;yi 2 Xi. Assume without loss of generality that
xi < yi. For notational convenience, write x = (xi;x¡i) and y = (yi;x¡i). Discern three
cases:
Case 1: mi 6µ R(y).
Since some arcs that correspond with machines in mi are not a member of any minimum
cut of the °ow network ¡(y), it must be that arc(i) 2 C for every C 2 MC(y). By
decreasing cap(i) from yi to xi the collection of minimum cuts does not change. So
R(y) = R(x). This implies ui(y) ¡ ui(x) = U(y) ¡ U(x) = xi ¡ yi.
Case 2: mi µ R(x).
By Lemma 6.11, there exists a minimum cut (S;T) in the °ow network ¡(x) such that
T = R(x). Since mi µ T, arc(i) = 2 S. By increasing cap(i) from xi to yi, (S;T)
remains a minimum cut; no new minimum cuts appear, although some may disappear.
So R(y) µ R(x). Because T µ R(y) it follows that R(y) = R(x) and that ui(y)¡ui(x) =
U(y) ¡ U(x) = xi ¡ yi.
Case 3: mi 6µ R(x) and mi µ R(y).
In this case, ui(y) ¡ ui(x) = !i ¡ yi + xi > 0. When player i spends the amount xi,
arc(i) 2 C for every C 2 MC(x). Let zi 2 (xi;yi] be the smallest contribution of player
i for which arc(i) is no longer in every minimum cut of the °ow network ¡(zi;x¡i). Case
1 shows that R(x) = R(t;x¡i) for every t 2 (xi;zi). Case 2 shows that R(y) = R(t;x¡i)
for every t 2 [zi;yi]. By increasing cap(i) from xi to zi, no minimum cut disappears,
whereas some minimum cuts will appear, at least one of them not containing arc(i).
Therefore R(x) is a proper subset of R(zi;x¡i) = R(y) and as a consequence
U(y) ¡ U(x) =
X
l: mlµR(y)
!l ¡ yi ¡
X
l: mlµR(x)
!l + xi > = !i ¡ yi + xi > 0:
This concludes our proof. 2
Consequently, a contribution game is best-response equivalent with a coordination game
where the payo® functions of the players are replaced by the utilitarian welfare function
U. This is a signi¯cant insight: even though the players play a noncooperative game,Equilibria of contribution games 67
utilitarian social welfare enters their game in the sense that | given the strategy pro¯le
of the opponents | a player maximizes his payo® if and only if he maximizes utilitarian
welfare. Therefore, it is of interest to investigate the relation between equilibria of the
contribution game and strategies that maximize social welfare.
6.5 Equilibria of contribution games
The existence of Nash equilibria of contribution games is established in the ¯rst theorem
of this section. This result is not straightforward, taking into account the fact that
payo® functions ui are discontinuous and the strategy set of player i equals [0;!i), which
is not closed. Two properties of Nash equilibria are derived: no money is wasted in
an equilibrium and if a player is not satis¯ed since not all of his machines are realized,
then he contributes nothing. These two properties are used to establish the existence
of strategy pro¯les that maximize utilitarian welfare in a contribution game. Utilitarian
welfare maximizing strategy pro¯les are proven to be strong Nash equilibria: no coalition
of players has an incentive to deviate from such a pro¯le.
Theorem 6.13 Each contribution game G(C) has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is based on an algorithm which is shown to terminate in ¯nitely many
steps with a Nash equilibrium of the game. Initially, set k = 0 and x0 = 0: each player
contributes zero. The general step of the algorithm is as follows. After k iterations, we








cj = max °ow(¡(x
k)) = min cut(¡(x
k)); (6.1)
fi 2 N j x
k
i > 0;mi 6µ R(x
k)g = ;; (6.2)
fi 2 N j mi µ R(x
k¡1)g ½ fi 2 N j mi µ R(x
k)g if k > = 1: (6.3)
The pro¯le x0 = 0 trivially satis¯es these conditions. De¯ne
C
k = fi 2 N j x
k
i > 0;mi µ R(x
k)g;
F
k = fi 2 N j x
k
i = 0;mi µ R(x
k)g;
N
k = fi 2 N j x
k
i = 0;mi 6µ R(x
k)g:
The algorithm stops after k iterations if Nk = ; or if Nk 6= ; and xk is a Nash equilibrium
of G(C). If the algorithm does not stop after k iterations, some player i(k + 1) 2 N can
improve by unilaterally changing his contribution. We claim that i(k + 1) 2 Nk. To68 Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Facilities; A Class of Ordinal Potential Games
prove this claim, notice that by (6.2) N is the union of the pairwise disjoint sets Ck, F k,
and Nk.
Clearly, i(k + 1) = 2 F k, since players i 2 F k achieve their payo® maximum !i by
contributing nothing and therefore cannot possibly increase their payo®.
To show that i(k +1) = 2 Ck, consider h 2 Ck. By de¯nition xk
h > 0 and mh µ R(xk).
Player h cannot bene¯t from increasing his contribution: for yh 2 Xh with yh > xk
h
we have uh(yh;xk
¡h) < = !h ¡ yh < !h ¡ xk
h = uh(xk). Player h also cannot bene¯t from
decreasing his contribution: Property (6.1) implies that each maximal °ow f in ¡(xk)
uses every arc arc(i) with i 2 N to full capacity xk
i and each arc arc(j) with j 2 R(xk)
to full capacity cj. If player h decreases his contribution, say to ¸xk
h with ¸ 2 [0;1), a
maximal °ow f0 in the new °ow network can be constructed as follows:
For i 2 N : f0(arc(i)) =
(
¸f(arc(i)) if i = h
f(arc(i)) otherwise:
For i 2 N;j 2 mi : f0(arc(ij)) =
(
¸f(arc(ij)) if i = h;j 2 mh
f(arc(ij)) otherwise:
For j 2 M : f0(arc(j)) =
P
i2N: j2mi f0(arc(ij)):
If j 2 mh is such that f(arc(hj)) > 0, then f0(arc(j)) < f(arc(j)) = cj, so j is not used
to full capacity by the maximal °ow f0 in the new °ow network: not all machines in mh
are used to full capacity by every maximal °ow, so player h will lose his reward !h if
he decreases his contribution, thus decreasing his payo® from !h ¡ xk
h > 0 to something
nonpositive, namely ¡¸xk
h.
Consequently, i(k+1) 2 Nk, which implies xk
i(k+1) = 0. The fact that he can improve,
means that
P
j2mi(k+1)nR(xk) cj < !i(k+1): he can pay the costs necessary to ¯nance that








i if i 6= i(k + 1)
P
j2minR(xk) cj if i = i(k + 1):
Notice that a maximal °ow f in ¡(xk) can easily be extended to a maximal °ow in ¡(xk+1)
by adding a °ow via player i(k+1) that pays exactly for his machines in mi(k+1)nR(xk).
Since such an extended maximal °ow exactly ¯nances the machines in R(xk) [ mi(k+1)
and no others, it follows that R(xk+1) = R(xk) [ mi(k+1). Increasing k by one, this
also means that the input again satis¯es (6.1) { (6.3), so that the general step can be
repeated.
Two things remain to be shown: that the algorithm ends and that | if it ends after
k iterations | xk is indeed a Nash equilibrium of the game.
By construction, the algorithm ends after k iterations if Nk 6= ; and xk is a Nash
equilibrium, or if Nk = ;. If Nk = ;, xk must be a Nash equilibrium, since it was shownEquilibria of contribution games 69
above that any player that could bene¯t from unilateral deviation had to be a member
of Nk. By (6.3), jNkj < jNk¡1j if k > = 1, so the algorithm terminates. 2
Now that the existence of Nash equilibria in contribution games has been established,
it becomes interesting to study their properties. The next proposition makes clear that
players whose machine sets are not completely realized do not contribute anything in an
equilibrium. Moreover, no money is wasted: in an equilibrium, the contributions of the
players exactly su±ce to pay for the realized machines.
Proposition 6.14 Let G(C) be a contribution game and x 2 NE(G(C)).
1. Let i 2 N. If mi 6µ R(x), then xi = 0.
2.
P




1. Assume mi 6µ R(x) and suppose that xi > 0. By de¯nition of R, mi 6µ R(x) implies
that there is no minimum cut (S;T) in ¡(x) such that mi µ T. Hence, arc(i) is in
each minimum cut of ¡(x). Reducing i's contribution slightly does not change the
set of minimum cuts and thus increases i's payo®, contradicting x 2 NE(G(C)).








By Lemma 6.11, ¡(x) has a minimum cut (S;T) such that R(x) = T. If mi µ T =
R(x) and xi > 0, then arc(i) = 2 S. If mi 6µ T = R(x), then xi = 0 by Proposition
6.14.1. Hence S contains no arcs arc(i) with cap(i) = xi > 0. Thus
X
j2R(x)
cj = min cut(¡(x)) = max °ow(¡(x)):
Suppose X
j2R(x)




Then there exists an i 2 N with xi > 0 such that arc(i) is not used to full
capacity in some maximal °ow in ¡(x). According to Lemma 6.6.2, arc(i) is in no
minimum cut. Then i can reduce his contribution slightly without a®ecting the set
of minimum cuts and thus increase his payo®, contradicting x 2 NE(G(C)). 2
The next proposition shows that a strategy pro¯le maximizing utilitarian welfare U exists
in each contribution game G(C). Notice that the collection argmaxx2X U(x) is a subset
of NE(G(C)); otherwise, some player could increase his payo® by deviating, but then
the ordinal potential U would increase as well.70 Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Facilities; A Class of Ordinal Potential Games
Proposition 6.15 Let G(C) be a contribution game and U =
P
i2N ui. Then the utili-
tarian welfare function achieves its maximum: argmaxx2X U(x) 6= ;.
Proof. Observe that argmaxx2X U(x) = argmaxfU(x) j x 2 NE(G(C))g. Let x 2



















There are ¯nitely many machines, so the collection fR(x) j x 2 NE(G(C))g µ 2M has
¯nitely many elements. This implies that fU(x) j x 2 NE(G(C))g also has ¯nitely many
elements. Consequently, this set has a maximum: argmaxx2X U(x) 6= ;. 2
In a potential game, the collection of strategy pro¯les at which there is a potential
achieving its maximum is called the potential maximizer. The potential maximizer is
suggested as an equilibrium re¯nement tool by Monderer and Shapley (1996) and Peleg,
Potters, and Tijs (1996). In ordinal potential games, di®erent potentials give rise to
di®erent maximizers (as opposed, for instance, to exact potential games). Hence the
collection of strategies maximizing utilitarian welfare in a contribution game may be a
proper subset of the potential maximizer of the game.
Strong Nash equilibria were de¯ned in Aumann (1959). In a game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni,
a strategy combination x 2 X is a strong Nash equilibrium if for every ; 6= S µ N and
every yS 2 XS there exists an i 2 S such that ui(x) > = ui(xNnS;yS). In other words,
x 2 X is a strong Nash equilibrium if there is no coalition ; 6= S µ N of players and no
alternative strategy yi 2 Xi nfxig for the members i 2 S such that ui(xNnS;yS) > ui(x)
for each player i 2 S. A slightly weaker de¯nition would be to require that there is no
coalition of players that can deviate and make each of its members not worse o® and at
least one of its members better o®. In contribution games, however, the two de¯nitions
are equivalent, since each payo® function ui satis¯es
8x;y 2 X : xi 6= yi ) ui(x) 6= ui(y):
The set of strong Nash equilibria of a game G is denoted SNE(G).
Although the set of Nash equilibria is nonempty in a wide class of noncooperative
games, existence of strong Nash equilibria is much rarer. Existence of strong Nash
equilibria in contribution games is established in the next theorem by showing that a
strategy pro¯le maximizing utilitarian welfare is a strong Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6.16 Let G(C) = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a contribution game, U =
P
i2N ui.
Then argmaxx2X U(x) µ SNE(G(C)). Hence SNE(G(C)) 6= ;.Equilibria of contribution games 71
Proof. As soon as the inclusion is established, existence of strong Nash equilibria
follows from Proposition 6.15. Let x 2 argmaxx2X U(x). Individual players cannot
pro¯tably deviate from x, since x 2 NE(G(C)). The entire player set N cannot pro¯tably
deviate from x, since x maximizes
P
i2N ui. Suppose that x = 2 SNE(G(C)). Then there
exists a coalition S ½ N with 1 < jSj < jNj and strategies yi 2 Xi n fxig for each
i 2 S such that ui(xNnS;yS) > ui(x) for each i 2 S. For notational convenience, de¯ne
y = (xNnS;yS). Below it is shown that there is a strategy pro¯le z 2 X such that
U(z) > U(x), contradicting the assumption that x maximizes U.
A player i 2 N, in general, belongs to one of four types:
(type 1) xi > 0 ; mi µ R(x);
(type 2) xi = 0 ; mi 6µ R(x);
(type 3) xi > 0 ; mi 6µ R(x);
(type 4) xi = 0 ; mi µ R(x):
Since x is a Nash equilibrium, Proposition 6.14.1 implies that there are no players of the
third type in ¡(x). If a player is of the fourth type, he achieves his payo® maximum !i
without contributing: such players cannot belong to S. Hence, members of S are either
of type 1 or of type 2.
Write S = S1 [ S2 with Sk = fi 2 S j i is of type kg;k = 1;2. The fact that the
members of S deviate from x and improve their payo® implies
yi < xi and mi µ R(y) if i 2 S1; (6.4)
yi > 0 and mi µ R(y) if i 2 S2: (6.5)
It is impossible that S2 = ;. Suppose, to the contrary, that all members of S are of type
1: S = S1. By (6.4), there exists for each i 2 S = S1 a ¸i 2 [0;1) such that yi = ¸ixi.
Take any maximal °ow f in ¡(x). Then a maximal °ow f0 in ¡(y) is obtained as follows:
For i 2 N : f0(arc(i)) =
(
¸if(arc(i)) if i 2 S
f(arc(i)) otherwise:
For i 2 N;j 2 mi : f0(arc(ij)) =
(
¸if(arc(ij)) if i 2 S;j 2 mi
f(arc(ij)) otherwise:
For j 2 M : f0(arc(j)) =
P
i2N: j2mi f0(arc(ij)):
According to Proposition 6.14.2, the contributions in ¡(x) are exactly su±cient to pay
for the machines in R(x). By de¯nition of R: f(arc(j)) = cj for all j 2 R(x). If i 2 S72 Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Facilities; A Class of Ordinal Potential Games
pays part of the costs of j 2 mi according to f, i.e., f(arc(ij)) > 0, then this °ow
decreases by a factor ¸i in ¡(y), so that f0(arc(j)) < f(arc(j)) = cj. Hence arc(j) is
not used to full capacity by the maximal °ow f0 in ¡(y), implying that j = 2 R(y). Then
mi 6µ R(y), contradicting (6.4). This completes the proof that S2 6= ;.
De¯ne V = fi 2 N j xi > 0g and the nonempty machine set M0 =
S





Let f be a maximal °ow in ¡(x). By de¯nition of R, every arc arc(j) with j 2 R(x)













Let g be a maximal °ow in ¡(y). By (6.5), M0 µ R(y). By de¯nition of R, every arc
arc(j) with j 2 M0 is used to full capacity by g:
for j 2 M





i2V mi, the °ow in arcs arc(j) with j 2 M0 is generated entirely
by members of S2:
for j 2 M













and is generated entirely by the members of S2. Given °ow g, an arbitrary player i 2 S2
pays
P




















j2M0\mi g(arc(ij)) if i 2 S2
xi otherwise:
Combine °ows f and g to a feasible °ow h in ¡(z) as follows:
For i 2 N : h(arc(i)) =
½ zi if i 2 S2
f(arc(i)) = xi = zi otherwise:
For i 2 N;j 2 mi : h(arc(ij)) =
(
g(arc(ij)) if i 2 S2;j 2 M0
f(arc(ij)) otherwise:




g(arc(j)) = cj if j 2 M0
f(arc(j)) = cj if j 2 R(x)































Thus, h is a maximal °ow in ¡(z) and farc(j) j j 2 R(x) [ M0g is a minimum cut
of ¡(z). Hence R(z) = R(x) [ M0. But then ui(z) > = ui(x) for each i 2 N n S2 and
ui(z) = !i ¡ zi > 0 = ui(x) for each i 2 S2, implying U(z) > U(x). This contradicts
x 2 argmaxx2X U(x). Conclude that x is indeed a strong Nash equilibrium. 2
The converse inclusion of Theorem 6.16 holds as well. The set of realized machines is
the same in each strong Nash equilibrium and | as a consequence | every strong Nash
equilibrium maximizes utilitarian welfare.
Theorem 6.17 Let G(C) be a contribution game and U =
P
i2N ui. If x;y 2 SNE(G(C)),
then R(x) = R(y). Hence SNE(G(C)) µ argmaxz2X U(z).
Proof. As soon as the implication is established, the inclusion of the set of strong Nash
equilibria in the set of maximizers of utilitarian welfare can be shown as follows: let
x 2 SNE(G(C)) and y 2 argmaxz2X U(z). Then y 2 SNE(G(C)) by Theorem 6.16 and


































= U(y) = max
z2X U(z):
So x 2 argmaxz2X U(z), as was to be shown.
To show the implication, let x;y 2 SNE(G(C)) and suppose R(x) 6= R(y). Without
loss of generality, R(y) n R(x) 6= ;. Below it is shown that the coalition
D = fi 2 N j yi > 0;mi \ [R(y) n R(x)] 6= ;g74 Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Facilities; A Class of Ordinal Potential Games
can pro¯tably deviate from x, contradicting x 2 SNE(G(C)).
If i 2 D, then mi 6µ R(x), so Proposition 6.14.1 implies that xi = 0 and ui(x) = 0.
Let f be a maximal °ow in ¡(y). By de¯nition of R, every arc arc(j) with j 2
R(y) n R(x) is used to full capacity cj by f. Since this °ow is generated entirely by the
members of D, one ¯nds




Player i 2 D contributes
P
j2mi\[R(y)nR(x)] f(arc(ij)) to the machines in R(y) n R(x) in





xi if i = 2 D
P
j2mi\[R(y)nR(x)] f(arc(ij)) if i 2 D:
It is shown that this deviation from x by the members of D will guarantee the realization
of R(x) [ R(y), which is an improvement for the members of D. Let g be a maximal
°ow in ¡(x). A °ow h in ¡(z) that extends the °ow g in such a way that the machines
in R(y) n R(x) can be ¯nanced by the members of D is de¯ned as follows.
For i 2 N : h(arc(i)) = zi




f(arc(ij)) if i 2 D;j 2 R(y) n R(x)
g(arc(ij)) = 0 if i 2 D;j = 2 R(y) n R(x)
g(arc(ij)) otherwise:
For j 2 M : h(arc(j)) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
g(arc(j)) = 0 if j 2 M and
j = 2 R(x) [ R(y)
P
i2D: j2mi f(arc(ij)) = cj if j 2 R(y) n R(x)
g(arc(j)) = cj if j 2 R(x):





min cut(¡(z)). Hence R(z) = R(x) [ R(y). Then for each i 2 D: ui(z) = !i ¡ zi > 0 =
ui(x), contradicting x 2 SNE(G(C)). 2
6.6 Strong Nash equilibria and the core
Since by Theorem 6.17 each strong Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative contribu-
tion game induces maximal utilitarian welfare, the corresponding pro¯le of individual
net-payo®s de¯nes a pre-imputation of the cooperative realization game. These pre-
imputations are in fact core allocations of the realization game. To be more precise,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of strong Nash equilibria of the
contribution game and the subset of the core of the realization game where players withStrong Nash equilibria and the core 75
zero payo®s must be null players. In other words, the set of strong Nash equilibria natu-
rally corresponds to the largest subset of the core that maximizes the number of players
with positive rewards. Recall that i 2 N is a null player for a TU-game (N;v) if for
all S µ N n fig it holds v(S [ fig) = v(S). So a null player i is a dummy player with
v(fig) = 0 (see e.g. Shapley, 1953).
Theorem 6.18 Consider a realization problem G = hN;M;m;!;ci, its associated con-
tribution problem C = hN;M;m;!;c;Ri, and the corresponding cooperative realization
game (N;vG) and contribution game G(C) = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni. There exists a one-
to-one correspondence from the set of strong Nash equilibria of G(C) to the following
subset K of C(N;vG):
K := fu 2 C(N;vG) j for all i 2 N;ui = 0 implies that i is a null player of vGg:
Proof. Theorem 6.17 states that in each strong Nash equilibrium of G(C) the same
subset of M is realized. Call this subset R. De¯ne N+ = fi 2 N j mi µ Rg. For every
u 2 K, N+ = fi 2 N j ui > 0g. To see this, let u 2 K.
² If i 2 N+, then mi is realized in every strong Nash equilibrium y, so the reward
!i of player i contributes to U(y). Hence, vG(N) > vG(N n fig). So i is not a null
player of (N;vG), which implies ui > 0 by de¯nition of K.
² If i = 2 N+, then !i does not contribute to U(y) for any strong Nash equilibrium
y and therefore vG(N) = vG(N n fig). Then zi = 0 for every core element z; in
particular ui = 0.






!i ¡ ui if i 2 N+ (so ui > 0)
0 if i 62 N+ (so ui = 0):
We prove that x := x(u) is a strong Nash equilibrium. First, we show that xi is a
strategy of player i, i.e., that xi 2 [0;!i). This is the case since for all i 2 N+, ui > 0

























Hence, in order to prove that U(x) is maximal (and thus, by Theorem 6.16, x is a strong
Nash equilibrium), it remains to show that R(x) = R. That is, for every j 2 R, there
must exist a minimum cut in ¡(x) containing arc(j). There exists a cut with capacity
P
i2N xi of which arc(j) is a member: take all arcs of the players i 2 N with xi = 0
and all arcs of elements in R. Hence, it su±ces to show that a minimum cut in ¡(x)76 Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Facilities; A Class of Ordinal Potential Games
has (at least) capacity
P
i2N xi. Let (S;Q) be a minimum cut (with S µ N, Q µ M).












































The ¯rst inequality holds because (S;Q) is a cut, the second follows from the de¯nition
of vG, the third follows from the assumption that u is a core element, and the fourth
follows from the de¯nition of x.
Now let x 2 SNE(G(C)). Then u = (ui(x))i2N can be considered as an allocation of
(N;vG). By Theorems 6.16 and 6.17, U achieves its maximum at x, so the allocation u
is e±cient:
P
i2N ui = vG(N) (= maxy2X U(y)).
Let S µ N. To show that u 2 C(N;vG), we must prove that
P
i2S ui > = vG(S). Since
u > = 0, assume that vG(S) > 0.




j2Q cj, where Q =
S
i2S+ mi. We prove that Q µ R. Since vG(S+) > 0,
S+ 6= ;. Let i 2 S+. Then vG(S+) ¡ vG(S+ n fig) > 0 by the minimality assumption on
S+. By convexity of (N;vG), we get vG(N)¡vG(N nfig) > 0. Hence, the grand coalition
strictly bene¯ts from the fact that i is one of its members, so !i contributes to the value
of N. Therefore, mi µ R.
In equilibrium no money is wasted and a coalition pays only for machines it needs
(see Proposition 6.14), so it follows that
P

















cj = vG(S+) = vG(S):
Conclude that u 2 C(N;vG). To show that u 2 K, consider a player i 2 N with ui = 0.
Then mi 6µ R. Hence vG(N) = vG(N n fig). This gives that player i is a null player, by
convexity of (N;vG).
To prove the one-to-one correspondence, one has to prove that
1. for each y 2 K: u(x(y)) = y andStrong Nash equilibria and the core 77
2. for each y 2 SNE(G(C)): x(u(y)) = y.
The proof of these claims is straightforward, since for each u 2 K and y 2 SNE(G(C)):
fi 2 N j ui > 0g = fi 2 N j mi µ R(y)g. 278 Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Facilities; A Class of Ordinal Potential GamesChapter 7
Best-Response Potential Games
7.1 Introduction
In potential games, introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996), information concerning
Nash equilibria can be incorporated into a single real-valued function on the strategy
space. All classes of potential games that Monderer and Shapley de¯ned share the ¯nite
improvement property: start with an arbitrary strategy pro¯le. Each time, let a player
that can improve deviate to a better strategy. Under the ¯nite improvement property,
this process eventually ends, obviously in a Nash equilibrium.
The purpose of this chapter, which is based on Voorneveld (1998), is to introduce
and study best-response potential games, a new class of potential games. The main
distinctive feature is that it allows in¯nite improvement paths, by imposing restrictions
only on paths in which players that can improve actually deviate to a best response. The
de¯nition of best-response potential games is given in Section 7.2. A characterization of
these games is provided in Section 7.3. Relations with the potential games of Monderer
and Shapley (1996) are indicated in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 contains a discussion and
motivation for the concept of best-response potential games.
7.2 Best-response potential games
This section contains the de¯nition of best-response potential games and some prelimi-
nary results.
De¯nition 7.1 A strategic game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is a best-response potential
game if there exists a function P : X ! I R such that
8i 2 N;8x¡i 2 X¡i : arg max
xi2Xi
ui(xi;x¡i) = arg max
xi2Xi
P(xi;x¡i):
The function P is called a (best-response) potential of the game G. /
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In other words, a game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is a best-response potential game if
there exists a coordination game hN;(Xi)i2N;(P)i2Ni where the payo® to each player is
given by function P such that the best-response correspondence of each player i 2 N in
G coincides with his best-response correspondence in the coordination game.
Recall that mixed extensions are not considered in Part I of this thesis and that `Nash
equilibrium' should be read as `pure-strategy Nash equilibrium'.
Proposition 7.2 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a best-response potential game with
best-response potential P.
1. The Nash equilibria of G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni and G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(P)i2Ni, the
coordination game with all payo® functions replaced by the potential P, coincide.
2. If P has a maximum over X (e.g. if X is ¯nite), G has a Nash equilibrium.
7.3 Characterization
This section contains a characterization of best-response potential games, similar to
Theorem 5.6, the main result of Voorneveld and Norde (1997).
Let hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a strategic game. A path in the strategy space X is
a sequence (x1;x2;:::) of elements xk 2 X such that for all k = 1;2;::: the strategy
combinations xk and xk+1 di®er in exactly one, say the i(k)-th, coordinate. A path is
best-response compatible if the deviating player moves to a best response:






Best-response compatible paths have restrictions only on consecutive strategy pro¯les,
so by de¯nition the trivial path (x1) consisting of a single strategy pro¯le x1 2 X is best-
response compatible. A ¯nite path (x1;:::;xm) is called a best-response cycle if it is best-
response compatible, x1 = xm, and ui(k)(xk) < ui(k)(xk+1) for some k 2 f1;:::;m ¡ 1g.
De¯ne a binary relation < on the strategy space X as follows: x < y if there exists
a best-response compatible path from x to y, i.e., there is a best-response compatible
path (x1;:::;xm) with x1 = x;xm = y. Notice that x < x for each x 2 X, since (x) is
a best-response compatible path from x to x. The binary relation » on X is de¯ned by
x » y if x < y and y < x.
By checking re°exivity, symmetry, and transitivity, one sees that the binary relation
» is an equivalence relation. Denote the equivalence class of x 2 X with respect to »
by [x], i.e., [x] = fy 2 X j y » xg, and de¯ne a binary relation Á on the set X» of
equivalence classes as follows: [x] Á [y] if [x] 6= [y] and x < y. To show that this relation
is well-de¯ned, observe that the choice of representatives in the equivalence classes is of
no concern:
8x; ~ x;y; ~ y 2 X with x » ~ x and y » ~ y : x < y , ~ x < ~ y:Characterization 81
Notice, moreover, that the relation Á on X» is irre°exive and transitive.
A tuple (A;Á) consisting of a set A and an irre°exive and transitive binary relation
Á on A is properly ordered if there exists a function F : A ! I R that preserves the order
Á:
8x;y 2 A : x Á y ) F(x) < F(y):
Theorem 7.3 A strategic game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is a best-response potential
game if and only if the following two conditions are satis¯ed:
1. X contains no best-response cycles;
2. (X»;Á) is properly ordered.
Proof.
()): Assume P is a best-response potential for G. Suppose that (x1;:::;xm) is a
best-response cycle. By best-response compatibility, P(xk) < = P(xk+1) for each k =
1;:::;m ¡ 1. Since ui(k)(xk) < ui(k)(xk+1) for some k 2 f1;:::;m ¡ 1g, it follows that
for such k: P(xk) < P(xk+1). Conclude that P(x1) < P(xm) = P(x1), a contradiction.
This shows that X contains no best-response cycles.
To prove that (X»;Á) is properly ordered, de¯ne F : X» ! I R by taking for all
[x] 2 X» : F([x]) = P(x). To see that F is well-de¯ned, let y;z 2 [x]. Since y » z there
is a best-response compatible path from y to z and vice versa. But since the game has
no best-response cycles, all changes in the payo® to the deviating players along these
paths must be zero: P(y) = P(z).
Now take [x];[y] 2 X» with [x] Á [y]. Since x < y, there is a best-response compatible
path from x to y, so P(x) < = P(y). Moreover, since x and y are in di®erent equivalence
classes, some player must have gained from deviating along this path: P(x) < P(y).
Hence F([x]) < F([y]).
((): Assume that the two conditions hold. Since (X»;Á) is properly ordered, there
exists a function F : X» ! I R that preserves the order Á. De¯ne P : X ! I R by
P(x) = F([x]) for all x 2 X. Let i 2 N;x¡i 2 X¡i.
² Let yi 2 argmaxxi2Xi ui(xi;x¡i) and zi 2 Xi n fyig.
{ If ui(yi;x¡i) = ui(zi;x¡i), then (yi;x¡i) » (zi;x¡i), so P(yi;x¡i) = F([(yi;x¡i)])
= F([(zi;x¡i)]) = P(zi;x¡i).
{ If ui(yi;x¡i) > ui(zi;x¡i), then (zi;x¡i) < (yi;x¡i). By the absence of best-
response cycles, not (yi;x¡i) < (zi;x¡i). Hence [(zi;x¡i)] Á [(yi;x¡i)], which
implies P(zi;x¡i) = F([(zi;x¡i)]) < F([(yi;x¡i)]) = P(yi;x¡i).
The above observations imply that yi 2 argmaxxi2Xi P(xi;x¡i). This concludes
the proof that
8i 2 N;8x¡i 2 X¡i : arg max
xi2Xi
ui(xi;x¡i) µ arg max
xi2Xi
P(xi;x¡i): (7.1)82 Best-Response Potential Games
² Let yi 2 argmaxxi2Xi P(xi;x¡i) and zi 2 Xi n fyig. Suppose ui(zi;x¡i) >
ui(yi;x¡i). Then (yi;x¡i) < (zi;x¡i). By the absence of best-response cycles,
not (zi;x¡i) < (yi;x¡i). Hence [(yi;x¡i)] Á [(zi;x¡i)], which implies P(yi;x¡i) =
F([(yi;x¡i)]) < F([(zi;x¡i)]) = P(zi;x¡i), contradicting yi 2 argmaxxi2Xi P(xi;x¡i).
This ¯nishes the proof that
8i 2 N;8x¡i 2 X¡i : arg max
xi2Xi
ui(xi;x¡i) ¶ arg max
xi2Xi
P(xi;x¡i): (7.2)
Conclude from (7.1) and (7.2) that P is a best-response potential for the game G. 2
If the strategy space X is countable, i.e., X is ¯nite or there exists a bijection between
I N and X, the proper order condition is redundant.
Theorem 7.4 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a strategic game. If X is countable, then
G is a best-response potential game if and only if X contains no best-response cycles.
Proof. If X is countable, X» is countable. It follows from Lemma 5.4 that (X»;Á) is
properly ordered. The result now follows from Theorem 7.3. 2
This theorem, together with Proposition 7.2 generalizes Theorem 4.2 in Jurg et al.
(1993).
7.4 Relations with other potential games
Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduce exact, weighted, ordinal, and generalized ordinal
potential games. The relations between these classes of games (indicated by E, W, O,
and G, respectively) and best-response potential games (indicated by BR) are indicated
in Figure 7.1. For easy reference, their de¯nitions are as follows. A strategic game
hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is
² an exact potential game if there exists a function P : X ! I R such that for all
i 2 N, for all x¡i 2 X¡i, and all yi;zi 2 Xi:
ui(yi;x¡i) ¡ ui(zi;x¡i) = P(yi;x¡i) ¡ P(zi;x¡i):
² a weighted potential game if there exists a function P : X ! I R and a vector (wi)i2N
of positive numbers such that for all i 2 N, for all x¡i 2 X¡i, and all yi;zi 2 Xi:
ui(yi;x¡i) ¡ ui(zi;x¡i) = wi(P(yi;x¡i) ¡ P(zi;x¡i)):
² an ordinal potential game if there exists a function P : X ! I R such that for all
i 2 N, for all x¡i 2 X¡i, and all yi;zi 2 Xi:
ui(yi;x¡i) ¡ ui(zi;x¡i) > 0 , P(yi;x¡i) ¡ P(zi;x¡i) > 0:Relations with other potential games 83
² a generalized ordinal potential game if there exists a function P : X ! I R such that
for all i 2 N, for all x¡i 2 X¡i, and all yi;zi 2 Xi:
ui(yi;x¡i) ¡ ui(zi;x¡i) > 0 ) P(yi;x¡i) ¡ P(zi;x¡i) > 0:
Since Monderer and Shapley already indicated the relations between their classes of





Figure 7.1: Relations between classes of potential games
That an ordinal potential game is a best-response potential game follows immedi-
ately from their de¯nitions. Example 7.5 indicates that a generalized ordinal potential
game is not necessarily a best-response potential game. Example 7.6 indicates that a
best-response potential game is not necessarily a generalized ordinal potential game. Ex-
ample 7.7 indicates that the intersection of the set of best-response potential games and
generalized ordinal potential games properly includes the set of ordinal potential games,
i.e., there are games which are both a best-response and a generalized ordinal potential
game, but not an ordinal potential game.
Example 7.5 The game in Figure 7.2a has a generalized ordinal potential as given in
Figure 7.2b. However, a best-response potential (and ordinal potential) would have to
satisfy P(T;L) = P(B;L) > P(B;R) > P(T;R) > P(T;L), which is a contradiction. /
Example 7.6 The game in Figure 7.3a has a best-response potential as given in Fig-
ure 7.3b. However, a generalized ordinal (or ordinal) potential would have to satisfy









Figure 7.2: Not a best-response potential game
L M R
T 2,2 1,0 0,1
B 0,0 0,1 1,0
a
L M R
T 4 3 0
B 0 2 1
b
Figure 7.3: Not a generalized ordinal potential game
Example 7.7 The game in Figure 7.4a has a best-response and generalized ordinal
potential as given in Figure 7.4b. However, an ordinal potential would have to satisfy
P(T;M) > P(B;M) > P(B;R) > P(T;R) = P(T;M), a contradiction. /
L M R
T 0,2 1,0 0,0
B 0,2 0,1 1,0
a
L M R
T 4 3 0
B 4 2 1
b
Figure 7.4: Not an ordinal potential game
7.5 Discussion
There are several reasons for introducing best-response potential games. In the ¯rst
place, they are based on a simple insight: to determine Nash equilibria, what matters
are best-responses. It is quite natural, in trying to ¯nd out whether a ¯nite game has
a Nash equilibrium, to look at the best situation a player can achieve by changing his
strategy choice. This idea is at the root of ¯ctitious play (Brown, 1951). Moreover, this
is exactly what Milchtaich (1996) does to prove the existence of an equilibrium in his
congestion games.
Best-response potential games di®er from the potential games of Monderer and Shap-
ley in an important aspect: they allow the presence of in¯nite improvement paths even
in ¯nite games. The games of Monderer and Shapley have equilibria because one could
look at an improvement path and notice that it stopped somewhere. Best-response
potential games give su±cient conditions for the existence of equilibria even if in¯nite
improvement paths exist, as is the case in Example 7.6.Discussion 85
The obvious next step would be to consider games in which the Nash equilibrium
set corresponds with the Nash equilibrium set of a suitably chosen coordination game.
Formally,
De¯nition 7.8 A strategic game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is a Nash potential game if
there exists a function P : X ! I R such that for all x 2 X:
x is a Nash equilibrium of G , x is a Nash equilibrium of hN;(Xi)i2N;(P)i2Ni:
The function P is called a (Nash) potential of the game G. /
It turns out that in ¯nite games, the set of Nash potential games is exactly the set
of games with pure Nash equilibria. But in the in¯nite case, this concept makes no
distinction whatsoever: every in¯nite game is a Nash potential game.
Theorem 7.9 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a game.
² If G is ¯nite, G is a Nash potential game if and only if it has a pure Nash equilib-
rium;
² If G is in¯nite, G is a Nash potential game.
Proof. Clearly, a ¯nite Nash potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Now assume that G has a pure Nash equilibrium. It is shown that G is a Nash
potential game, irrespective of the cardinality of the strategy space X.
De¯ne the function p : X £NE(G) ! f0;1;:::;jNjg for each strategy pro¯le x 2 X
and each Nash equilibrium y of G as
p(x;y) =j fi 2 N : xi 6= yig j;
i.e., p(x;y) is the number of players that need to switch strategies to turn x into the
Nash equilibrium y. De¯ne the function P : X ! I R for each x 2 X as
P(x) = ¡ min
y2NE(G)
p(x;y);
i.e., P(x) equals minus the minimal number of strategy changes that is required to go
from x to a Nash equilibrium.
To see that P is a Nash potential for the game G, de¯ne H = hN;(Xi)i2N;(P)i2Ni
and notice that
x 2 NE(H) , P(x) = 0 , x 2 NE(G):
All implications are trivial, except the fact that P(x) = 0 if x 2 NE(H). To see this, let
x 2 X be such that P(x) < 0. Take y 2 NE(G) such that P(x) = ¡p(x;y) and select
i 2 N such that xi 6= yi. Then P(x) < P(yi;x¡i), so x = 2 NE(H).86 Best-Response Potential Games
This settles the proof that every game with a Nash equilibrium is a Nash potential
game. Remains to show that an in¯nite game without Nash equilibria is also a Nash
potential game. In that case, at least one player i 2 N has an in¯nite strategy set Xi.
This set has a countable subset with elements indexed xi;s;s 2 I N. De¯ne the function





s if xi = xi;s
0 otherwise.
To see that the coordination game with payo® functions P has no Nash equilibria, let
x 2 X. Now either xi = xi;s for some s 2 I N in which case P(x) = s, or P(x) = 0. In
both cases, player i 2 N would do better by deviating to xi;s+1. 2Chapter 8
Equilibria and Approximate
Equilibria in In¯nite Potential
Games
8.1 Introduction
In strategic games where each player has only ¯nitely many pure strategies, the existence
of Nash equilibria is not guaranteed, unless mixed strategies are allowed (Nash, 1950a,
1951). In games where two or more players have in¯nitely many pure strategies, this
result breaks down: not even mixed strategies yield equilibrium existence. A famous
example is the 1£1 zero-sum game of Wald (1945) where both players choose a natural
number and the player choosing the smallest number pays one dollar to the other player.
Norde and Potters (1997) prove that approximate equilibria exist in bimatrix games
where one player has a ¯nite number of pure strategies and the other player in¯nitely
(but countably) many pure strategies.
Since maxima of potential functions coincide with Nash equilibria of the correspond-
ing game and a potential function achieves its maximum over a ¯nite set of strategy
pro¯les, it follows that ¯nite potential games have Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
This need no longer be the case if in¯nite games are considered.
If a Nash equilibrium does not exist, there may be strategy pro¯les in which players
either receive a large payo® that satis¯es them or cannot gain too much from deviating.
Such an instance is an approximate equilibrium. Approximate equilibria are de¯ned in
Section 8.2.
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide some results on the existence of Nash
equilibria or approximate equilibria in in¯nite potential games. Norde and Tijs (1998)
provided results for exact potential games. These results are summarized in Section 8.3.
Voorneveld (1997) looks at more general classes of potential games. In Section 8.4 we
look at approximate equilibria for such general classes of potential games. We show that
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generalized ordinal potential games in which at most one player has an in¯nite set of
strategies always have approximate equilibria. This generalizes a theorem from Norde
and Tijs (1998) on exact potential games to ordinal and generalized ordinal potential
games.
An open problem from Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) is solved in Section 8.5 by
showing that an ordinal potential game where all players have compact strategy sets and
continuous payo® functions may not have a continuous ordinal potential function.
8.2 De¯nitions and preliminary results
First, recall the de¯nitions of the several classes of potential games as summarized in
Chapter 7, in particular Section 7.4. If G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni is a potential game, i.e.
admits any type of potential, the potential maximizer is the set of strategy combinations
x 2 X for which some potential P achieves a maximum. The following proposition
summarizes the existence result for pure Nash equilibria in ¯nite potential games.
Proposition 8.1 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a potential game and P a potential
for G. If x 2 X is a Nash equilibrium of hN;(Xi)i2N;(P)i2Ni, i.e., of the coordination
game with all payo® functions replaced by P, then x is a Nash equilibrium of G. In
particular, every ¯nite potential game has at least one pure Nash equilibrium, since the
potential maximizer is nonempty.
If G is an exact or ordinal potential game and x is a Nash equilibrium of G, then x is also
a Nash equilibrium of hN;(Xi)i2N;(P)i2Ni. This is not necessarily true for generalized
ordinal potential games.
Example 8.2 Consider a one-player game with strategy space X1 and u1(x) = 0 for
all x 2 X1. Then any function P : X1 ! I R is a generalized ordinal potential function,
since in generalized ordinal potential games there are no requirements on the potential
function if the deviating player's payo® does not change. So the maxima of P w.r.t.
unilateral deviations not necessarily pick out all pure Nash equilibria of the game. /
Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a game. Recall that a path in the strategy space is
a sequence of strategy pro¯les generated by unilateral deviations and that a cycle is a
nontrivial path that ends where it started. Call a cycle (x1;:::;xm) in the strategy space
X an improvement cycle if at each step k 2 f1;:::;m ¡ 1g the unique deviating player
i(k) 2 N increases his payo®: ui(k)(xk) < ui(k)(xk+1). The proof of the following lemma
is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Lemma 8.3 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a generalized ordinal potential game.
Then G contains no improvement cycles.In¯nite exact potential games 89
Let " > 0;k 2 I R. A strategy xi 2 Xi of player i 2 N is called an "-best response to
x¡i 2 X¡i if
ui(xi;x¡i) > = sup
yi2Xi
ui(yi;x¡i) ¡ "
and a k-guaranteeing response to x¡i 2 X¡i if
ui(xi;x¡i) > = k:
By playing an "-best response, a player makes sure that he cannot gain more than " by
deviating. Playing a k-guaranteeing response gives him a payo® of at least k. If xi is
either an "-best or k-guaranteeing response (or both) to x¡i, it is called an (";k)-best
response to x¡i. Notice that an (";k)-best response to x¡i always exists. A strategy
combination x 2 X is called an "-equilibrium of the game G if for each i 2 N, xi is an
"-best response to x¡i. It is called an (";k)-equilibrium if xi is an (";k)-best response to
x¡i for all i 2 N. In such an equilibrium, each player can gain at most " from deviating
or receives at least a utility of k.
A game is called weakly determined if it has an (";k)-equilibrium for every " > 0 and
every k 2 I R.
This section is concluded with some examples to illustrate these de¯nitions. Notice
that a one-person game is trivially a potential game.
Example 8.4 Consider a one-person game with the player having strategy space Z and
u(x) = x for all x 2 Z. This game has no Nash equilibria, but is weakly determined,
since for every k 2 I R, x = dke is a k-guaranteeing response, where for r 2 I R;dre is the
smallest integer greater than or equal to r. /
Example 8.5 Consider a one-person game with the player having strategy space (0;1)
and u(x) = ¡1
x for all x 2 (0;1). This game has no Nash equilibria, but for every " > 0,
x > 1
" is an "-equilibrium. /
The following example from Norde and Tijs (1998) shows that in¯nite potential games
may not be weakly determined.
Example 8.6 Consider the 1£1-bimatrix game with payo® functions u1(i;j) = i¡j
and u2(i;j) = j ¡ i, where i;j 2 I N. This is an exact potential game, with a potential
P(i;j) = i+j for all i;j 2 I N. Clearly, this game does not have (";k)-equilibria whenever
k > 0. /
8.3 In¯nite exact potential games
The results concerning weak determinateness of exact potential games that were obtained
by Norde and Tijs (1998) rely heavily on the fact that di®erences in the value of the90 Equilibria and Approximate Equilibria in In¯nite Potential Games
potential coincide with the di®erence in utility to deviating players or on the decomposi-
tion of exact potential games into coordination games and dummy games. These results
are summarized in this section. In the next section, more general classes of potential
games are considered.
Call a game continuous if the strategy spaces are topological spaces and all payo®
functions are continuous with respect to the product topology. Continuous exact po-
tential games have continuous exact potential functions and continuous functions on a
compact set achieve a maximum. Hence (cf. Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Lemma 4.3):
Proposition 8.7 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a continuous exact potential game
with compact strategy sets. Then G has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Moreover,
Proposition 8.8 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be an exact potential game with upper
bounded potential P. Then G is weakly determined.
Proof. Let " > 0. Choose x 2 X such that P(x) > supy2X P(y) ¡ ". Then x is an
"-equilibrium of G. 2
Exact potential games where at most one player has a non-compact set of pure strategies
are | under some continuity assumptions | weakly determined. Recall that a real-
valued function f on a topological space T is lower semi-continuous if for each c 2 I R the
set fx 2 T j f(x) < = cg is closed.
Theorem 8.9 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be an exact potential game. If
² X1;:::;Xn¡1 are compact topological spaces,
² x¡n 7! ui(xn;x¡n) is continuous for all i 2 N n fng and xn 2 Xn, and
² x¡n 7! un(xn;x¡n) is lower semi-continuous for all xn 2 Xn,
then G is weakly determined.
Proof. According to Proposition 8.8 it su±ces to look at exact potentials P which are
not upper bounded. Let xn 2 Xn and (y1;:::;yn¡1) 2 X¡n. By de¯nition of an exact
potential function it follows that for every (x1;:::;xn¡1) 2 X¡n:
P(x1;:::;xn) = u1(x1;x2;:::;xn) ¡ u1(y1;x2;:::;xn)
+ u2(y1;x2;:::;xn) ¡ u2(y1;y2;:::;xn)
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+ un¡1(y1;y2;:::;xn¡1;xn) ¡ un¡1(y1;y2;:::;yn¡1;xn)
+ P(y1;:::;yn¡1;xn);
which shows that x¡n 7! P(xn;x¡n) is continuous. Let k 2 I R and de¯ne dn = un ¡ P.
Then x¡n 7! dn(xn;x¡n) is lower semi-continuous for every xn 2 Xn. Moreover, dn does
not depend on xn, so we may de¯ne l = minx2X dn(x). Choose y = (y1;:::;yn) 2 X
such that P(y) > = k ¡ l, which is possible since P is not upper bounded. Since x¡n 7!
P(yn;x¡n) is continuous and X¡n is compact, we may choose z¡n 2 X¡n such that
P(yn;z¡n) = maxx¡n2X¡n P(xn;z¡n). Then players i 2 N n fng cannot at all improve
upon (yn;z¡n) and un(yn;z¡n) = P(yn;z¡n) + dn(yn;z¡n) > = P(yn;y¡n) + l > = k, so
(yn;z¡n) is an (";k)-equilibrium for every " > 0. 2
Consider an exact potential game G in which all but one player have a ¯nite set of pure
strategies. Endow these ¯nite sets with the discrete topology. An immediate corollary of
Theorem 8.9 is that G is weakly determined. This result is generalized in Theorem 8.11.
But what happens if two players have in¯nite sets of pure strategies? Then a remarkable
phenomenon occurs: there may be games with the same exact potential function, of
which one game is weakly determined and the other not.
Example 8.10 Consider 1 £ 1-bimatrix game where X1 = X2 = I N and u1(i;j) =
u2(i;j) = i + j for all i;j 2 I N. This is an exact potential game with potential P(i;j) =
i + j for all i;j 2 I N. Let k 2 I R;" > 0. Let r = dke 2 I N be the smallest integer
greater than or equal to k. Then (r;r) is an (";k)-equilibrium, so this game is weakly
determined.
Now change the payo® functions to those in Example 8.6. Again P : (i;j) 7! i+j is
an exact potential of this game, but the game is not weakly determined. /
8.4 In¯nite potential games
The results in the previous section concerned exact potential games. In this section we
look at other classes of potential games. If at most one player in a generalized ordinal
potential game has an in¯nite set of strategies, the game has (";k)-equilibria for all
" > 0;k 2 I R.
Theorem 8.11 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a generalized ordinal potential game.
If X1;:::;Xn¡1 are ¯nite sets, then G is weakly determined.
Proof. Let P be a potential for G. Fix '(xn) 2 argmaxx¡n2X¡n P(xn;x¡n) for each
xn 2 Xn. Let " > 0;k 2 I R. Construct a sequence ° = (x1;x2;:::) in X as follows: Take
xn 2 Xn, de¯ne x1 = (xn;'(xn)). Let m 2 I N. Suppose xm is de¯ned. If m is odd, and92 Equilibria and Approximate Equilibria in In¯nite Potential Games
² xm
n is not an (";k)-best response to xm
¡n, take xm+1 = (xn;xm
¡n) with xn an (";k)-
best response to xm
¡n;
² otherwise, stop.
If m is even, and
² xm
¡n = 2 argmaxx¡n2X¡n P(xm




If the sequence ° is ¯nite, the terminal point is clearly an (";k)-equilibrium. So now
assume this sequence is in¯nite.
Since the sets X1;:::;Xn¡1 are ¯nite, there exist l;m 2 I N such that l is even,
m is odd, l < m, and xl
¡n = xm
¡n. By construction, P(xl) < P(xm), which implies
un(xl) < = un(xm). But xl
n is an (";k)-best response to xl
¡n = xm
¡n, so xm




n ), the other players cannot improve at all. Hence xm
is an (";k)-equilibrium. 2
Example 8.6 indicates that this result cannot be extended to include two or more players
with an in¯nite strategy set.
Under di®erent assumptions one can also establish existence of Nash equilibria, like
in the following theorem. Recall that a real-valued function f on a topological space T
is called upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) if for each c 2 I R the set fx 2 T j f(x) > = cg is
closed.
Theorem 8.12 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a generalized ordinal potential game or
a best-response potential game. If X1;:::;Xn¡1 are ¯nite, Xn is a compact topological
space and un is u.s.c. in the n-th coordinate, then G has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Fix for each x¡n 2 X¡n an element '(x¡n) 2 ©(x¡n) = argmaxz2Xn un(z;x¡n),
which is possible by the upper semi-continuity and compactness conditions.
Suppose that G does not have a Nash equilibrium. Let x¡n 2 X¡n. Take x1 =
('(x¡n);x¡n). Then there exists an in¯nite path (x1;x2;:::) such that for each k 2 I N, if
xk
n = 2 ©(xk
¡n), then xk+1 = ('(xk
¡n);xk
¡n), and otherwise xk+1 = (yi;xk
¡i) for some player
i 2 N n fng not playing a best response against xk
¡i and yi 2 argmaxxi2Xi ui(xi;xk
¡i) a
best response to xk
¡i.
Since X¡n is ¯nite and player n uses only strategies from f'(x¡n) j x¡n 2 X¡ng,
there exist k;l 2 I N;k < l, such that xk = xl. Hence (xk;xk+1;:::;xl) is a best-response
cycle and in particular an improvement cycle. However, Theorem 7.3 and Lemma 8.3
show that the absence of such cycles is necessary for the existence of a best-response or
generalized ordinal potential function, which yields the desired contradiction. 2Continuity of potential functions 93
8.5 Continuity of potential functions
Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) study properties of the potential maximizer. It was left as
an open problem in their paper whether ordinal potential games on a compact strategy
space with payo® functions ui which are continuous in the i-th coordinate have a non-
empty potential maximizer or, even stronger, whether all such ordinal potential games
possess a continuous potential. The result from this section indicates that this is not the
case, even if payo® functions are continuous in each coordinate.
Theorem 8.13 There exists an ordinal potential game with compact strategy spaces and
continuous payo® functions for which no potential achieves a maximum and which con-
sequently has no continuous ordinal potential function.
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(x2+y2)3 otherwise.
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xy
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for the game. This follows easily from u1(x;y) = y5P(x;y) and u2(x;y) = x5P(x;y).
Now consider any ordinal potential Q for this game and the path C in the strategy





2n) to ( 1
2n+1; 1
2n)::: This path is depicted in
Figure 8.1.
For n 2 I N0 and y = 1
2n the functions u1(¢;y) and (hence) Q(¢;y) are strictly decreasing
on [ 1
2n+1; 1
2n]. We will work out this case and leave other similar cases to the reader. The








(x2 + y2)4 :
Since 1
2n+1 < = x < =
1
2n, we have that 1
22n ¡ 5
22n < = y2¡5x2 < =
1
22n ¡ 5
22n+2, which is equivalent
to ¡4





Similarly, for n 2 I N and x = 1
2n the functions u2(x;¢) and (hence) Q(x;¢) are strictly
decreasing on [ 1
2n; 1
2n¡1]. This implies that Q must strictly increase along the path C
from (1;1) to (0;0).94 Equilibria and Approximate Equilibria in In¯nite Potential Games
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .








Figure 8.1: The strategy space and path C from Theorem 8.13.
Also Q(x;0) = Q(1;0) < Q(1;1) and Q(0;y) = Q(0;1) < Q(1;1). Once again using
the above, if (x;y) lies to the right of C, like the point a in Figure 8.1, and (x0;y) is
on C, like the point a0, then Q(x;y) < Q(x0;y), since given y 2 (0;1), there exists a
n 2 I N such that 1
2n < = y < 1
2n¡1. Then by de¯nition ( 1
2n;y) is on C and u1(¢;y) is strictly
decreasing on [ 1
2n;1].
Also, if (x;y) lies to the left of C, like the point b, and (x;y0) is on C, like the point
b0, then Q(x;y) < Q(x;y0), since, given x 2 (0;1), there exists an n 2 I N such that
1
2n+1 < = x < 1
2n. Then by de¯nition (x; 1
2n) is on C and u2(x;¢) is strictly decreasing on
[ 1
2n;1].
Therefore, for any (x;y) 2 [0;1]2, we have Q(x;y) < Q( 1
2n; 1
2n) for some n 2 I N0.
For the points a and b in Figure 8.1, such points are denoted by a00 and b00, respectively.
Since the sequence fQ( 1
2n; 1
2n)g1
n=0 is strictly increasing, Q has no maximum, which is
what we had to prove.
The continuity of a potential function for this game together with the compactness
of the strategy space in the product topology would imply the existence of a maximum,
contradicting our proof. Hence this game has no continuous potential. 2Continuity of potential functions 95
Notice that continuity, however, is too strong a requirement. Reasonable conditions may
exist under which a potential turns out to be upper semi-continuous, which given the
compactness of the strategy space would still result in a maximum.96 Equilibria and Approximate Equilibria in In¯nite Potential GamesChapter 9
Ordinal Games and Potentials
9.1 Potential functions and utility functions
In the previous chapters we studied several classes of potential games and gave applica-
tions to economic problems. The present chapter concludes our discussion of potential
games.
We saw that potential functions are a handy tool for establishing results concerning
Nash equilibria; a central result was the existence of pure Nash equilibria in ¯nite games.
But is a potential just a handy tool? Is there no exact meaning we can attach to a
potential function? Several authors (Slade, 1994, Monderer and Shapley, 1996) have
asked themselves this question, but did not come up with an answer. This can be due
to the fact that there are many di®erent types of potential functions, which tends to
blur the overall picture. Norde and Patrone (1999) are motivated by Voorneveld and
Norde (1997) to extend the notion of potentials to ordinal games. Although seemingly
ignoring the question of attaching a meaning to the potential function, they nevertheless
implicitly provide an answer.
Consider a game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni. If the aim is to check whether or not a given
strategy pro¯le x 2 X is a Nash equilibrium and a player i 2 N unilaterally deviates,
then the only factor of interest is how this a®ects player i's payo®; the e®ect of i's
deviation on another player j 6= i is of no concern whatsoever. Abstracting from such
irrelevant information, one can say that the preferences of the unilaterally deviating
players de¯ne an overall preference relation, a binary relation Á on the strategy space X
such that for each pair x;y 2 X of strategy pro¯les, x Á y if and only if x and y di®er
in exactly one | say the i-th | coordinate and ui(x) < ui(y). All types of potential
functions P introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996) have in common that
8x;y 2 X : x Á y ) P(x) < P(y):
So P is essentially a utility function representing the relation Á; summarizing:
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A potential function as de¯ned by Monderer and Shapley is an overall utility
function in the sense that it represents the preferences of unilaterally deviat-
ing players.
Notice that the binary relation Á is neither complete nor transitive; no comparisons are
made between strategy pro¯les that di®er in more than one coordinate. The reason for
this is illustrated in the following example.




Figure 9.1: A potential game
preference relation Á is given by
(T;R) Á (T;L);(B;L) Á (T;L);(T;R) Á (B;R);(B;L) Á (B;R):
It is clear that the following two functions P and Q are (ordinal) potentials of this game:
P(T;L) = 1; P(T;R) = P(B;L) = 0; P(B;R) = 1;
Q(T;L) = 2; Q(T;R) = Q(B;L) = 0; Q(B;R) = 1:
P ranks the two pure Nash equilibria of the game equally; but no meaning should be
attached to the di®erence between the value of the potential at (T;L) and (B;R): even
though both players prefer the equilibrium (B;R) to the equilibrium (T;L), the potential
function Q attaches a lower value to (B;R). This justi¯es looking at the incomplete and
nontransitive order Á.
Having established that a potential function is a utility function representing prefer-
ences of unilaterally deviating players, some intuition arises for the speci¯c requirements
that make a game a potential game. In utility theory, it is common that the absence of
certain cycles in a binary relation is necessary and su±cient for the existence of a utility
function representing this relation (Bridges, 1983).
In the remainder of this chapter, we consider ordinal games: games in which a player
is characterized by a general type of preferences on the strategy space. The main question
will be whether we can still ¯nd something like a potential function and what type of
cycles must be excluded. We start by taking a step back. Instead of looking at games with
multiple players, the case of a single decision maker is treated ¯rst. The decision maker
is endowed with a preference structure specifying his strict preference and indi®erence
relation over a countable set of outcomes.Preference structures 99
To handle nontransitive indi®erence relations, Luce (1956) introduced his well-known
threshold model in which a decision maker prefers one outcome over another if and only
if the increase in utility exceeds a certain nonnegative threshold. Formally, denoting
the set of outcomes by X, strict preference by Â and indi®erence by », each x 2 X is
assigned a utility u(x) and a threshold t(x) > = 0 such that for all x;y 2 X:
x Â y , u(x) > u(y) + t(y)




u(x) < = u(y) + t(y);
u(y) < = u(x) + t(x):
In this chapter, most of which is based on Voorneveld (1999b), also incomparability
between outcomes and nontransitivity of strict preferences is allowed. Incomparabilities
arise if the decision maker is not capable to compare outcomes, ¯nds it unethical to do
so, or thinks that outcomes are comparable, but lacks the information to do so. Fishburn
(1991) motivates nontransitive preferences. In this case the double implications above
are replaced by single implications, so that we want for all x;y 2 X:
x Â y ) u(x) > u(y) + t(y)




u(x) < = u(y) + t(y);
u(y) < = u(x) + t(x)
Our main theorem gives necessary and su±cient conditions for the existence of functions
u and t as above on a broad class of preference structures over a countable set of alter-
natives. As a corollary, a representation theorem of interval orders (See Bridges, 1983,
and Fishburn, 1970) is obtained.
Section 9.2 provides de¯nitions of preference structures, Section 9.3 formulates the
main representation theorem. The di±culty of extending the theorem to uncountable
sets is illustrated in Section 9.4. In Section 9.5 the representation theorem from Section
9.3 and Lemma 5.4 are used to characterize two types of potential functions for ordinal
games through the absence of certain cycles in the strategy space.
9.2 Preference structures
A preference structure on a set X is a pair (Â;») of binary relations on X such that
² For each x;y 2 X, at most one of the following is true: x Â y;y Â x;x » y;
² The relation » is re°exive and symmetric.100 Ordinal Games and Potentials
The ¯rst condition implies that Â is anti-symmetric (if x Â y, then not y Â x). With Â
interpreted as strict preference and » as indi®erence, this leads to a very general type of
preferences in which neither strict preference, nor indi®erence is assumed to be transitive
and in which a decision maker may have pairs x;y 2 X which he cannot compare; this
imposes much less rationality restrictions on the decision maker than usual. Let us give
an example of such a preference structure.
Example 9.1 An agent intends to invest in one of four sports teams: X = fa;b;c;dg.
He has to base his decision on a limited amount of information: the number of scored
points of each team in the matches played in the last three weeks; so each of the four
teams can be represented by a vector in I R
3. For instance, b = (1;3;0) 2 I R
3 indicates
that team b scored one point one week ago, three points two weeks ago, and no points
three weeks ago. His preferences are based on coordinate-wise comparisons. Being
convinced that a one-point di®erence can be based on pure luck rather than quality, he
¯nds a di®erence between two scores noticeable if it exceeds one. He bases his judgment
between to teams x and y in X on the most recent pair of consecutive matches i;i + 1
in which the teams scored a noticeably di®erent number of points.
² if no such pair exists, he is indi®erent between x and y;
² if such a pair does exist, then




xi > yi + 1
xi+1 > yi+1 + 1
² otherwise he cannot compare.
To illustrate this, assume
a = (a1;a2;a3) = (4;4;0);b = (1;3;0);c = (2;2;2);d = (3;0;0):
By de¯nition, his equivalence relation is re°exive: 8x 2 X : x » x. Since a2 = 4 and
b2 = 3 are not noticeably di®erent, there is no pair of consecutive matches in which
teams a and b scored a noticeably di®erent number of points. Therefore a » b and b » a.
Similarly b » c;c » b;a » d, and d » a. But team a scored a noticeably higher number
of points in the most recent two matches than team c: a1 > c1+1 and a2 > c2+1. Hence
a Â c. Similarly c Â d: the teams did not score a noticeably di®erent number of points
in the most recent match, but c performed noticeably better than d two and three weeks
ago: c2 > d2 + 1 and c3 > d3 + 1. Finally, notice that b and d are incomparable: the
number of points of both teams in the most recent two matches is noticeably di®erent,
but one week ago d was noticeably better than b (d1 > b1 +1), whereas two weeks ago b
was noticeably better than d (b2 > d2 + 1).Preference structures 101
This relation satis¯es the conditions on a preference structure. However, neither »
nor Â is transitive, since
a » b;b » c;a Â c;
and
a Â c;c Â d;a » d:
/
Consider a set X with preference structure (Â;»). A path in X is a ¯nite sequence
(x1;:::;xm) of elements of X such that for each k = 1;:::;m ¡ 1, either xk Â xk+1 or
xk » xk+1. In the ¯rst case, we speak of a Â-connection between xk and xk+1, in the
second case of a »-connection between xk and xk+1. A cycle in X is a path (x1;:::;xm)
in X with at least two di®erent elements of X and x1 = xm.
A path (x1;:::;xm) in X has two consecutive »-connections if for some k = 1;:::;m¡
2: xk » xk+1 and xk+1 » xk+2 or | in case the path is a cycle | if x1 » x2 and
xm¡1 » xm = x1.
Denote by ¤ the composition of Â and », i.e., for each x;y 2 X:
x ¤ y , (9z 2 X : x Â z; and z » y):
Since » is re°exive, x Â y implies x¤y. The relation ¤ is acyclic if its transitive closure
is irre°exive, i.e., if there is no ¯nite sequence (x1;:::;xm) of elements of X such that
x1 = xm and for each k = 1;:::;m ¡ 1: xk ¤ xk+1.
A special case of a preference structure is an interval order (Fishburn, 1970). The
preference structure (Â;») is an interval order if for each x;y 2 X
x » y , ( not x Â y and not y Â x); (9.1)
and for each x;x0;y;y0 2 X
(x Â y and x
0 Â y
0) ) (x Â y
0 or x
0 Â y):
In interval orders, exactly one of the claims x Â y;y Â x;x » y is true. De¯ne the
binary relation º on X by taking for each x;y 2 X:
x º y , not y Â x:
Then it is easily seen that a preference structure satisfying (9.1) is an interval order if
and only if for each x;x0;y;y0 2 X:
x Â x
0 º y
0 Â y ) x Â y: (9.2)
Hence, interval orders have transitive strict preference Â. The preference structure of an
interval order can be identi¯ed with the relation Â, since the relations » and º follow
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Lemma 9.2 Let Â be an interval order on a set X. Then the relation ¤ is acyclic.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that X contains a cycle (x1;y1;x2;y2;:::;xm¡1;ym¡1;xm)
such that for each k = 1;:::;m¡1: xk Â yk and yk » xk+1. Then x1 Â y1 by de¯nition.
Moreover, x1 Â y1 » x2 Â y2, so (9.2) implies x1 Â y2. Similarly, one shows that x1 Â yk
for each k = 1;:::;m ¡ 1. In particular, x1 Â ym¡1. However, by de¯nition of the
cycle, ym¡1 » xm = x1, so x1 » ym¡1 by symmetry of ». But at most one of the two
possibilities x1 Â ym¡1 and x1 » ym¡1 is true, a contradiction. 2
9.3 The representation theorem
This section contains the main theorem and an application of this theorem to obtain a
well-known characterization of interval orders.
Theorem 9.3 Let X be a countable set and (Â;») a preference structure on X. The
following claims are equivalent.
(a) There exist functions u : X ! I R and t : X ! I R+ such that for all x;y 2 X:
x Â y ) u(x) > u(y) + t(y)




u(x) < = u(y) + t(y);
u(y) < = u(x) + t(x)
(b) The relation ¤ is acyclic;
(c) Every cycle in X contains at least two consecutive »-connections.
Proof.
(a) ) (b): Assume (a) holds and suppose that ¤ is cyclic. Take a sequence (x1;:::;xm)
of points in X such that x1 = xm and for each k = 1;:::;m ¡ 1 : xk ¤ xk+1. Then for
each such k there exists a yk 2 X such that xk Â yk and yk » xk+1, which implies
u(xk) > u(yk) + t(yk) > = u(xk+1). Hence u(x1) > u(x2) > ::: > u(xm) = u(x1), a
contradiction.
(b) ) (c): Suppose (x1;:::;xm) is a cycle in X without two consecutive »-connections.
W.l.o.g. x1 Â x2. Let (y1;:::;yn) with n < = m be the sequence of points in X obtained by
removing from (x1;:::;xm) all those points xk (k = 1;:::;m ¡ 1) satisfying xk » xk+1,
i.e., all those points that are indi®erent to the next point in the cycle. Notice that by
construction y1 = x1, yn = xm = x1, and for each k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1 there exists an
l 2 f1;:::;m ¡ 1g such that
² either yk = xl and yk+1 = xl+1, in which case yk Â yk+1, which implies yk ¤ yk+1,The representation theorem 103
² or yk = xl and yk+1 = xl+2, in which case yk Â xl+1 and xl+1 » yk+1, which also
implies yk ¤ yk+1.
But then the sequence (y1;:::;yn) indicates that ¤ is cyclic.
(c) ) (a): Assume (c) holds. Since X is countable, write X = fxk j k 2 I Ng. Call
a path from x to y a good path if it does not contain two consecutive »-connections.
De¯ne for each x ´ xk 2 X:
S(x) := fn 2 I N j there is a good path from x to xn starting with a Â -connectiong;







t(x) := 2¡k¡1 + v(x) ¡ u(x):
We proceed to prove that u and t de¯ned above give the desired representation.
² Clearly S(x) µ T(x), so v > = u and t > 0.
² Let x;xk 2 X;x Â xk. Then T(xk) µ S(x). Moreover, k 2 S(x), but k = 2 T(xk),
since by assumption every cycle in X has two consecutive »-connections. Hence
T(xk) ½ S(x) and k 2 S(x)nT(xk). So u(x) = v(xk)+
P
n2S(x)nT(xk) 2¡n > = v(xk)+
2¡k > v(xk) + 2¡k¡1 = u(xk) + t(xk).
² Let x;y 2 X;x » y. Then S(y) µ T(x). Hence u(x) + t(x) > v(x) > = u(y) and
similarly u(y) + t(y) > = u(x).
This completes the proof. 2
Remark 9.4 Luce (1956) considers nonnegative threshold functions, Fishburn (1970)
and Bridges (1983) consider positive threshold functions. Our statement of (c) involves
nonnegative threshold functions t : X ! I R+. However, in the proof that (c) implies
(a) we actually construct a positive function. Clearly, the proof that (a) implies (b)
| and hence the theorem | also holds if t were required to be positive rather than
nonnnegative. The theorem was formulated with nonnegative threshold functions for
intuitive reasons: there seems to be no reason to require that su±ciently perceptive
decision makers need to have a positive threshold above which they can perceive changes
in utility. /
An immediate corollary of this theorem is a well-known representation theorem of interval
orders. See Fishburn (1970, Theorem 4) and Bridges (1983, Theorem 2).104 Ordinal Games and Potentials
Theorem 9.5 Let X be a countable set and Â a binary relation on X. The following
claims are equivalent.
(a) The relation Â is an interval order;
(b) There exist functions u;v : X ! I R;v > = u; such that for each x;y 2 X, x Â y if
and only if u(x) > v(y);
(c) There exist functions u;t : X ! I R;t > 0, such that for each x;y 2 X, x Â y if and
only if u(x) > u(y) + t(y).
Proof. Obviously (c) ) (b) ) (a). That (a) ) (c) follows from Lemma 9.2, Remark
9.4, and Theorem 9.3. That u(x) > u(y) + t(y) implies x Â y is clear: y Â x implies
u(y)+t(y) > u(y) > u(x)+t(x) > u(x) and x » y implies u(y)+t(y) > = u(x). In interval
orders exactly one of the claims x Â y;y Â x, or x » y holds, so one must have that
x Â y. 2
9.4 Uncountable sets
In Theorem 9.3, the proof that (a) ) (b) ) (c) holds for arbitrary, not necessarily
countable, sets X. Moreover, it is easy to see that also (c) implies (b) for arbitrary
sets. However, acyclicity of ¤ does not imply the existence of the desired functions u;t
if the set X is uncountable. This is not surprising: it is usually necessary to require
additional assumptions to guarantee the existence of preference representing functions
on uncountable sets. The purpose of this section is to indicate that such assumptions
are not straightforward. Fishburn (1973) discusses representations of interval orders on
uncountable sets.
The existence of functions u;t as in part (a) of Theorem 9.3 implies that
8x;y 2 X : x ¤ y ) u(x) > u(y): (9.3)
Hence, the existence of a function u : X ! I R satisfying (9.3) is a necessary condition for
the existence of functions u;t satisfying the conditions in Theorem 9.3a. However, it is
not su±cient. Suppose such a function u exists. Without loss of generality, u is bounded
(take x 7! arctan(u(x)) if necessary). The function t : X ! I R+ has to satisfy for each
x;y 2 X, if y Â x, then u(y) ¡ u(x) > t(x) and if y » x, then u(y) ¡ u(x) < = t(x).
De¯ne S(x) := supfu(y) ¡ u(x) j y » xg and I(x) := inffu(y) ¡ u(x) j y Â xg. Let
y Â x;z » x. Then u(y) > u(z), so S(x) < = I(x). Notice also that S(x) > = u(x)¡u(x) = 0.
So if S(x) < I(x), one can take t(x) 2 [S(x);I(x)). However, if S(x) = I(x), then the
only candidate for t(x) equals S(x). But to make sure that u(y) ¡ u(x) > t(x) for all y
with y Â x, we need the additional property that the in¯mum I(x) is not achieved.
The next example shows that in some cases there exists a function u : X ! I R
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Example 9.6 Take X = I R and de¯ne for each x;y 2 I R:
x Â y , x > = y + 1;
x » y , jx ¡ yj < 1:
Then
x ¤ y , 9z 2 I R : (x > = z + 1;jz ¡ yj < 1) , 9z 2 I R : x > = z + 1 > y > z ¡ 1 , x > y:
So ¤ is acyclic and the set of functions preserving the order ¤ is the set of strictly
increasing functions u : I R ! I R. For every strictly increasing function u and every
x 2 X we have that I(x) = inf
y > = x+1 u(y)¡u(x) = u(x+1)¡u(x). Hence the in¯mum
is achieved. This means that a function t as in Theorem 9.3 exists if and only if there is
an increasing function u such that
8x 2 I R : S(x) < u(x + 1) ¡ u(x);
i.e., an increasing function u : I R ! I R such that for each x 2 I R: supy<x u(y) < u(x).
Suppose such a function u exists. We derive a contradiction by constructing an injective
function f from the uncountable set I R n Q to the countable set Q. For each x 2 I R n Q,
take f(x) 2 Q such that supy<x u(y) < f(x) < u(x). To show that f is injective, let
x;y 2 I R n Q;x < y. Then f(x) < u(x) < supz<y u(z) < f(y). /
9.5 Ordinal games and potentials
To conclude this chapter, we return to the game theoretic set-up. Consider an ordinal
game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(Âi;»i)i2Ni, where
² N is ¯nite;
² for each player i 2 N: Xi is countable, and
² for each player i 2 N: (Âi;»i) is a preference structure over X.
Examples of games in which players may be easier characterized by means of preference
structures instead of single real-valued payo® functions include multicriteria games, the
topic of the second part of this thesis.
Using the representation theorem 9.3, it follows that in certain ordinal games the
information concerning Nash equilibria can be summarized in a utility/potential function
and a threshold function.
Theorem 9.7 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(Âi;»i)i2Ni be an ordinal game. The following
claims are equivalent:106 Ordinal Games and Potentials
(a) There exist functions P : X ! I R and T : X ! I R+ such that for each i 2 N, each
x¡i 2 X¡i and each xi;yi 2 Xi:
(xi;x¡i) Âi (yi;x¡i) ) P(xi;x¡i) > P(yi;x¡i) + T(yi;x¡i):
(b) Every cycle of unilateral deviations contains at least two consecutive deviations to
strategies which the deviating players ¯nd equivalent.
One of the main motivations for this chapter was to study preference structures that
could be represented by means of a utility function and a threshold function. With-
out invoking threshold functions, one can sharpen the above theorem. The proof is
completely analogous to that of Lemma 5.4.
Theorem 9.8 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(Âi;»i)i2Ni be an ordinal game. The following
claims are equivalent:
(a) There exist functions P : X ! I R such that for each i 2 N, each x¡i 2 X¡i and
each xi;yi 2 Xi:
(xi;x¡i) Âi (yi;x¡i) ) P(xi;x¡i) > P(yi;x¡i):
(b) There are no cycles of unilateral deviations in which each deviating player changes
to an outcome he strictly prefers.Part II
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Introduction to Part II
10.1 Multicriteria optimization
Multicriteria optimization extends optimization theory by permitting several | possibly
con°icting | objective functions, which are to be `optimized' simultaneously. By now
an important branch of Operations Research (see Steuer et al., 1996), it ranges from
highly verbal approaches like Larichev and Moshkovich (1997) to highly mathematical
approaches like Sawaragi et al. (1985), and is known by various other names, includ-
ing: Pareto optimization, vector optimization, e±cient optimization, and multiobjective
optimization.
Formally, a multicriteria optimization problem can be formulated as
Optimize f1(x);:::;fr(x)
subject to x 2 F;
(10.1)
where F denotes the feasible set of alternatives and r 2 I N the number of separate
criterion functions fk : F ! I R (k = 1;:::;r).
The simultaneous optimization of multiple objective functions suggests the question:
what does it mean to optimize, i.e., what is a good outcome? Di®erent answers to this
question lead to di®erent ways of solving multicriteria optimization problems. The exact
distinction between the methods is not always clear. For a detailed description and good
introductions to the area, see White (1982), Yu (1985), and Zeleny (1982). Figure 10.1
lists several approaches. Below, their main ideas are brie°y discussed.
Suppose a feasible set of outcomes is evaluated on the basis of two criterion functions,
f1 and f2, each of which is desired to be as large as possible. Let the feasible set S in
the objective space be the polytope in Figure 10.2. That is, for every point s 2 S there
exists a feasible alternative x such that (f1(x);f2(x)) = s.
In ¯nding Pareto-optimal points, there is a common distinction between strongly and
weakly Pareto-optimal points. A feasible point in I R
n is strongly Pareto-optimal if there
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² Find the Pareto-optimal outcomes;
² Hierarchical optimization method;
² Trade-o® method;
² Scalarization method, including
{ Weighted objectives method;
{ Distance function method;
{ Minmax optimization method;
² Goal programming method;



























Figure 10.2: A 2-criterion problem
is no other feasible point which is larger in at least one coordinate and not smaller in all
other coordinates. A feasible point in I R
n is weakly Pareto-optimal if there is no other
feasible point which is larger in each coordinate. In Figure 10.2, for instance, a is neither
weakly nor strongly Pareto-optimal, b is weakly Pareto-optimal, but not strongly, since
b1 < c1 and b2 = c2, and c is strongly Pareto-optimal. The set of weakly Pareto-optimal
points consists of the line-segments (b;c), (c;d), and (d;e), whereas the set of stronglyMulticriteria optimization 111
Pareto-optimal points consists of the line-segments (c;d) and (d;e).
The hierarchical optimization method allows the decision maker to rank his criteria in
order of importance. Starting with the most important criterion function, each function
is then optimized individually, subject to possible additional constraints that restrict
the feasible domain to points giving rise to values in the previously optimized functions
that are not too far away from their optimal level. For instance, if in Figure 10.2 the
¯rst criterion is most important, the decision maker would start with maximizing f1; the
maximum of f1 is e1. In the next step, he would maximize f2 subject to the feasibility
constraints and the additional constraint that f1 cannot be more than say 5 percent
below e1. If no such slack is allowed, i.e., if the optima of the k-th ranking objective
function has to be determined subject to the constraint that the k¡1 previous objective
functions remain at their optimal level, one speaks about lexicographic optimization.
The trade-o® method, also known as the constraint method, essentially chooses one
of the objective functions as the function to optimize and imposes additional constraints
on the remaining objective functions, restricting them to lie in a desirable range, for
instance:
Optimize fk(x)
subject to x 2 F
fm(x) 2 Dm 8m 2 f1;:::;k ¡ 1;k + 1;:::;rg
There are several scalarization methods, where the multicriteria problem to be solved
is reduced to a standard optimization problem with a single objective function by, ¯rst,
de¯ning a global criterion function g : I R
r ! I R re°ecting a suitable aggregate of the
separate objective functions f1;:::;fr in the multicriteria problem (10.1) and, second,
solving
Optimize g(f1(x);:::;fr(x))
subject to x 2 F
One scalarization method is the weighted objectives method, which assigns nonnega-
tive weights wk > = 0 (k = 1;:::;r) to each of the objective functions fk in the multicriteria





subject to x 2 F;
thereby reducing the problem to a standard optimization problem with a single objective
function. If the feasible set in the objective space satis¯es certain convexity conditions,
it can be shown that all Pareto-optimal points can be found by suitable weightings of
the criteria functions. See Theorem 10.1 in Section 10.3.112 Introduction to Part II
Another scalarization method is the distance function method. Here, the distance
between the feasible set and an ideal solution is minimized. Consider Figure 10.2. In
this problem, the optimal level of the ¯rst criterion is e1 and the optimal level of the
second criterion is b2 = c2. Hence a good candidate for the ideal solution would be




The distance function method then solves
Minimize [
Pr
k=1 jfk(x) ¡ Ikjp]
1=p
subject to x 2 F;
where p 2 [1;1] is a chosen parameter re°ecting the actual norm that is optimized.
Variants include:
1. Di®erent types of distance functions;















Although usually treated separately in the literature, the minmax optimization method
is essentially a distance function method which minimizes the maximal relative deviation
of the individual objective functions from the ideal solution. Formally, it coincides with








subject to x 2 F:
The goal programming method, introduced by Charnes and Cooper (1961), requires
the decision maker to set goals for each of the objective functions. Let f0
k denote the goal
for the k-th objective function in (10.1). Next, weighting factors wk > = 0 (k = 1;:::;r)
are assigned to rank the goals in order of importance. Finally, a single objective function














k 8k 2 f1;:::;rg
d
¡
k > = 0;d
+
k > = 0 8k 2 f1;:::;rgMulticriteria games 113
10.2 Multicriteria games
In matters of con°ict, players frequently evaluate situations on the basis of several cri-
teria. Selten (1994, p.42), for instance, regards any decision procedure as \guided by
multiple goals, which are not easily comparable". Moreover, \[s]uch procedures seek to
avoid tradeo®s among di®erent goal dimensions", i.e., should not be modelled on the ba-
sis of a single goal function, but should explicitly take into account the multiple criteria
that are of relevance to the decision.
The second part of this thesis studies multicriteria games, also appearing in the
literature as `games with vector payo®s' or `multiobjective games'. The main focus is on
noncooperative games. Multicriteria games were ¯rst studied by Blackwell (1956), who
provides an analog of the minimax theorem for repeated zero-sum games with vector
payo®s in terms of approachable and excludable sets. These notions re°ect the extent to
which a player can control the trajectory of the average payo®s. A subset of the payo®
space is approachable if a player through repeated play of a zero-sum game can force
the average payo® to approach this set and excludable if the average payo® can be kept
away from this set. Blackwell's theorem is one of the central results in the theory of
repeated games with incomplete information. See Aumann and Maschler (1995).
Formally, a (noncooperative) multicriteria game is a tuple G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni,
where
² N ½ I N is a nonempty, ¯nite set of players;
² each player i 2 N has a nonempty set Xi of pure strategies, and
² for each player i 2 N the function ui :
Q
j2N Xj ! I R
r(i) maps each strategy
combination to a point in r(i)-dimensional Euclidean space.
The interpretation of the function ui is that player i 2 N considers not just one, but
r(i) 2 I N di®erent criteria.
A player i 2 N can for instance be seen as a set of individuals, as an organization
with r(i) members, each having his own utility function. Under this interpretation of
a multicriteria game we have an interesting aggregate of con°icts: the organizations
i 2 N are engaged in a noncooperative game in which the members k = 1;:::;r(i) of an
organization i jointly have to agree on a strategy choice.
In fact, this is a feature that all games in the second part of this thesis have in
common: they are based on an aggregate of con°icts, namely con°icts between the
players, but also between the criteria a speci¯c player takes into account, i.e., the relevant
characteristics by which a decision maker evaluates his strategic possibilities.
Notice that strategic games can be seen as multicriteria games in which each of the
players has exactly one criterion. The Nash equilibrium concept for strategic games
requires that each player plays a best response against the strategy combination of his114 Introduction to Part II
opponents. If a player has a real-valued utility function, best responses are unambigu-
ously de¯ned as those strategies to which there is no alternative strategy yielding a higher
utility. As observed in the previous section, the selection of good outcomes in the pres-
ence of multiple goal/utility functions is less clear. In fact, di®erent solution concepts
can be de¯ned by giving di®erent answers to the question `What is a best response?'
This topic is taken up in Chapters 11 and 13.
The Pareto equilibrium concept of Chapter 11 de¯nes best responses as those strate-
gies yielding a Pareto-optimal outcome. Pareto equilibria were ¯rst introduced by Shap-
ley (1959) in the context of two-player zero-sum games with vector payo®s. The de¯nition
easily extends to more general classes of multicriteria games. See Borm et al. (1989),
Kru¶ s and Bronisz (1994), Wang (1991, 1993), Zeleny (1975). Chapter 11 studies the
properties of the Pareto equilibrium concept and provides several axiomatic characteri-
zations. Chapter 12 considers the structure of the set of Pareto equilibria in two-person
multicriteria games, a topic that is, among other things, of computational interest.
In Chapter 13 three other solution concepts for noncooperative multicriteria games
are de¯ned:
² compromise equilibria, where players choose those strategies as best responses that
are closest to the ideal outcome. This concept is closely related to the distance
function method described in the previous section.
² Nash bargaining equilibria, where players choose those strategies as best responses
that yield a bargaining solution far away from a disagreement point. This concept
is closely related to the game theoretic literature on bargaining.
² perfect equilibria, a re¯nement of Pareto equilibria that is motivated by the re¯ne-
ment literature in noncooperative game theory.
Chapter 14 considers Pareto-optimal security strategies in two-person zero-sum games
with multiple criteria. Pareto-optimal security strategies were introduced by Ghose and
Prasad (1989) as `cautious' strategies, in the sense that a player checks, for each of his
strategy choices, what is the worst that can happen to him in each criterion separately.
In this way, a player assigns to each strategy a `security vector' that speci¯es the worst-
case scenario if this strategy is chosen. A Pareto-optimal security strategy is a strategy
that gives rise to the most agreeable worst-case scenario. Several characterizations of
Pareto-optimal security strategies are provided. In particular, Pareto-optimal security
strategies will be seen to coincide with minimax strategies of a standard matrix game, a
two-person zero-sum game with only one criterion in which each player chooses a mixed
strategy.
Cooperative multicriteria games are studied in Chapter 15. A distinction is made
between indivisible, public criteria that take the same value for all members of a coalition
of players, and divisible, private criteria, that can be freely divided over the coalitionPreliminaries 115
members. The chapter mainly focuses on a core concept for cooperative multicriteria
games. This core concept is axiomatized and additional motivation for the core concept is
provided by showing that core elements naturally arise as strong equilibria of associated
noncooperative claim games, in which players independently state coalitions they want
to form and the payo® they want to receive.
Chapter 16 proposes and analyzes a model for boundedly rational behavior of players
in interactive situations that can be modelled as an ordinal game. The model focuses on
best replies, the set of actions a player cannot improve upon given the action pro¯le of
his opponents. If a player ends up playing an action that is not a best reply against the
actions taken by his opponents, he may feel regret for not having done the right thing.
The anticipation of regret may in°uence the decision making and determine the behavior
of players. Chapter 16 suggests matching behavior as an explanation of how this in°uence
may work. Matching is observed in numerous experimental situations of decision making
under uncertainty and essentially means that an alternative is chosen with a probability
proportional to its value. A common explanation of the matching phenomenon involves
agents who do not believe that the mechanism causing the uncertainty is entirely random
and try to `outguess' the mechanism by trying to decipher the pattern. This explanation
is particularly appealing in interactive situations where players are confronted with other
players, rather than with nature.
Chapter 17 studies aggregate con°icts that arise through the uncertainty of players
about the exact game that is played. The random games that are introduced incorporate
uncertainty about all characteristics of the game: its player set, the action sets, as well
as the preferences of the involved players. Having to decide upon a course of action in
such an environment allows unforeseen contingencies to frustrate the implementation of
action choices. Maximum likelihood equilibria are introduced, a solution concept that
selects those actions that are most likely to end up in a good outcome of the random
game.
The above description of the chapters in the second part of this thesis was purposely
kept short. For more detailed introductions refer to the ¯rst sections of the respective
chapters.
10.3 Preliminaries
This section contains de¯nitions and matters of notation, additional to those provided
in Section 1.4.
Three classes of noncooperative games are considered in the following chapters. We
write
² ¡finite for the set of ¯nite multicriteria games, i.e., multicriteria games with ¯nitely
many players, each player having ¯nitely many pure strategies, and in which mixed
strategies are not allowed;116 Introduction to Part II
² ¡ for the set of mixed extensions of ¯nite multicriteria games;
² ¡strategic for the set of mixed extensions of ¯nite games in strategic form, where
¡strategic ½ ¡, since strategic games are multicriteria games in which each player
has only one criterion.
In all three cases, one needs to specify the set N of players, sets (Xi)i2N of pure strategies,
and payo® functions (ui)i2N, so we adopt the generic notation G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni
for games in all three classes and indicate where necessary with notation like G 2 ¡finite,
G 2 ¡, and/or G 2 ¡strategic whether or not mixed strategies and multidimensional
payo®s are allowed. The number of criteria of player i 2 N is denoted by r(i) 2 I N. The
mixed strategy set of player i 2 N is denoted ¢(Xi) or ¢i if the set of pure strategies is









Write Xi = f1;:::;m(i)g, where m(i) = jXij is the number of pure strategies. The
mixed strategy that assigns probability one to pure strategy k 2 Xi is denoted by
ek 2 ¢i. Mixed strategies of player i are sometimes denoted by ¾i and sometimes by
xi 2 ¢(Xi). In the second case, xik denotes the probability assigned to the k-th strategy
in Xi. The carrier of xi 2 ¢(Xi) is the set fk 2 Xi j xik > 0g of pure strategies that are
played with positive probability in xi.
For a real number x 2 I R,
jxj =
(
x if x > = 0;
¡x if x < 0;




the inner product of x and y. Let m;n 2 I N. The set of m£n matrices with real entries
is denoted by I R
m£n.
The unit simplex in I R
n is denoted by ¢n, its relative interior by ¢0
n:





xi = 1g ¢
0






For two subsets A and B of a vector space V we de¯ne A + B = fa + b j a 2 A;b 2 Bg.
Let A µ I R
n be a ¯nite set. Its convex hull, consisting of all convex combinations of
elements in A, is denoted conv (A) and is called a polytope. The comprehensive hull of
a set A µ I R
n is denoted compr (A):
compr (A) := fb 2 I R
n j b < = a for some a 2 Ag:
Semi-algebraic sets in I R
n are solution sets to systems of polynomial inequalities: a
set A µ I R
n is semi-algebraic if it is the ¯nite union of sets of the form
fx 2 I R
n j f1(x) < = 0;:::;fm(x) < = 0g;Preliminaries 117
where fk : I R
n ! I R is a polynomial function for each k = 1;:::;m.
For vectors a;b 2 I R
n, we write
a = b , 8k 2 f1;:::;ng : ak = bk
a > = b , 8k 2 f1;:::;ng : ak > = bk
a ¸ b , a > = b; and a 6= b
a > b , 8k 2 f1;:::;ng : ak > bk
Relations < = ;·;< are de¯ned analogously.
Let A µ I R
n and a;b 2 A. Then a weakly (Pareto) dominates b if a ¸ b and a strongly
(Pareto) dominates b if a > b. The weak Pareto edge of A is the set
fa 2 A j69b 2 A : b > ag:
The strong Pareto edge of A is the set
fa 2 A j69b 2 A : b ¸ ag:
Be cautious: elements of the weak Pareto edge are those points that are not strongly
dominated; elements of the strong Pareto edge are those points that are not weakly
dominated. Elements of the weak (strong) Pareto edge of A are called weakly (strongly)
Pareto optimal.
Under convexity conditions, Pareto-optimal points can be found by assigning weights
to the separate criteria and maximizing the weighted sum of the coordinates.
Theorem 10.1 Let C µ I R
n and c 2 C.
(i) If C is convex, then c is weakly Pareto-optimal if and only if there exists a ¸ 2 ¢n
such that for all d 2 C: hc;¸i > = hd;¸i;
(ii) If C is a polytope, then c is strongly Pareto-optimal if and only if there exists a
¸ 2 ¢0
n such that for all d 2 C: hc;¸i > = hd;¸i.
Proof. The `if' parts of the theorem are straightforward. We start by proving the `only
if' part of (i).
Take B = fx 2 I R
n j 9y 2 C : y > xg and A = B [ C. Then A is convex, c is weakly
Pareto-optimal in A and c lies on the boundary of A. Hence there exists a hyperplane
with normal ¸ 2 I R
n n f0g supporting A at c:
8d 2 A : hc;¸i > = hd;¸i:
Without loss of generality
Pn
k=1 ¸k = 1. To see that ¸ ¸ 0, let d 2 I R
n;d < c, (so d 2 B),
and k 2 f1;:::;ng. De¯ne for all m 2 I N : dm = d¡mek. Then c > d ¸ dm implies that
dm 2 B µ A, so
hc;¸i > = hdm;¸i = hd;¸i ¡ m¸k118 Introduction to Part II
for all m 2 I N. So ¸k > = 0. Since this holds for all k 2 f1;:::;ng and ¸ 2 I R
n n f0g, it
follows that ¸ 2 ¢n.
Next, the proof of the `only if' part of (ii). Since C is a polytope, there exist ¯nitely
many vectors v1;:::;vs 2 I R
n and real numbers ®1;:::;®s such that C = \s
k=1fx 2 I R
n j
hvk;xi < = ®kg. Let I = fk 2 f1;:::;sg j hvk;ci = ®kg. This set is nonempty, otherwise
there would be a su±ciently small " > 0 such that (c1 +";:::;cn +") 2 C, which would
strongly Pareto-dominate c.
Let M be the n £ jIj-matrix with columns fvk j k 2 Ig. Then there is no x 2 I R
n
solving xM < = 0;x ¸ 0. Otherwise, this would imply that c + "x 2 C for su±ciently
small " > 0. But then c + "x ¸ c, contradicting strong Pareto-optimality of c.
By the duality theorem (cf. Gale, 1960, p.49, Theorem 2.10), there is a vector
y 2 I R
jIj such that My > 0 and y > = 0. Take ¸ = My 2 I R
n
++ and let d 2 C. Since
hvk;di < = ®k = hvk;ci for all k 2 I, it follows that dM < = cM. Consequently, hc;¸i =
cMy > = dMy = hd;¸i. It is clear that ¸ can be normalized to add up to one, ¯nishing
the proof. 2
For two nonempty sets X µ I R
k and Y µ I R
`, a correspondence F : X! ! Y is a function
that assigns to each element x 2 X an element of 2Y nf;g, i.e., a nonempty subset F(x)
of Y . F is called upper semicontinuous (u.s.c.) in x 2 X if for every open neighborhood
V of F(x) there exists an open neighborhood U of x with F(x0) µ V for every x0 2 U.
F is upper semicontinuous (u.s.c.) on X if F is u.s.c. in each x 2 X.
Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem is a often used to prove the existence of equilibria.
Theorem 10.2 [Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem] Let C be a nonempty, compact,
convex subset of I R
p and let F : C! ! C be an u.s.c. correspondence such that F(x) is
nonempty, compact, convex for each x 2 C. Then there exists an element c 2 C such
that c 2 F(c).
The maximum theorem shows that the maxima of parametric optimization problems are
well-behaved.
Theorem 10.3 [Maximum theorem] Let X and Y be metric spaces, Y compact,
and f : X £ Y ! I R continuous. Then m : x 7! maxy2Y f(x;y) is continuous and
M : x 7! fy 2 Y j f(x;y) = m(x)g is u.s.c.Chapter 11
Pareto Equilibria in Noncooperative
Multicriteria Games
11.1 Introduction
The Nash equilibrium concept relies on the stability property that single players | given
the strategy pro¯le of their opponents | cannot deviate to a better outcome. In single-
criterion games, this is a clear statement: each player's incentives are unambiguously
described by his real-valued utility function. An incentive to deviate just means having
an alternative that yields a higher utility. In multicriteria games, the question `What is
a good outcome?' does not have such a clear answer. In fact, several extensions of the
Nash equilibrium concept to multicriteria games can be introduced, depending on the
answer to this question.
This chapter considers two extensions of the Nash equilibrium concept to nonco-
operative multicriteria games. They are based on weak and strong Pareto dominance.
Shapley (1959) was the ¯rst to introduce such equilibrium points in two-person zero-sum
games with multiple criteria. Zeleny (1975) addresses the same issue. Borm et al. (1989)
extend the analysis of Shapley to general two-person multicriteria games.
De¯nitions of weak and strong Pareto equilibria are given in Section 11.2. Pareto
equilibria are characterized as Nash equilibria in suitably weighted single-criterion games,
thus providing a simple existence proof. Other properties are mentioned in the same
section.
In a recent manifesto Bouyssou et al. (1993) observe that within multicriteria decision
making `[a] systematic axiomatic analysis of decision procedures and algorithms is yet to
be carried out'. In the second part of this chapter, based on Voorneveld, Vermeulen, and
Borm (1999), several axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept for multicriteria
games are provided.
Axiomatic properties of the Nash equilibrium concept based on the notion of con-
sistency have been studied in several articles, including Peleg and Tijs (1996), Peleg,
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Potters, and Tijs (1996), and Norde et al. (1996). Informally, consistency requires that
if a strategy combination x is a solution of a game with player set N, and players outside
a coalition S of players commit to playing according to xNnS, i.e. the strategy combina-
tion restricted to the players in N nS, then xS is a solution of the reduced game. Several
of these axiomatizations carry over to multicriteria games. The strong result of Norde
et al. (1996), characterizing the Nash equilibrium concept on the set of mixed exten-
sions of ¯nite strategic form games by nonemptiness, the selection of utility maximizing
strategies in one-person games, and consistency, does not have such an analogon in mul-
ticriteria games: we show that nonemptiness, consistency and an immediate extension
of utility maximization are not su±cient to axiomatize the Pareto equilibrium concept.
An additional property is provided to establish an axiomatization.
11.2 Pareto equilibria
Weak and strong Pareto equilibria are relatively straightforward extensions of the Nash
equilibrium concept that rule out unilateral deviations to strategies that are better in
the sense of the orders > and ¸ on a ¯nite dimensional Euclidean space. This section
provides de¯nitions of Pareto equilibria, points out some properties that are di®erent
from the Nash equilibrium concept, and characterizes Pareto equilibria as Nash equilibria
of weighted games.
De¯nition 11.1 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡ be a multicriteria game. A strategy
pro¯le x 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi) is a
² weak Pareto equilibrium if for each player i 2 N there does not exist a yi 2 ¢(Xi)
such that ui(yi;x¡i) > ui(xi;x¡i);
² strong Pareto equilibrium if for each player i 2 N there does not exist a yi 2 ¢(Xi)
such that ui(yi;x¡i) ¸ ui(xi;x¡i).
The set of weak and strong Pareto equilibria of G are denoted by WPE(G) and SPE(G),
respectively. /
It is clear that every strong Pareto equilibrium is a weak Pareto equilibrium, but not the
other way around. For a concrete example, refer to Figure 11.2 in Section 11.5. Weak
and strong Pareto equilibria of multicriteria games in ¡finite, in which mixed strategies
are not allowed, are | of course | de¯ned in a similar way by restricting attention to
pure strategies. A multicriteria game in which each of the players has only one criterion
is simply a strategic game. In the case of strategic games, the sets of weak and strong
Pareto equilibria coincide with the set of Nash equilibria.
Alternatively, Pareto equilibria can be characterized as ¯xed points of certain best-
response correspondences. Formally, let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a multicriteriaPareto equilibria 121
game, x 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi) a strategy pro¯le and i 2 N a player. De¯ne
WBi(x¡i) = fxi 2 ¢(Xi) j69yi 2 ¢(Xi) : ui(yi;x¡i) > ui(xi;x¡i)g;




SBi(x¡i) = fxi 2 ¢(Xi) j69yi 2 ¢(Xi) : ui(yi;x¡i) ¸ ui(xi;x¡i)g;




the natural counterparts of the best-response correspondence for weak and strong Pareto
equilibria. The ¯xed points of WB and SB are exactly the weak and strong Pareto
equilibria. In some cases, when the game G needs to be stressed to avoid confusion, we
write WBi(G;¢), etc.
The following example is taken from Van Megen et al. (1999).
Example 11.2 Consider a game G with an inspector (player 1) who has to decide
whether or not to inspect a factory (player 2) to check if its production is hygienical.
The inspector has two objectives: to minimize inspection costs and to guarantee an
acceptable level of hygiene in production. The factory also has two objectives: to mini-
mize production costs and to achieve some level of hygienical production. The strategies
the inspector can take are Inspection (I) and No Inspection (NI); the factory chooses
between Hygienical (H) or Non-Hygienical (NH) production. Payo®s are as given be-
low. Here c > 1 denotes the penalty that is imposed if the inspected production fails to
H NH





I (¡1;1) (¡c ¡ 1;1)
NI (¡1;1) (0;0)
Payo®s to factory
be hygienical. The ¯rst coordinate of the payo® to player 1 denotes the negative costs
of inspection, the second coordinate speci¯es satisfaction with the hygienical situation.
The ¯rst coordinate for the factory depicts extra negative production costs, the second
represents the hygiene satisfaction level.
Let p 2 [0;1] denote the probability of player 1 playing I and let q 2 [0;1] denote
the probability of player 2 playing H. Then u1(1;q) = (¡qc + c ¡ 1; 1
2 + 1
2q) and





f1g if 0 < = q < 1 ¡ 1
c
[0;1] if 1 ¡ 1
c
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[0;1] if 0 < = p < =
1
c+1 or p = 1
f1g if 1
c+1 < p < 1
This implies that WPE(G) = ([0; 1
c+1]£[1¡ 1
c]) [ (( 1
c+1;1)£f1g) [ (f1g£[0;1]). The
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analysis above shows that weak Pareto equilibria in this model are those in which there is
full inspection, those in which the factory produces in a hygienical way with probability 1,
and those in which the chance upon inspection is small, but the production is nevertheless
hygienical with a relatively high probability. Moreover, it is seen that a higher penalty
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f1g if 0 < = q < = 1 ¡ 1
c
[0;1] if 1 ¡ 1
c < q < 1










< = p < = 1
This implies that SPE(G) = (f0g £ (1 ¡ 1
c;1]) [ ((0; 1
c+1) £ (1 ¡ 1
c;1)). /
A ¯rst peculiar feature of Pareto equilibria that is worth noting, is the following. In
single-criterion games, every pure Nash equilibrium is also a mixed Nash equilibrium.



























Figure 11.1: Pure, not mixed equilibria
Example 11.3 Consider a one-player game in which the unique player i has two criteria,
three pure strategies a;b, and c and payo®s ui = (ui1;ui2) as in Figure 11.1. All three
pure strategies are both weak and strong Pareto equilibria when only pure strategies are
allowed. But when mixtures are taken into account, strategy a is dominated. /
A second point of interest is that a mixture of two points that are not Pareto domi-
nated may be Pareto dominated. Refer for instance to Figure 10.2 and take a convex
combination of points c and e. This implies that the well-known characterization of
Nash equilibria, according to which a strategy pro¯le is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if each pure strategy that is played with positive probability is a pure best reply against
the strategy pro¯le of the opponents, does not hold for Pareto equilibria. An analogous
characterization exists, however, when carriers are restricted to the faces of the payo®
polytope that are contained in the set of Pareto optimal points.
Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a multicriteria game, x 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi) a strategy
pro¯le and i 2 N a player. Take C(G;xi) = fk 2 Xi j xik > 0g, the carrier of xi, as
the set of pure strategies k in Xi that are played with positive probability. A set I µ Xi
of pure strategies is called weakly e±cient for player i against x¡i if for all xi 2 ¢(Xi)
with C(G;xi) µ I it holds that xi 2 WBi(x¡i). A set I µ Xi is a weakly e±cient pure
best reply set for player i against x¡i if it is weakly e±cient and there is no K µ Xi
with I ½ K such that K is weakly e±cient. Let Ei(G;x¡i) be the set of weakly e±cient
pure best reply sets for player i against x¡i. The following result in terms of weak
Pareto equilibria is stated without proof. The analogon for strong Pareto equilibria is
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Proposition 11.4 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡ be a multicriteria game and x 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi). Then for all i 2 N:
xi 2 WBi(x¡i) , C(G;xi) µ I for some I 2 Ei(G;x¡i):
The weighted objectives method for solving multicriteria problems involves assigning
weights to each of the criteria, re°ecting their relative importance. Consider a multi-
criteria game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni in which player i has r(i) 2 I N criteria. For
each i 2 N, let ¸i 2 ¢r(i) be a vector of weights for the criteria, ¸ := (¸i)i2N. The
¸-weighted game G¸ is the strategic form game with player set N, mixed strategy spaces
(¢(Xi))i2N, and payo® functions (vi)i2N de¯ned for all i 2 N and x 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi) by
vi(x) = h¸i;ui(x)i =
Pr(i)
k=1 ¸ikuik(x). If each player assigns equal weight to all his crite-
ria, i.e., ¸i = 1
r(i)(1;:::;1) 2 I R
r(i) for all i 2 N, the weighted game is denoted by Ge.
The following theorem, stating that Pareto equilibria are exactly the Nash equilibria of
weighted games for suitable weight vectors, is due to Shapley (1959). Shapley stated the
theorem for two-person zero-sum multicriteria games, but the result extends immediately
to more general games.
Theorem 11.5 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡ be a multicriteria game and x 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi). Then
² x 2 WPE(G) if and only if there exists for each i 2 N a vector of weights ¸i 2 ¢r(i)
such that x 2 NE(G¸);
² x 2 SPE(G) if and only if there exists for each i 2 N a vector of weights ¸i 2 ¢0
r(i)
such that x 2 NE(G¸).
The proof of this theorem follows easily from Theorem 10.1. See also Zeleny (1975),
Borm et al. (1989), and Kru¶ s and Bronisz (1994). As a corollary, Pareto equilibria
always exist in mixed extensions of ¯nite multicriteria games, since for any vector of
weights the game G¸ has Nash equilibria in mixed strategies (Nash, 1950a, 1951). Wang
(1991, 1993) provides existence results for Pareto equilibria in a larger class of games,
mainly based on the Kakutani ¯xed point theorem.
11.3 The consistency axiom
The next two sections are devoted to axiomatizing the weak Pareto equilibrium concept.
The main axiom is consistency, which requires that if a strategy combination x is a
solution of a game with player set N and each player i that is not a member of a coalition
S µ N commits to playing his strategy xi, then xS, the strategy pro¯le restricted to the
remaining players, is a solution of the reduced game.
To avoid confusion about the players involved in a game, multicriteria games are
sometimes denoted by G = hNG;(Xi)i2NG;(ui)i2NGi, where NG is the player set ofThe consistency axiom 125
the game G. Another matter of crucial importance in the remainder of this chapter is
whether or not mixed strategies and multiple criteria are allowed. Therefore, special care
is taken to specify whether a game is contained in ¡;¡finite, or ¡strategic.
Let G = hNG;(Xi)i2NG;(ui)i2NGi 2 ¡ be a multicriteria game, let x 2
Q
i2NG ¢(Xi)
be a strategy pro¯le, and let S 2 2NG n f;;NGg be a proper subcoalition of the player
set NG. The reduced game GS;x of G with respect to S and x is the multicriteria game
in ¡ in which
² the player set is S;
² each player i 2 S has the same set Xi of pure strategies as in G;
² the payo® functions (u0
i)i2S are de¯ned by u0
i(yS) := ui(yS;xNGnS) for all yS 2
Q
i2S ¢(Xi).
Notice that this is the game that arises if the players in NGnS commit to playing accord-
ing to xNGnS, the strategy combination restricted to the players in NG n S. De¯nitions
for reduced games on ¡finite and ¡strategic are completely analogous.
A solution concept on ¡ is a function ½ which assigns to each element G 2 ¡ a
subset ½(G) µ
Q
i2NG ¢(Xi) of strategy combinations. Analogously one de¯nes a solution
concept on ¡strategic or ¡finite. Clearly, WPE and SPE, the functions that assign to a
multicriteria game its set of weak and strong Pareto equilibria, respectively, are solution
concepts.
For strategic form games, we recall the following axioms. A solution concept ½ on
¡strategic satis¯es:
² Nonemptiness (NEM), if ½(G) 6= ; for all G 2 ¡strategic;
² Utility Maximization (UM), if for each one-player game G = hfig;Xi;uii 2
¡strategic we have that ½(G) µ fx 2 ¢(Xi) j ui(x) ¸ ui(y) 8y 2 ¢(Xi)g;
² Consistency (CONS), if for each game G 2 ¡strategic, each proper subcoalition
S 2 2NG n f;;NGg, and each element x 2 ½(G), we have that xS 2 ½(GS;x).
Norde et al. (1996) prove:
Proposition 11.6 A solution concept ½ on ¡strategic satis¯es NEM, UM, and CONS if
and only if ½ = NE, the Nash equilibrium concept.
This yields the conclusion that there is no proper re¯nement of the Nash equilibrium
concept that satis¯es NEM, UM, and CONS.126 Pareto Equilibria in Noncooperative Multicriteria Games
11.4 Finite multicriteria games
Peleg and Tijs (1996) and Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) provide several axiomatizations
of the Nash equilibrium concept for ¯nite strategic form games. In this section two of
these axiomatizations are extended to weak Pareto equilibria of ¯nite multicriteria games.
Remark 11.13 at the end of this chapter points out how axiomatizations for weak Pareto
equilibria can be adapted to axiomatizations for strong Pareto equilibria.
We use the following axioms. A solution concept ½ on ¡finite satis¯es:
² Restricted Nonemptiness (r-NEM), if for every G 2 ¡finite with WPE(G) 6= ;
we have ½(G) 6= ;;
² One-Person E±ciency (OPE), if for each one-player game G = hfig;Xi;uii 2
¡finite we have that ½(G) = fx 2 Xi j69y 2 Xi : ui(y) > ui(x)g;
² Consistency (CONS), if for each G 2 ¡finite, each proper subcoalition S 2
2NG n f;;NGg, and each element x 2 ½(G), we have that xS 2 ½(GS;x);
² Converse Consistency (COCONS), if for each G 2 ¡finite with at least two
players, we have that e ½(G) µ ½(G), where
e ½(G) = fx 2
Y
i2NG
Xi j 8S 2 2
NG
n f;;N
Gg : xS 2 ½(G
S;x)g:
According to restricted nonemptiness, the solution concept provides a nonempty set of
strategies whenever weak Pareto equilibria exist. One-person e±ciency claims that in
games with only one player, the solution concept picks out all strategies which yield a
maximal payo® with respect to the > - order. Consistency means that a solution x of a
game is also a solution of each reduced game in which the players that leave the game
play according to the strategies in x. Converse consistency prescribes that a strategy
combination which gives rise to a solution in every reduced game is also a solution of
the original game.
Our ¯rst result indicates that the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept on
¯nite strategic games of Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996, Thm. 3) in terms of restricted
nonemptiness, one-person e±ciency, and consistency can be generalized to multicriteria
games.
Theorem 11.7 A solution concept ½ on ¡finite satis¯es r-NEM, OPE, and CONS if and
only if ½ = WPE.
Proof. It is clear that WPE satis¯es the axioms. Let ½ be a solution concept on ¡finite
satisfying r-NEM, OPE, and CONS. Let G = hNG;(Xi)i2NG;(ui)i2NGi 2 ¡finite. We
¯rst show that ½(G) µ WPE(G). Let x 2 ½(G). If jNGj = 1, then x 2 WPE(G)
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xi 2 fyi 2 Xi j 69 zi 2 Xi : ui(zi;x¡i) > ui(yi;x¡i)g by OPE. Hence x is a weak Pareto
equilibrium: x 2 WPE(G). Since G 2 ¡finite was chosen arbitrarily, conclude that
½ µ WPE.
To prove that WPE µ ½, again let G = hNG;(Xi)i2NG;(ui)i2NGi 2 ¡finite and let
^ x 2 WPE(G). Construct a multicriteria game H 2 ¡finite as follows:
² let m 2 I N n NG; the player set is NG [ fmg;
² players i 2 NG have the same strategy set Xi as in G;
² player m has strategy set f0;1g;








ui(x) if xm = 1
¡er(i) if xm = 0;xi 6= ^ xi
er(i) if xm = 0;xi = ^ xi
where er(i) 2 I R
r(i) is the vector with each component equal to one.








0 if xm = 0
¡1 if xm = 1;x 6= ^ x
1 if xm = 1;x = ^ x
Simple veri¯cation indicates that (1; ^ x) is the unique weak Pareto equilibrium of H.
Since ½(H) µ WPE(H) by the previous part of the proof, we conclude by r-NEM
that (1; ^ x) 2 ½(H). Then by CONS, ^ x 2 ½(HNG;(1;^ x)) = ½(G), since by de¯nition
HNG;(1;^ x) = G. Hence ^ x 2 ½(G), ¯nishing our proof. 2
Our second result shows that the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept on ¯nite
strategic games of Peleg and Tijs (1996, Thm. 2.12) in terms of one-person e±ciency,
consistency, and converse consistency can also be generalized to multicriteria games.
Theorem 11.8 A solution concept ½ on ¡finite satis¯es OPE, CONS, and COCONS if
and only if ½ = WPE.
Proof. WPE satis¯es the axioms. Let ½ be a solution concept on ¡finite that also
satis¯es them. As in the proof of Theorem 11.7, we have that ½(G) µ WPE(G) for each
G 2 ¡finite by OPE and CONS. To prove that WPE(G) µ ½(G) for each G 2 ¡finite, we
use induction on the number of players. In one-player games, the claim follows from OPE.
Now assume the claim holds for all ¯nite multicriteria games with at most n players and
let G 2 ¡finite be an (n + 1)-player game. By CONS of WPE: WPE(G) µ g WPE(G).128 Pareto Equilibria in Noncooperative Multicriteria Games
By induction: g WPE(G) µ e ½(G). By COCONS of ½: e ½(G) µ ½(G). Combining these
three inclusions: WPE(G) µ ½(G). 2
These results seem to illustrate that the axiomatizations that exist in the literature for the
Nash equilibrium concept generalize to the Pareto equilibrium concept for multicriteria
games. This analogy, however, breaks down when we consider mixed extensions of ¯nite
multicriteria games, as is done in the next section.
11.5 Mixed extensions of ¯nite multicriteria games
Norde et al. (1996) characterize the Nash equilibrium concept on mixed extensions of
¯nite strategic form games by nonemptiness, utility maximization, and consistency (cf.
Proposition 11.6). In this section it is shown that analogons of these properties are not
su±cient to characterize the weak Pareto equilibrium concept in mixed extensions of
¯nite multicriteria games.
First, we list some of the axioms used in this section. A solution concept ½ on ¡
satis¯es:
² Nonemptiness (NEM), if ½(G) 6= ; for each G 2 ¡;
² Weak One-Person E±ciency (WOPE), if for each game G = hfig;Xi;uii 2 ¡
with one player we have that ½(G) µ fx 2 ¢(Xi) j69y 2 ¢(Xi) : ui(y) > ui(x)g;
² Consistency (CONS), if for each G 2 ¡, each proper subcoalition S 2 2NG n
f;;NGg, and each element x 2 ½(G), we have that xS 2 ½(GS;x);
² Converse Consistency (COCONS), if for each G 2 ¡ with at least two players,
we have that e ½(G) µ ½(G), where
e ½(G) = fx 2
Y
i2NG
¢(Xi) j 8S 2 2
NG
n f;;N
Gg : xS 2 ½(G
S;x)g:
It is easy to see that WPE on ¡ satis¯es NEM (See Theorem 11.5), WOPE, and CONS.
Moreover,
Lemma 11.9 If a solution concept ½ on ¡ satis¯es WOPE and CONS, then ½ µ WPE.
Proof. Let ½ be a solution concept on ¡, satisfying WOPE and CONS. Let G 2 ¡ and
x 2 ½(G). If jNGj = 1, then x 2 WPE(G) by WOPE. If jNGj > 1, then for each player
i 2 NG: xi 2 ½(Gfig;x) by CONS, so xi 2 fyi 2 ¢(Xi) j69zi 2 ¢(Xi) : ui(zi;x¡i) >
ui(yi;x¡i)g by WOPE. Hence x is a weak Pareto equilibrium: x 2 WPE(G). 2
Obviously, WPE is the largest solution concept on ¡ satisfying NEM, WOPE, and
CONS, but not the only one, as our next result shows.Mixed extensions of ¯nite multicriteria games 129
Theorem 11.10 There exists a solution concept ½ on ¡ which satis¯es NEM, WOPE,
and CONS, such that ½ 6= WPE.
Proof. De¯ne ½ as follows. Let G = hNG;(Xi)i2NG;(ui)i2NGi 2 ¡. Then
½(G) =
(
fx 2 ¢(Xi) j69y 2 ¢(Xi) : ui(y) > ui(x)g = WPE(G) if jNGj = 1
SPE(G) if jNGj > 1
The de¯nition of ½ for one-player games guarantees that ½ satis¯es WOPE. Theorem
11.5 establishes that ½ satis¯es NEM. It is easy to see that ½ is also consistent. To show
that ½ 6= WPE, consider the game G in Figure 11.2, where both players have two pure




Figure 11.2: Consistent re¯nement of WPE
Obviously (B;L) 2 WPE(G), but (B;L) 62 ½(G), since u1(T;L) ¸ u1(B;L). 2
A more interesting class of re¯nements of the Pareto equilibrium concept on ¡ that
satisfy NEM, WOPE, and CONS are the compromise equilibria introduced in Chapter
13. In order to arrive at an axiomatization of WPE, we require an additional axiom. A
solution concept ½ on ¡ satis¯es:
² WEIGHT if for every game G 2 ¡ and each vector ¸ = (¸i)i2NG 2
Q
i2NG ¢r(i) of
weights: ½(G¸) µ ½(G).
The solution concept ½ satis¯es WEIGHT if for every weight vector, the solutions of
the associated weighted strategic form game are solutions of the underlying multicriteria
game.
Our main result, using the strong theorems of Norde et al. (1996) and Shapley
(1959), shows that the weak Pareto equilibrium concept is the unique solution concept
on ¡ satisfying NEM, WOPE, CONS, and WEIGHT.
Theorem 11.11 A solution concept ½ on ¡ satis¯es NEM, WOPE, CONS, and WEIGHT
if and only if ½ = WPE.
Proof. Straightforward veri¯cation and application of Theorem 11.5 indicates that
WPE indeed satis¯es the four axioms. Now let ½ be a solution concept on ¡ satisfying
NEM, WOPE, CONS, and WEIGHT. By Lemma 11.9, ½ µ WPE. Now let G 2 ¡,
and x 2 WPE(G). Remains to show that x 2 ½(G). By Theorem 11.5, there exists
a vector ¸ = (¸i)i2NG 2
Q
i2NG ¢r(i) of weights such that x 2 NE(G¸). Notice that ½
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UM, and CONS, and hence by Proposition 11.6, ½(H) = NE(H) for all H 2 ¡strategic.
Consequently, ½(G¸) = NE(G¸) 3 x. So by WEIGHT: x 2 ½(G). 2
Finally, without proof, we mention that the analogon of Theorem 11.8 also holds when
we consider mixed extensions:
Theorem 11.12 A solution concept ½ on ¡ satis¯es OPE, CONS, and COCONS if and
only if ½ = WPE.
It is an easy exercise to show that the axioms used in our theorems are logically inde-
pendent.
Remark 11.13 In the proof of Theorem 11.10 we mentioned the strong Pareto equilib-
rium concept. By slight modi¯cations in the axioms (in particular, to (weak) one-person
strong e±ciency and a weight axiom concerning strictly positive, rather than nonnega-
tive, weights), all axiomatizations in Sections 11.4 and 11.5 have analogons for the strong
Pareto equilibrium concept. Also, a result analogous to Theorem 11.10 holds. To see
this, de¯ne a solution concept Ã on ¡ as follows. Let G = hNG;(Xi)i2NG;(ui)i2NGi 2 ¡.
² If jNGj = 1, take Ã(G) = fx 2 ¢(Xi) j69y 2 ¢(Xi) : ui(y) ¸ ui(x)g. This
guarantees that Ã satis¯es (weak) one-person strong e±ciency.
² If jNGj > 1, take Ã(G) = NE(Ge), the set of Nash equilibria of the scalarized
game in which the players assign equal weight to their criteria. By the existence
of Nash equilibria in mixed extensions, Ã satis¯es NEM.
It is easy to see that Ã is also consistent. To show that Ã is not equal to the strong
Pareto equilibrium concept, refer again to the game G in Figure 11.2. (T;L) is a strong
Pareto equilibrium of G, but the weighted payo® to player 2 increases from 1+0
2 to 0+2
2
if he deviates to R, indicating that (T;L) = 2 Ã(G) = NE(Ge). /Chapter 12




Nash introduced the notion of an equilibrium for noncooperative games in strategic form
in his papers in 1950a and 1951. Since then the Nash equilibrium concept and its re¯ne-
ments have been and still are studied extensively. One of the topics in this investigation
concerns the structure of the set of equilibria of bimatrix games, noncooperative two-
player games in strategic form. Over the last decades a fair number of papers has been
published on this topic. It turned out that the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game is a
¯nite union of polytopes. Proofs of this fact can for example be found in Winkels (1979),
Jansen (1981) and Jansen and Jurg (1990).
These results are of considerable importance from a computational point of view.
One reason for this is that the original proofs by Nash of the existence of equilibria
is not constructive. The 1950 paper uses the Kakutani ¯xed point theorem, whereas
the 1951 paper applies the Brouwer ¯xed point theorem to establish existence. These
proofs, therefore, do not tell you how to ¯nd an equilibrium for a given game. Also the
basic inequalities in the de¯nition of the equilibrium concept are not of much help. In
general (without further assumptions on the structure of the game) these inequalities are
polynomial and it is not clear how one can actually calculate one single solution given
these inequalities, let alone how to ¯nd a parametric representation of the complete set
of equilibria.
In the case of bimatrix games life is much simpler. For such a game it is possible to
show that the set of equilibria is a ¯nite union of polytopes and it is moreover possible to
derive a polyhedral description of each of these polytopes. Hence, by using some theory
of linear inequalities, it is possible to compute all extremal points of such a polytope
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and in this way ¯nd a parametric description of the set of equilibria. There are also a
number of exact algorithms for the computation of one speci¯c equilibrium, such as the
algorithm of Lemke and Howson (1964), that are based on the special structure of the
set of equilibria for bimatrix games.
This chapter, based on Borm, Vermeulen, and Voorneveld (1998), investigates to
what extent the results on the structure of the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game
carry over to the Pareto equilibrium concept introduced by Shapley (1959) for two-
person multicriteria games. This concept was discussed in more depth in Chapter 11.
Unfortunately, most results are on the negative side of the spectrum. The speci¯c results
are speci¯ed below.
² Section 12.4 provides an example to show that the set of weak Pareto equilibria
may have a quadratic component whenever both players have three or more pure
strategies and one of the players has more than one criterion.
² In Section 12.5 we show that the set of equilibria is indeed a ¯nite union of polytopes
if one of the players has two pure strategies.
In order to make the chapter closer to the existing literature on the structure of equi-
librium sets in bimatrix games, notation is used that di®ers slightly from that in the
previous chapters. Most of this notation is settled in the next section. Section 12.3
contains general results on the structure of the set of weak Pareto equilibria.
12.2 Preliminaries
In a (two-person multicriteria) game the ¯rst player has a ¯nite set M of pure strategies
and player two has a ¯nite set N of pure strategies. The players are supposed to choose
their strategies simultaneously. Given their choices m 2 M and n 2 N, player one has
a ¯nite set S of criteria to evaluate the pure strategy pair (m;n). For each criterion
s 2 S the evaluation is a real number (As)mn 2 I R. Of course we also have an evaluation
(Bt)mn 2 I R for each criterion t 2 T of player two. Thus the game is speci¯ed by the two
sequences
A := (As)s2S and B := (Bt)t2T
of matrices
As := [(As)mn](m;n)2M£N and Bt := [(Bt)mn](m;n)2M£N:
Despite the fact that the players may have more than one criterion, we will refer to A
and B as payo® matrices. The game is denoted by (A;B). The players of the game
are also allowed to use mixed strategies. Given such mixed strategies p 2 ¢(M) and
q 2 ¢(N) for players one and two respectively, the vectors
pAq := (pAsq)s2S and pBq := (pBtq)t2TStability regions and structure 133
are called payo® vectors (for player one and two, resp.).
A very convenient way to de¯ne equilibria, certainly when one wants to analyze their
structure, is by means of best replies. In the notation for bimatrix games, the best-
response correspondence that gives rise to weak Pareto equilibria is de¯ned as follows:
De¯nition 12.1 Let (A;B) be a game and let q 2 ¢(N) be a strategy of player two.
A strategy p 2 ¢(M) of player one is a best reply of player one against q if there is no
other strategy p0 2 ¢(M) such that the payo® vector p0Aq strongly dominates the payo®
vector pAq. The set of best replies of player one against q is denoted by WB1(q). /
The best-response correspondence WB2 of player 2 against strategies p 2 ¢(M) is
de¯ned analogously. In equilibrium, both players play a best response.
De¯nition 12.2 A strategy pair (p;q) is an equilibrium of (A;B) if p 2 WB1(q) and
q 2 WB2(p). /
Notice that we restrict attention to weak Pareto equilibria in this chapter. Since the
more restrictive notion of strong Pareto equilibria does not necessarily yield a closed set
of equilibria (see Example 11.2), we decided to use the weaker version.
12.3 Stability regions and structure
In case of bimatrix games, the proof that the set of Nash equilibria is a ¯nite union of
polytopes is based on the fact that this set of equilibria can be chopped up into a ¯nite
number of sets. Then each of these sets can easily be shown to be a polytope. It turns
out to be worthwhile to execute this procedure for multicriteria games as well.
First of all, recall that according to Theorem 11.5 weak Pareto equilibria coincide
with Nash equilibria of weighted games where nonnegative weight is assigned to each of
the criteria. Recall that for each criterion t 2 T the real number eiBtej is the payo® of
player two according to his criterion t and Bt is the matrix whose entry on place i;j is
this number eiBtej. Now suppose that player two decides to assign a weight ¹t > = 0 to
each criterion t 2 T available to him (we assume that
P
t2T ¹t equals one). The vector
¹ = (¹t)t2T is called a weight vector. According to the criterion associated with this















to calculate his payo®. With this terminology, the result of Shapley (1959) can be
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Lemma 12.3 Let (A;B) be a two-person multicriteria game. Let p be a strategy of
player one and let q be a strategy of player two. Then the following two statements are
equivalent.
² q is a best reply of player two against p
² There exists a weight vector ¹ := (¹t)t2T such that q is a best reply of player two
against p in the single-criterion game B(¹).
In words, the lemma states that q is a best reply of player two against p if and only
if player two can assign to each criterion t 2 T a nonnegative weight ¹t such that the
resulting weighted payo® is maximal in q, given that player one plays p. For a proof,
refer to Theorem 10.1.
We decompose the set of equilibria of the game (A;B) into a ¯nite number of sets
that are easier to handle. This decomposition is in fact the multicriteria equivalent of
the technique that is used to prove that the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game is a ¯nite
union of polytopes. In order to give the reader some background concerning the line of
reasoning employed here, we will ¯rst give an informal discussion of this technique.
Suppose that we have a bimatrix game and a subset I of the set of pure strategies
of player one. Then we can associate two areas with this set, one in the set of mixed
strategies of player one and one in the set of mixed strategies of player two. For player
one, this is the set ¢(I) of mixed strategies that put all weight exclusively on the pure
strategies in I, and for player two this is the set U(I) of mixed strategies of player two
against which (at least) all strategies in ¢(I) are best replies. Such a set U(I) is called a
stability region. Obviously we can do the same for a subset J of the set of pure strategies
of player two.
Now the crucial point is that for a bimatrix game all these sets ¢(I), ¢(J), U(I),
and U(J) are polytopes (and for each of these polytopes it is even possible to ¯nd a
describing system of linear inequalities). So, also the set
(¢(I) \ U(J)) £ (¢(J) \ U(I))
is a polytope. Moreover there is only a ¯nite number of such sets and it can be shown
that their union equals the set of Nash equilibria of the given bimatrix game.
Although the sets U(I) and U(J) not necessarily need to be polytopes in the mul-
ticriteria case, we can still carry out this procedure for two-person multicriteria games.
To this end, let v be an element of I R
n and let P be a polytope in I R
n. The vector v is
said to attain its maximum over P in the point x 2 P if
hv;xi > = hv;yi for all y 2 P:
Then we have the following well-known lemma.Stability regions and structure 135
Lemma 12.4 Let v be a vector in I R
n. Further, let P be a polytope in I R
n and let F
be a face of P. If v attains its maximum over P in some relative interior point x of F,
then it also attains its maximum over P in any other point of F.
Now let I be a subset of M. Slightly abusing notation we write ¢(I) for the set of
strategies p 2 ¢(M) whose carrier is a subset of I. Further, the stability region U(I) (of
player two) is de¯ned as
U(I) := fq 2 ¢(N) j ¢(I) µ WB1(q)g:
Similarly we can de¯ne sets ¢(J) and U(J) for a subset J of N.
Theorem 12.5 Let (A;B) be a two-person multicriteria game. The set of equilibria of
the game (A;B) equals the union over all I µ M and J µ N of the sets
(¢(I) \ U(J)) £ (¢(J) \ U(I)):
Proof.
(a) Assume that a strategy pair (p¤;q¤) is an element of a set (¢(I) \ U(J)) £ (¢(J) \
U(I)) for some subset I of M and subset J of N. We will only show that p¤ is a best
reply against q¤.
Since q¤ is an element of U(I), we know that any strategy in ¢(I) is a best reply
against q¤. Now p¤ is an element of ¢(I) by assumption. Hence, p¤ is a best reply
against q¤.
(b) Conversely, let (p¤;q¤) be an equilibrium. Take I = C(p¤) and J = C(q¤). We will
show that p¤ is an element of ¢(I) \ U(J).
Obviously p¤ is an element of ¢(I). So it remains to show that p¤ is also an element
of U(J). In other words, we need to show that each strategy q 2 ¢(J) is a best reply
against p¤. To this end, take a q 2 ¢(J). Since q¤ is a best reply against p¤ we know
by Lemma 12.3 that there exists a weight vector ¹ = (¹t)t2T such that q¤ is a best reply
against p¤ in the single-criterion game B(¹). In other words, the vector p¤B(¹) attains
its maximum over ¢(N) in q¤. However, since q¤ is an element of the relative interior
of ¢(J), p¤B(¹) must also attain its maximum in q by Lemma 12.4. Hence, q is a best
reply against p¤ according to B(¹), and, again by Lemma 12.3, q is a best reply against
p¤. 2
Clearly the sets ¢(I) and ¢(J) are polytopes for all subsets I of M and J of N. So,
from the previous theorem it follows that the set of equilibria of the game (A;B) is a
¯nite union of polytopes as soon as the sets U(I) and U(J) are polytopes. Unfortunately
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12.4 An example
We will give a fairly elaborate analysis of the counterexample. This is done because the
calculations involved in the determination of best replies and stability regions for this
game are exemplary for such calculations in general.
There are two players in the game. Player one is the row player and player two is the
column player. Both players have three pure strategies. The pure strategies of player
one are called T;M, and B, the pure strategies of player two are called L;C, and R.
Further, player one has two criteria and player two has only one criterion. The payo®
for player two according to his criterion is always zero. The payo® matrix A of player
one is given in Figure 12.1.
L C R
T (1;1) (0;0) (0;0)
M (0;0) (4;0) (0;0)
B (0;0) (0;0) (0;4)
Figure 12.1: The payo® matrix A of player one
Since player two is completely indi®erent between his strategies, it is immediately
clear that a strategy pair (p¤;q¤) 2 ¢(M) £ ¢(N) is an equilibrium of the game if
and only if p¤ is an element of WB1(q¤). In other words, the set of equilibria equals
the graph of the best-reply correspondence WB1. In order to calculate this graph we
will ¯rst compute the areas in the strategy space of the second player where the best
reply correspondence WB1 is constant. In other words, we need to compute the stability
regions of player two.
First of all note that if player two plays strategy q = (qL;qC;qR) and player one plays
his pure strategy eT, the payo® for player one is eTAq = (qL;qL). This is a point on the
line x = y when plotted in the xy-plane. Similarly, eMAq = (4qC;0) is a point on the
line y = 0 and eBAq = (0;4qR) is a point on the line x = 0. Now there are ¯ve possible


















































































In situation I both eMAq and eBAq are dominated by eTAq. In situation II eTAq
dominates eBAq, but does not dominate eMAq. (Situation III is the symmetric situation
with the roles of the second and third pure strategy of player one interchanged.) In
situation IV eTAq is itself undominated and dominates neither eMAq nor eBAq, and V
depicts the situation in which eTAq is dominated by some convex combination of eMAq
and eBAq.
Now if we calculate exactly where in the strategy space of player two these ¯ve
situations occur we get Figure 12.2 below. The boldface roman numbers in the various
areas in this picture correspond to the roman numbers assigned to the situations depicted
above. Notice that an area in the strategy space of player two corresponding to one of
the ¯ve situations above is necessarily of full dimension by the graphics above. Further,
one cannot jump from situation V to situations I, II or III without crossing the area
where situation IV occurs (except on the boundary of the strategy space).
The boundary line between areas I and II and areas III, IV and V is given by the
equality qL = 4qR. Similarly, qL = 4qC is the boundary between areas I and III and
areas II, IV and V.
Finally, it can be seen in the graphics above that the boundary between area V and
the others is exactly the set of strategies where eTAq is an element of the line segment
between eMAq and eBAq. This means that it is the set of strategies for which (qL;qL)
satis¯es the linear equation qRx + qCy = 4qCqR. Hence it must be the set of strategies
that satisfy the quadratic equation
qLqR + qLqC = 4qCqR
(except the solution (qL;qC;qR) = (1;0;0) of this equation). This gives us enough
information to write down the stability regions of player two.
U(fTg) = I [ II [ III [ IV
U(fMg) = II [ IV [ V












Figure 12.2: Stability regions of player two
U(fT;Mg) = II [ IV
U(fT;Bg) = III [ IV
U(fM;Bg) = V
U(fT;M;Bg) = IV \ V
Note the essential di®erences with the structure of stability regions for bimatrix games.
For a bimatrix game we would for example have the equality
U(fM;Bg) = U(fMg) \ U(fBg):
The example shows that this is no longer true for multicriteria games. In this case the
set
U(fMg) \ U(fBg) = IV [ V
subdivides into the areas IV, on whose relative interior
¢(fT;Mg) [ ¢(fT;Bg)
is the set of best replies, and V, on whose relative interior the set of best replies is indeed
¢(fT;M;Bg). An area like IV simply cannot occur for bimatrix games.
The second essential di®erence, and the main one in this section, is the fact that
U(fT;M;Bg) is a quadratic curve. This means that the subset
¢(fT;M;Bg) £ U(fT;M;Bg)Multicriteria games of size 2 £ n 139
of the set of equilibria cannot be written as a ¯nite union of polytopes. This concludes
the example.
Remark 12.6 The observation that the set of equilibria of a multicriteria game in
general cannot be written as a ¯nite union of polytopes implies that in Theorem 11.5
it will usually be necessary to invoke in¯nitely many vectors of weights to compute the
Pareto equilibria as Nash equilibria of weighted games. /
12.5 Multicriteria games of size 2 £ n
The previous example shows that, in case at least one of the players has more than one
criterion, the set of equilibria may have a quadratic component as soon as both players
have at least three pure strategies. The degenerate case in which one of the players
has only one pure strategy immediately yields that the set of equilibria is a ¯nite union
of polytopes. This case is not considered in the remainder of this chapter. So, in the
multicriteria case it is necessary to have (at least) one player who has exactly two pure
strategies to guarantee that the set of equilibria is indeed a ¯nite union of polytopes. In
this section we will show that this assumption is also su±cient.
Without loss of generality, we assume that every two-person multicriteria game (A;B)
considered in this section is a 2 £n-game in which player one's set of pure strategies M
equals fT;Bg.
This section is ordered as follows: ¯rst we establish that the stability regions of player
two are ¯nite unions of polytopes. Next, the same result is proven for the stability regions
of the ¯rst player. The computational aspects are considered in the ¯nal part of this
section.
First, the stability regions of player two. In this special case the analysis of the
dominance relation on the possible payo® vectors for player one for a ¯xed strategy q
of player two is quite straightforward. Since player one has only two pure strategies
eT and eB, the set of possible payo® vectors is a line segment (or a singleton in case
eTAq = eBAq) in I R
S. Given this observation it is easy to check
Lemma 12.7 The following two statements are equivalent.
² eTAq is dominated by pAq for some p 2 ¢(M).
² eTAq is dominated by eBAq.
Given this lemma we can show that each stability region U(I) of player two is a ¯nite
union of polytopes. Two cases are considered.
Case 1. For jIj = 1. Assume w.l.o.g. that I = fTg. Then
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= fq 2 ¢(N) j eT 2 WB1(q)g
= fq 2 ¢(N) j eTAq is not dominated by pAq for any p 2 ¢(M)g




fq 2 ¢(N) j eTAsq > = eBAsqg
where the fourth equality follows from the previous lemma. Clearly this last expression
is a ¯nite union of polytopes.
Case 2. For I = fT;Bg. Using the previous lemma it is easy to check that U(I) is the
set of strategies q for which eTAq does not dominate eBAq and eBAq does not dominate
eTAq. So, U(I) = U(fTg) \ U(fBg). Thus, since both U(fTg) and U(fBg) are ¯nite
unions of polytopes as we saw in Case 1, U(I) is also a ¯nite union of polytopes.
This ¯nishes the proof of
Theorem 12.8 Let (A;B) be a 2 £ n two-person multicriteria game. Then for each
I µ M = fT;Bg, the stability region U(I) of player two is a ¯nite union of polytopes.
Now that we have come this far, the only thing left to prove is that the stability region
U(J) = fp 2 ¢(M) j ¢(J) µ WB2(p)g
is a ¯nite union of polytopes for each set J µ N of pure strategies of player two. In
order to do this we need to do some preliminary work.
Let the subset V (J) of ¢(M) £ I R
T be de¯ned by
V (J) := f(p;¹) j ¢(J) is included in the set of best replies against p
according to the criterion B(¹)g
= f(p;¹) j ¢(J) is included in the set of strategies where
the vector pB(¹) attains its maximum over ¢(N)g:
Note that we allow pB(¹) to attain its maximum in points outside ¢(J) as well. We
only require that ¢(J) is indeed a subset of the set of points where pB(¹) attains its
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Further, let the projection ¼ : I R
2 £ I R
T ! I R
2 be de¯ned by
¼(p;v) := p for all (p;v) 2 I R
2 £ I R
T:
Now we can prove
Lemma 12.9 The stability region U(J) equals the projection ¼ (V (J)) of the set V (J).
Proof.
(a) Let p be an element of U(J). We will show that p is also an element of ¼ (V (J)).
Let q¤ be an element of the relative interior of ¢(J). Since p is an element of U(J) we
know that q¤ is a best reply to p. Then we know, by Lemma 12.3, that there is a weight
vector ¹ = (¹t)t2T such that the vector pB(¹) attains its maximum over ¢(N) in q¤. So,
since q¤ is a relative interior point of ¢(J), pB(¹) also attains its maximum over ¢(N)
in any other point of ¢(J) by Lemma 12.4. Therefore (p;¹) is an element of V (J) and
p = ¼(p;¹) is an element of ¼ (V (J)).
(b) Conversely, let p = ¼(p;¹) be an element of ¼ (V (J)) and let q be an element of
¢(J). Then we know that the vector pB(¹) attains its maximum over ¢(N) in q. Again
by Lemma 12.3, this means that q is a best reply against p. Hence, since q was chosen
arbitrarily in ¢(J), p is an element of U(J). 2
This enables us to show
Theorem 12.10 Let (A;B) be a 2 £ n two-person multicriteria game. Then for each
J µ N, the stability region U(J) of player one is a ¯nite union of polytopes.
Proof. Observe that the set V (J) is the collection of points (p;¹) 2 I R
2 £ I R
T that
satisfy the system of polynomial (in)equalities
pi > = 0 for i = 1;2
p1 + p2 = 1









¹tpBtek for all j 2 J and k 2 N:
Therefore, V (J) is a semi-algebraic set. Furthermore, by Lemma 12.9, U(J) equals the
set of vectors p 2 I R
2 such that there exists a ¹ 2 I R
T for which
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Hence, by the Theorem of Tarski (1951) and Seidenberg (1954) (see Blume and Zame,
1994, for a clear discussion of this theorem) U(J) is also a semi-algebraic set. Further,
U(J) is compact, since V (J) is compact and ¼ is continuous. So, U(J) is the union of a
¯nite collection fS®g®2A of sets S® in ¢(M) and each S® is described by a ¯nite number
of polynomial inequalities
p®;k(x) > = 0 (k = 1;:::;m(®)):
However, ¢(M) is a line segment in I R
2. So the set of points in ¢(M) that satis¯es one
particular inequality is the ¯nite union of (closed) line segments (singletons also count
as line segments). So, since each S® is the intersection of such ¯nite unions, S® is itself
the ¯nite union of closed line segments. Therefore, since U(J) is the ¯nite union over
all sets S®, it is the ¯nite union of closed line segments. Hence, U(J) is a ¯nite union of
polytopes. 2
Combination of the previous two theorems yields the result we set out to prove:
Theorem 12.11 In two-person multicriteria games of size 2£n, the set of equilibria is
a ¯nite union of polytopes.
Finally, we consider the case where the second player has only one criterion: jTj = 1.
In this case we have a complete polyhedral description of the polytopes involved in the
union. Notice that we already know that the sets ¢(I) and ¢(J) are polytopes, and the
sets U(I) and U(J) are ¯nite unions of polytopes. We will now show that a polyhedral
description of all these polytopes can be found.
For the polytopes ¢(I), ¢(J) this polyhedral description is trivial. For U(I) we saw
in Case 1 below Lemma 12.7 that it is the ¯nite union of polytopes of the form
fq 2 ¢(N) j eTAsq > = eBAsqg:
So, in Case 1 the polytopes involved in the union are already given by linear inequalities.
This implies that also in Case 2 we can ¯nd the linear inequalities that describe the
polytopes involved. Finally, for J µ N, we get
U(J) = fp 2 ¢(M) j ¢(J) µ WB2(p)g
= fp 2 ¢(M) j pBej > = pBek for all j 2 J and k 2 Ng:
The assumption that jTj = 1 is used in the second equality. The last expression in the
display now shows that U(J) is itself a polytope that can be written as the solution set
of a ¯nite number of linear inequalities. This concludes the argumentation.Chapter 13
Compromise, Nash Bargaining, and
Perfect Equilibria
13.1 Introduction
In Chapter 10 we suggested the following interpretation of a noncooperative multicriteria
game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡: each player i 2 N represents an organization or
group of players and the function ui into I R
r(i) represents the r(i) 2 I N separate utility
functions of its members. This interpretation induces an aggregate con°ict: there is a
noncooperative game being played between the organizations and a cooperative game
within each organization, where its members jointly have to decide on a strategy choice
that is `optimal' given their utility functions.
Di®erent solution concepts can be de¯ned, depending on the answer to the following
central question:
What is a `best response'? (Q)
The Pareto equilibrium concept was studied in the previous two chapters. In this chapter,
three other solution concepts are proposed. The ¯rst two concepts provide di®erent
answers to question (Q). Compromise equilibria, introduced in Section 13.2, answer
question (Q) by requiring to be as close as possible to an ideal solution. Nash bargaining
equilibria, introduced in Section 13.3, answer question (Q) by suggesting a bargaining
solution far away from an undesirable solution. A more standard approach to equilibrium
re¯nements is taken in Section 13.4, where the analogon of perfect equilibria µ a la Selten
(1975) is de¯ned for multicriteria games. Section 13.5 contains some concluding remarks.
13.2 Compromise equilibria
The distance function method described in Chapter 10 as a solution method for multi-
criteria problems was based on the idea of ¯nding the feasible point(s) that are closest
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to an ideal outcome. Zeleny (1976) even states this | rather informally | as an axiom
of choice:
`Alternatives that are closer to the ideal are preferred to those that are farther
away. To be as close as possible to the perceived ideal is the rationale of
human choice.'
The distance function method as a way to ¯nd compromises for group con°icts was
popularized by Yu (1973; see also Freimer and Yu, 1976). It suggests two questions:
² What is an ideal point, and
² What is the meaning of `close to'?
Suppose that there are two individuals, called i1 and i2, and that their feasible set of
utilities is the polytope U in Figure 13.1. Individual i1 can at most hope for x, whereas
individual i2 can at most hope for y. The ideal point, in which they will both receive
their maximal utility, is therefore the point I = (x;y). Unfortunately, this point is
infeasible. To ¯nd a compromise, it is desirable to ¯nd a point close to I that is feasible.
Yu (1973) proposes to measure distances using lp-norms. Let p 2 [1;1]. The lp-norm
on I R
n assigns to each x 2 I R








where the l1-norm, also called the Tchebyshev norm, is de¯ned by
kxk1 := max
i=1;:::;njxij:
These norms induce distance functions on I R
n that map (x;y) 2 I R
n £ I R
n to kx ¡ ykp.
Using for instance the standard Euclidean distance l2, the compromise solution would
be the feasible outcome yielding the point c in Figure 13.1.
View each player i 2 N of a noncooperative multicriteria game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni as
an organization consisting of r(i) 2 I N members, each having his own utility function.
Confronted with a strategy pro¯le x¡i 2
Q
j2Nnfig ¢(Xj), the members of organization
i can answer the question `what is a best response against x¡i?' or, equivalently `what
strategy yields a good outcome in the payo® polytope fui(xi;x¡i) j xi 2 ¢(Xi)g =
conv fui(xi;x¡i) j xi 2 Xig?' by proposing a compromise solution. De¯ning a best
response in this way, and imposing the stability condition that each player should play
a best response given the strategy pro¯le of his opponents, one obtains compromise
equilibria.
Formally, let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a multicriteria game, i 2 N, and x¡i 2
Q
j2Nnfig ¢(Xj). Player i's ideal point, given x¡i, is the point Ii(x¡i) 2 I R
r(i) where forCompromise equilibria 145
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Figure 13.1: A compromise solution







Next, let each player i 2 N select an lp-norm, i.e, let p = (p(i))i2N 2 [1;1]N. A strategy
pro¯le x 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi) is a compromise equilibrium of the multicriteria game G, given
p, notation x 2 CEp(G), if each player i 2 N chooses a strategy pro¯le that yields a
utility vector closest to the ideal point according to the lp(i)-norm:
8i 2 N : xi 2 arg min
yi2¢(Xi)
kui(yi;x¡i) ¡ Ii(x¡i)kp(i):
Theorem 13.1 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡ and p = (p(i))i2N 2 [1;1]N. Then
CEp(G) 6= ;.
Proof. The proof is based on Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem. Let i 2 N. ¢¡i =
Q
j2Nnfig ¢(Xj) is a metric space. ¢i = ¢(Xi) is a compact metric space. The function
fi : ¢¡i £ ¢i ! I R with fi(x¡i;xi) = ¡kui(xi;x¡i) ¡ Ii(x¡i)kp(i) is continuous. By the
Maximum theorem




Mi : x¡i 7! arg max
xi2¢i
fi(x¡i;xi) = arg min
xi2¢(Xi)
kui(xi;x¡i) ¡ Ii(x¡i)kp(i)
is u.s.c. Nonemptiness of Mi(x¡i) is immediate from the fact that every continuous
function on a compact set achieves its maximum.
Moreover, for each x¡i 2 ¢¡i the set Mi(x¡i) µ ¢i is bounded and equals the inverse
image of fmi(x¡i)g under the continuous function fi(x¡i;¢), which implies that Mi(x¡i)
is closed. Hence Mi(x¡i) is compact for each x¡i 2 ¢¡i.146 Compromise, Nash Bargaining, and Perfect Equilibria
Also, for each x¡i 2 ¢¡i the set Mi(x¡i) = argminxi2¢(Xi) kui(xi;x¡i) ¡ Ii(x¡i)kp(i)




< = kui(¸yi + (1 ¡ ¸)zi;x¡i) ¡ Ii(x¡i)kp(i)
= k¸[ui(yi;x¡i) ¡ Ii(x¡i)] + (1 ¡ ¸)[ui(zi;x¡i) ¡ Ii(x¡i)]kp(i) (13.1)
< = ¸kui(yi;x¡i) ¡ Ii(x¡i)kp(i) + (1 ¡ ¸)kui(zi;x¡i) ¡ Ii(x¡i)kp(i) (13.2)
= ¸ min
xi2¢i
kui(xi;x¡i) ¡ Ii(x¡i)kp(i) (13.3)






where equality (13.1) follows from the multilinearity of ui, inequality (13.2) follows from
the triangle inequality, and equality (13.3) follows from the fact that yi;zi 2 Mi(x¡i).
But then all weak inequalities above are in fact equalities, proving that ¸yi+(1¡¸)zi 2
Mi(x¡i) = argminxi2¢i kui(xi;x¡i) ¡ Ii(x¡i)kp(i).
This completes the preliminary work. Notice that ¢ is nonempty, compact, and con-
vex, that M : ¢! ! ¢ with M(x) =
Q
i2N Mi(x¡i) is u.s.c., and that M(x) is nonempty,
compact, and convex for each x 2 ¢. Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem implies the exis-
tence of a point x 2 ¢ satisfying x 2 M(x), which is a compromise equilibrium. 2
Formally, CEp is not a solution concept, since the vector p = (p(i))i2N depends on the
player set of the game being played. This can be remedied in a trivial way: recall that
the set of potential players is I N and that each multicriteria game G 2 ¡ has a ¯nite
player set NG ½ I N. Fix a function p : I N ! [1;1] that speci¯es for each potential player
i 2 I N a norm lp(i). De¯ne a solution concept CEp on ¡ as follows:
8G 2 ¡ : CEp(G) = CE(p(i))i2NG(G);
i.e., CEp assigns to each game G 2 ¡ its set of compromise equilibria given that each
player i 2 NG uses the lp(i)-norm. It is a trivial exercise to show that the lp-norms satisfy
the following monotonicity condition:
8x;y 2 I R
n
+;8p 2 [1;1) : x ¸ y ) kxkp > kykp
8x;y 2 I R
n
+ : x ¸ y ) kxk1 > = kyk1Nash bargaining equilibria 147
Therefore, if x 2 CEp(G) is a compromise equilibrium and i 2 N has p(i) 2 [1;1),
strategy xi yields a payo® ui(xi;x¡i) on the strong Pareto edge of fui(yi;x¡i) j yi 2 ¢ig,
whereas a player i 2 N with p(i) = 1 selects a point on the weak Pareto edge. It is not
di±cult to check that CEp is a consistent solution concept. As a consequence, we found
a nontrivial, nonempty, consistent re¯nement of weak and strong Pareto equilibria.
Theorem 13.2 Let p : I N ! [1;1]. If p(i) 6= 1 for each player i 2 I N, then CEp is
a nonempty, consistent re¯nement of SPE. Otherwise, CEp is a nonempty, consistent
re¯nement of WPE.
13.3 Nash bargaining equilibria
There is an interesting duality between the multicriteria literature that suggests a com-
promise approach to ¯nding a desirable alternative from a feasible set and the game
theoretic approach on bargaining. The compromise approach entails formulating a de-
sirable, ideal solution solution and then `working your way down' to a feasible solution
as close as possible to the ideal. The bargaining approach entails formulating a typi-
cally undesirable disagreement point and then `working your way up' to a feasible point
dominating this disagreement outcome. Mixtures of the two approaches, like the Kalai-
Smorodinsky (1975) solution, exist as well.
In this section, Nash meets Nash. Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡. Confronted
with a strategy pro¯le x¡i 2
Q
j2Nnfig ¢(Xj), the members of organization i can answer
the question `what strategy yields a good outcome in the payo® polytope fui(xi;x¡i) j
xi 2 ¢(Xi)g = conv fui(xi;x¡i) j xi 2 Xig?' by ¯nding an appropriate disagreement
point in I R
r(i) and proposing the bargaining solution proposed by Nash (1950b). De¯ning
a best response in this way, and imposing the stability condition of the Nash equilibrium
concept (Nash, 1950a) that each player should play a best response given the strategy
pro¯le of his opponents, one obtains Nash bargaining equilibria.
Hence, in Nash bargaining equilibria we have
² for the noncooperative con°ict between players/organizations the Nash condition
that each player plays a best response against the strategy pro¯le of the opponents,
and
² the Nash bargaining solution to settle the cooperative con°ict within an organiza-
tion.
Formally, let i 2 N, and x¡i 2
Q
j2Nnfig ¢(Xj). Player i's disagreement point, given
x¡i, is the point di(x¡i) 2 I R
r(i) where for each k 2 f1;:::;r(i)g the k-th coordinate is
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A strategy pro¯le x 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi) is a Nash bargaining equilibrium of the multicriteria
game G, notation x 2 NBE(G), if each player i 2 N chooses a strategy pro¯le that
yields a utility vector coinciding with the Nash bargaining solution given feasible set
fui(yi;x¡i) j yi 2 ¢(Xi)g and disagreement point di(x¡i):





Theorem 13.3 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡. Then NBE(G) 6= ;.
Proof. De¯ne for each i 2 N the function fi : ¢¡i £ ¢i ! I R as follows:




Then fi is obviously continuous. By the Maximum theorem we know that
mi : x¡i 7! max
xi2¢i
fi(x¡i;xi)
is continuous and that
Mi : x¡i 7! arg max
xi2¢i
fi(x¡i;xi)
is u.s.c. Moreover, by continuity of fi, the set Mi(x¡i) is nonempty and compact for
each x¡i 2 ¢¡i.
To prove that Mi(x¡i) is convex, discern two cases. Either mi(x¡i) = 0, in which case
Mi(x¡i) = ¢i is convex, or mi(x¡i) > 0, in which case convexity of Mi(x¡i) follows from
the fact that maximizing fi is then equivalent with maximizing logfi, which is easily
seen to be a strictly concave function of xi.
Since ¢ is nonempty, convex, compact, the function M : ¢! ! ¢ with
M : x 7! M1(x¡1) £ ¢¢¢ £ Mn(x¡n)
is u.s.c., and M(x) is nonempty, convex, and compact for each x 2 ¢, the Kakutani ¯xed
point theorem implies the existence of a strategy pro¯le x 2 ¢ satisfying x 2 M(x). Such
a pro¯le x is a Nash bargaining equilibrium of the game G. 2
Some caution should be applied here. In a Nash bargaining equilibrium x 2 NBE(G)
it holds for each player i 2 N that
Qr(i)
k=1 (uik(xi;x¡i) ¡ dik(x¡i)) > 0 ,
9yi 2 ¢(Xi) :
Qr(i)
k=1 (uik(yi;x¡i) ¡ dik(x¡i)) > 0 ,
8k 2 f1;:::;r(i)g 9yi 2 ¢(Xi) : uik(yi;x¡i) ¡ dik(x¡i) > 0 ,
8k 2 f1;:::;r(i)g : uik(¢;x¡i) is not a constant function.Perfect equilibria 149
The second equivalence follows from multilinearity of ui. The nonnegative function
Qr(i)
k=1 (uik(¢;x¡i) ¡ dik(x¡i)) therefore equals the zero function if and only if for some
criterion k 2 f1;:::;r(i)g the function uik(¢;x¡i) is a constant function. In this case,
the strategy xi of player i in the Nash bargaining equilibrium x may yield a point on
the weak Pareto edge of the payo® polytope fui(yi;x¡i) j yi 2 ¢ig, rather than on the
strong Pareto edge. In the literature on bargaining situations this problem is usually
avoided by making nonlevelness assumptions. Consequently:
Theorem 13.4 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡. Then NBE(G) µ WPE(G). More-
over, if x 2 NBE(G) and for each player i 2 N and each criterion k 2 f1;:::;r(i)g the
function uik(¢;x¡i) is not constant, then x 2 SPE(G).
13.4 Perfect equilibria
This section, based on Van Megen et al. (1999), takes a more conventional game theoretic
approach to equilibrium re¯nements by de¯ning the analogon of perfect equilibria (Selten,
1975) for multicriteria games. A perfect equilibrium point is de¯ned as a limit point of
a sequence of weak Pareto equilibria of perturbed multicriteria games. Perturbed games
are derived from the original game by demanding that every pure strategy is played with
positive probability.
Formally, let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡ be a multicriteria game. Denote the ¯nite
set Xi of pure strategies of player i 2 N by Xi = fxi1;:::;xim(i)g, where m(i) = jXij.
A vector " = ("i)i2N 2
Q
i2N I R
m(i) is a mistake vector if
Pm(i)
k=1 "i
k < 1 and " > 0. The
"-perturbed game associated with G is the game G(") = hN;(Xi("))i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡,
where the pure strategy set of player i 2 N is Xi(") = fxi1(");:::;xim(i)(")g, where
xik(") denotes the mixed strategy in ¢(Xi) which gives probability "i




t to xik. With a slight abuse of notation, the payo® functions in
the game G(") are just the functions ui restricted to the new domain.
Since G(") is itself an element of ¡, carriers, payo® polytopes, and weakly e±cient
pure best reply sets (see Section 11.2), are well-de¯ned. Carriers and weakly e±cient
sets are de¯ned in terms of strategy indices. For instance, the set of pure strategies
of player i 2 N is indexed with labels 1;:::;m(i) in both G and G("). In G, strategy
k 2 f1;:::;m(i)g of player i refers to xik 2 Xi, whereas in G(") it refers to xik(") 2 Xi(").
Each mixed strategy in the perturbed game can be identi¯ed with a mixed strategy in
the original game, so that | with a minor abuse of notation | one obtains ¢(Xi(")) ½
¢(Xi).
In Proposition 13.5 it is shown that the weakly e±cient pure best reply sets of a
player i w.r.t. a mixed strategy ¾¡i 2
Q
j2Nnfig ¢j(Xj(")) in G and G(") coincide. In
the proof we use (for each i 2 N) the function fi : ¢(Xi) ! ¢(Xi(")) de¯ned for each
¾i 2 ¢(Xi) and each pure strategy k 2 f1;:::;m(i)g as
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Clearly, fi is continuous, dominance preserving and bijective where f
¡1
i : ¢(Xi(")) !
¢(Xi) is given by
f
¡1
i (~ ¾i)(xik) =






for all ~ ¾i 2 ¢(Xi(")) and k 2 f1;:::;m(i)g:
Furthermore, (13.4) immediately implies that ¾i assigns a positive probability to pure
strategy xik in G if and only if fi(¾i) assigns positive probability to pure strategy xik(")
in G("): C(G;¾i) = C(G(");fi(¾i)) for all ¾i 2 ¢(Xi).
Proposition 13.5 Let G 2 ¡, " a mistake vector in
Q
i2N I R
m(i), and ¾ 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi(")).
Then Ei(G;¾¡i) = Ei(G(");¾¡i) for all i 2 N.
Proof. Let i 2 N. It su±ces to show that any weakly e±cient set I w.r.t. ¾¡i in G is also
weakly e±cient w.r.t. ¾¡i in G(") and conversely. Take I 2 Ei(G;¾¡i) (refer to Section
11.2 for the de¯nition of Ei(G;¾¡i)) and suppose that I is not weakly e±cient w.r.t. ¾¡i
in G("). Hence, there exists a ~ ¾i 2 ¢(Xi(")) with C(G("); ~ ¾i) µ I which is dominated




i (^ ¾i);¾¡i) ¡ ui(f
¡1






(ui(^ ¾i;¾¡i) ¡ ui(~ ¾i;¾¡i)) > 0:
This contradicts the fact that I is weakly e±cient w.r.t. ¾¡i in G since C(G;f
¡1
i (~ ¾i)) =
C(G("); ~ ¾i) µ I. The proof of the converse is similar and therefore omitted. 2
De¯nition 13.6 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡. A strategy pro¯le ¾ = (¾i)i2N 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi) is a perfect equilibrium of G if there exists a sequence ("(k))1
k=1 of mistake
vectors converging to 0 and a sequence (¾(k))1
k=1 of strategy pro¯les such that ¾(k) 2
WPE(G("(k))) for each k 2 I N and limk!1 ¾(k) = ¾. The set of perfect equilibria of G
is denoted by PERF(G). /
The following observations can be made.
Theorem 13.7 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡. Then
(1) if r(i) = 1 for all i 2 N, then perfect equilibrium points correspond to perfect Nash
equilibria;
(2) PERF(G) 6= ;;Perfect equilibria 151
(3) PERF(G) µ WPE(G).
Proof. Claim (1) is obvious and claim (2) follows easily from the compactness of the
strategy space
Q
i2N ¢(Xi). To prove claim (3), let ¾ 2 PERF(G), ("(k))1
k=1 a sequence
of mistake vectors and (¾(k))1
k=1 a sequence of strategy pro¯les such that "(k) ! 0,
¾(k) 2 WPE(G("(k))) for all k 2 I N, and ¾(k) ! ¾. By Proposition 11.4 it su±ces to
show that for every i 2 N it holds that C(G;¾i) µ I for some I 2 Ei(G;¾¡i).
Let i 2 N. For every t 2 C(G;¾i) and su±ciently large k 2 I N it holds that ¾i(xit) >
"i
t(k) and hence for su±ciently large k, ¾(k)i(xit) > "i
t(k). This implies C(G;¾i) µ
C(G("(k));¾(k)i) for large k. Since ¾(k) 2 WPE(G("(k))), Proposition 11.4 implies
the existence of I(k) 2 Ei(G("(k));¾(k)¡i) such that C(G("(k));¾(k)i) µ I(k). By
Proposition 13.5 it holds that Ei(G("(k));¾(k)¡i) = Ei(G;¾(k)¡i). Therefore C(G;¾i) µ
C(G("(k));¾(k)i) µ I(k) for large k and for some I(k) 2 Ei(G;¾(k)¡i).
Draw a subsequence (¾(`))1
`=1 of (¾(k))1
k=1 such that I(`) = J for all `. Since
lim`!1 ¾(`)¡i = ¾¡i and J is weakly e±cient for all ¾(`)¡i in G, J is weakly e±cient
w.r.t. ¾¡i in G. So we can ¯nd a set I 2 Ei(G;¾¡i) with J µ I. Conclude that there is
an I 2 Ei(G;¾¡i) such that C(G;¾i) µ J µ I. 2
It is not di±cult to show that the set PERF(G) of perfect equilibria of G is closed in
Q
i2N ¢(Xi).
Example 13.8 In the inspection game of Example 11.2 we found f1g£[0;1] µ WPE(G).
But for q 2 [0;1) the strategy combination (1;q) is not perfect. Any probability distribu-
tion ~ p in ¢(X1(")) close to p = 1 has the property that WB2(G("); ~ p) = f1g. This implies
that for any sequence of mistake vectors (("(k)))1
k=1 and any sequence ((pk;qk))1
k=1 such
that (pk;qk) 2 WPE(G("(k)));limk!1 "(k) = 0, it holds that qk ! 1. Notice that all
other equilibrium points are perfect. /
Perfect equilibria can be characterized in several ways. First, "-perfectness for completely
mixed strategy combinations is de¯ned.
De¯nition 13.9 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡ and " 2 I R++. A strategy pro¯le
¾ 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi) with C(G;¾i) = f1;:::;m(i)g for all i 2 N is called "-perfect if for each
i 2 N there exists an Ii 2 Ei(G;¾¡i) such that ¾i(xit) < = " for all t = 2 Ii. /
An "-perfect strategy of player i is a completely mixed strategy such that all pure strate-
gies that are not in a certain weakly e±cient pure best reply set are played with proba-
bility at most ".
Theorem 13.10 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡ and ^ ¾ 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi). The following
three claims are equivalent.
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(2) There is a sequence ("(k))1
k=1 of positive real numbers converging to 0 and a se-




verging to ^ ¾ such that ¾(k) is "(k)-perfect for all k 2 I N.
(3) There is a sequence (¾(k))1
k=1 of completely mixed strategies such that for all k 2 I N
and all i 2 N: ^ ¾i 2 WBi(¾(k)¡i) and limk!1 ¾(k) = ^ ¾.
Proof. We show that (1) implies (2), (2) implies (3), and (3) implies (1).
(1) ) (2): Assume ^ ¾ 2 PERF(G). Take a sequence (±(k))1
k=1 of mistake vectors con-
verging to 0 and a sequence (¾(k))1
k=1 of weak Pareto equilibria in the perturbed games
G(±(k)) with limk!1 ¾(k) = ^ ¾. Take "(k) = maxf(±(k))i
tji 2 N;t 2 f1;:::;m(i)gg for
each k 2 I N. Then limk!1 "(k) = 0 and ¾(k) is a "(k)-perfect for each k.
(2) ) (3): Suppose (2) holds. Take a sequence ("(k))1
k=1 of positive real numbers
converging to 0 and a sequence (¾(k))1
k=1 of "(k)-perfect strategy pro¯les tending to ^ ¾.
Let i 2 N. For each k 2 I N, there is an I(k) 2 Ei(G;¾(k)¡i) with ¾(k)i(xit) < = "(k) for all
t = 2 I(k). If ` 2 C(G; ^ ¾i), there exists a su±ciently large N` 2 I N such that ^ ¾i(xi`) > "(k)
and ¾(k)i(xi`) > "(k) for all k > = N`.
Take M = maxfN`j` 2 C(G; ^ ¾i)g. For all k > = M and all ` 2 C(G; ^ ¾i) we have
^ ¾i(xi`) > "(k);¾(k)i(xi`) > "(k) and so C(G; ^ ¾i) µ I(k). Using Proposition 11.4, it
follows that ^ ¾i 2 WBi(G;¾(k)¡i).
(3) ) (1): Let (¾(k))1
k=1 be a sequence of completely mixed strategies converging to ^ ¾
such that ^ ¾i 2 WBi(G;¾(k)¡i) for all k 2 I N and all i 2 N. De¯ne for all k 2 I N, all






k if t 2 C(G; ^ ¾i)
¾(k)i(sit) if t = 2 C(G; ^ ¾i)
Clearly, limk!1("(k))i
t = 0 and "(k) = ("(k)i)i2N 2
Q
i2N I R
m(i) is a mistake vector if k
is large enough. It su±ces to show that ¾(k) 2 WPE(G("(k))) for large k.
Let i 2 N. For large k, ¾(k)i(xit) > 1
k = ("(k))i
t if t 2 C(G; ^ ¾i) and ¾(k)i(xit) =
("(k))i
t if t = 2 C(G; ^ ¾i). This implies that C(G("(k));¾(k)i) = C(G; ^ ¾i) for large k. Since
^ ¾i 2 WBi(G;¾(k)¡i) we can ¯nd I(k) 2 Ei(G;¾(k)¡i) with C(G; ^ ¾i) µ I(k). Conse-
quently, C(G("(k));¾(k)i) µ I(k) for large k. This implies that ¾(k) 2 WPE(G("(k)))
for large k. 2
Weak Pareto equilibria of ¯nite multicriteria games coincided with Nash equilibria of
weighted games, where nonnegative weight is assigned to each of the criteria; see Theorem
11.5. For perfect equilibria this equivalence does not hold: a perfect equilibrium of a
multicriteria game need not be a perfect Nash equilibrium of a weighted game.
Example 13.11 Strategy pro¯le (p¤;q¤) with p¤ = 1
1+c;q¤ = 1 is a perfect equilibrium
of the inspection game in Example 11.2. Let ¸ = (¸1;¸2) be a vector of weights. IfConcluding remarks 153
(p¤;q¤) 2 NE(G¸), then ¸1 = e2 = (0;1) in order to make the ¯rst player indi®erent




Since I weakly dominates NI in this payo® matrix, the completely mixed strategy p¤
cannot yield a perfect Nash equilibrium of G¸. /
The reverse statement does hold: every perfect Nash equilibrium of a weighted game is
a perfect equilibrium of the corresponding multicriteria game. Denote the set of perfect
Nash equilibria of a strategic game G by PN(G).
Proposition 13.12 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡ and ¸ = (¸i)i2N 2
Q
i2N ¢r(i).
Then PN(G¸) µ PERF(G).
Proof. Let ¾ 2 PN(G¸). Take a sequence of mistake vectors ("(k))1
k=1 converging
to 0 and a sequence of completely mixed strategy combinations (¾(k))1
k=1 such that
limk!1 ¾(k) = ¾ and ¾(k) 2 NE(G¸("(k)). Then ¾(k) 2 WPE(G¸("(k)) by Theorem
11.5 and hence ¾ 2 PERF(G). 2
Observe that perfect equilibria were based on weak Pareto equilibria, rather than strong
Pareto equilibria. This was done for a technical reason: the set of strong Pareto equilibria
need not be closed. In Example 11.2, for instance, the strategy pro¯le (p;q) with p = 1
c+1
and q = 1 is the limit of totally mixed strong Pareto equilibria, but is not a strong Pareto
equilibrium itself.
13.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, three re¯nements of the Pareto equilibrium concept were presented. The
roots of these concepts were fundamentally di®erent:
² Compromise equilibria were based on the compromise solutions of Yu (1973) that
enjoy great popularity in the literature on multicriteria optimization;
² Nash bargaining equilibria were based on the bargaining solution of Nash (1950b),
part of the literature on cooperative game theory;
² Perfect equilibria were based on the perfect equilibria of Selten (1975), part of
the literature on re¯nements of the Nash equilibrium concept for noncooperative
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Norde et al. (1996) showed that there is no proper re¯nement of the Nash equilibrium
concept for strategic games that yields utility maximizing strategies in one-person games,
is consistent, and yields a nonempty set of outcomes. Theorem 11.10 in Chapter 11
indicates that the Pareto equilibrium concept does not su®er from this drawback. In
fact, compromise equilibria give rise to such nontrivial re¯nements. Also Nash bargaining
equilibria are consistent re¯nements of the weak Pareto equilibrium concept.
These two concepts, compromise equilibria and Nash bargaining equilibria, di®er
from the standard game theoretic approach to equilibrium re¯nements, which usually
requires robustness against certain perturbations or trembles in the structure of the
game. It is the multicriteria character of the games under consideration that yield new
opportunities for re¯nements, simply by realizing that there is not only a con°ict between
players/organizations, but also within an organization to decide what exactly constitutes
a `best response' against a strategy pro¯le of the other players.
It would be interesting to approach equilibrium re¯nements in multicriteria games
from an axiomatic point of view. To axiomatize compromise equilibria, for instance,
one should ¯rst try to obtain an axiomatization for this concept in the case of a sin-
gle organization, rather than the case where several organizations interact. Combining
this with axioms like consistency and converse consistency would then quickly yield an
axiomatization.
Similarly, to axiomatize Nash bargaining equilibria, one would typically require a
combination of axioms that characterize the Nash bargaining solution in standard bar-
gaining problems (Nash, 1950b) and combine this with axioms used in noncooperative
game theory. The bargaining literature usually imposes the following nondegeneracy
condition: if S ½ I R
n is the feasible set of alternatives and d 2 I R
n the disagreement
point, then there is a feasible alternative s 2 S;s > d, that is better for all concerned
individuals; cf. Nash (1950b), Roth (1979, 1985), Peters (1992). In the present context,
the feasible set that the members of an organization bargain over changes as a function
of the strategy pro¯le of the opponents. There will typically be strategy pro¯les for
which this gives rise to a feasible set not satisfying the nondegeneracy condition, thereby
placing the problem outside the range of those covered in most of the existing literature
on bargaining.
A next step in re¯ning equilibria for multicriteria games that is more in the spirit
of the traditional re¯nement literature is to de¯ne the notion of proper equilibria as in
Myerson (1978). Intuitively, as in the perfect equilibrium concept, proper equilibria still
admit the possibility of making mistakes, but costly mistakes have lower probability. In
multicriteria games `costly mistakes' could be de¯ned by explicitly using the possibility
to de¯ne levels of best reply sets. For G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni 2 ¡ and ¾ 2
Q
i2N ¢(Xi)
the ¯rst level of best replies of player i 2 N w.r.t. ¾¡i in G is the set of all pure strategies
contained in the e±cient pure best reply sets w.r.t. ¾¡i. The second level is constructed
by considering the best replies if pure strategies in the ¯rst level are not taken intoConcluding remarks 155




i (G;¾¡i) := Ei(G;¾¡i)
and for every k 2 I N;k > 1: Mk(i) := ft 2 Mk¡1(i)jt = 2 I for all I 2 E
k¡1
i (G;¾¡i)g. A set
I µ Mk(i) is k-th level weakly e±cient if for all strategies ¾i 2 ¢(Xi) with C(G;¾i) µ I it
holds that ui(¾) is not dominated by any ui(^ ¾i;¾¡i) with C(G; ^ ¾i) µ Mk(i). I µ Mk(i)
is an k-th level weakly e±cient pure best reply set if I is k-th level weakly e±cient and
there is no k-th level e±cient set K µ Mk(i) with I µ K and I 6= K. Ek
i (G;¾¡i) is the
set of k-th level e±cient pure best reply sets for player i w.r.t. ¾¡i in ¡.
In every perturbed game, strategies included in lower levels should be played with
probabilities of lower order than those in higher levels. A proper equilibrium would be
de¯ned as a limit of such equilibria of perturbed games getting ever closer to the original
game. The main problem with this approach is that the the continuity properties of
these level sets are not as well-behaved as one would hope, making an existence proof a
di±cult matter.156 Compromise, Nash Bargaining, and Perfect EquilibriaChapter 14
Pareto-Optimal Security Strategies
14.1 Introduction
Multicriteria matrix games are generalizations of the standard matrix games introduced
and solved by von Neumann (1928), in the sense that in a multicriteria matrix game each
of the two players has a vector-valued payo® function. By a standard matrix game we
mean a two-person zero-sum game with only one criterion in which each player chooses
a mixed strategy, being a probability distribution over a ¯nite set of pure strategies.
Ghose and Prasad (1989) introduce Pareto-optimal security strategies in multicriteria
matrix games. The interpretation behind this concept is that a player, given his strategy
choice, considers the worst payo® he may incur in each criterion separately. A Pareto-
optimal security strategy is then a strategy for which there is no alternative that yields
a weakly more agreeable worst-case scenario.
Ghose (1991) characterized the ¯rst player's Pareto-optimal security strategies as
minimax strategies in a weighted zero-sum game with only one criterion. His proof is
complex, but was simpli¯ed by Fernandez and Puerto (1996), who also provide several
other characterizations.
The weighted zero-sum game with one criterion introduced by Ghose (1991) is not
a standard matrix game: the second player does not choose a probability distribution
over a ¯nite set of pure strategies, but selects a tuple of mixed strategies, one strategy
for each of the separate criteria.
The purpose of this chapter, based on Voorneveld (1999a), is to make the ¯nal addi-
tional step to standard matrix games, reducing the problem of ¯nding a Pareto-optimal
security strategy to ¯nding a minimax strategy in a matrix game, a problem that lies at
the foundation of game theory.
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14.2 De¯nitions and preliminary results
Consider a payo® matrix A with m rows and n columns. Each entry Aij of A is a k-
dimensional vector of real numbers. Equivalently, such a payo® matrix is described by
a k-tuple A = (A(1);:::;A(k)) of m £ n matrices with entries in I R. In a multicriteria
matrix game based on a payo® matrix A = (A(1);:::;A(k)), the ¯rst player chooses
rows and the second player chooses columns. The pure strategies or rows for the ¯rst
player are denoted by S1 = f1;:::;mg, the pure strategies or columns for the second
player are denoted by S2 = f1;:::;ng. Consequently, the mixed strategies of player 1
and 2 are ¢(S1) and ¢(S2), respectively. The payo® from player 1 to player 2, if player
1 chooses x 2 ¢(S1) and his opponent chooses y 2 ¢(S2), is
xAy = (xA(1)y;:::;xA(k)y):
The ¯rst player tries to minimize this vector, the second player to maximize it.
Remark 14.1 It is common in game theory when studying zero-sum games, to assume
that payo®s are from the column player to the row player and that the row player
maximizes his payo®, whereas the column player tries to minimize the payo® to the row
player. In this chapter we take the opposite view: the matrix A speci¯es the payo®s to
the column player rather than the row player. This is done to make the chapter in line
with the existing literature on Pareto-optimal security strategies, where this assumption
is made throughout. /
In the special case that k = 1, we have a matrix game, the topic of von Neumann's paper
(1928) and one of the starting points of game theory.
Given a strategy x 2 ¢(S1), the security level v(x) of player 1 is given by





That is, given a strategy x 2 ¢(S1), player 1 considers the worst payo® he may incur
in each criterion separately. Ghose and Prasad (1989) de¯ne Pareto-optimal security
strategies as follows:
De¯nition 14.2 A strategy x¤ 2 ¢(S1) is a Pareto-optimal security strategy (POSS) for
player 1 in the multicriteria matrix game A = (A(1);:::;A(k)) if there is no x 2 ¢(S1)
such that v(x¤) ¸ v(x). /
Consider a multicriteria matrix game B = (B(1);:::;B(k)) with k criteria. This in-
duces a serial (zero-sum) game S(B) with two players, where player 1 chooses a mixed
strategy x 2 ¢(S1) and player 2 chooses a vector y = (y1;:::;yk) 2
Qk
l=1 ¢(S2) of mixed
strategies, one strategy for each criterion. The payo® to player 1 if he chooses x and
his opponent chooses y = (y1;:::;yk) equals
Pk
l=1 xB(l)yl, which player 1 tries to min-
imize and his opponent tries to maximize. Borm et al. (1996) refer to serial games as
amalgations of games.
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Proposition 14.3 A strategy x¤ 2 ¢(S1) is a POSS for player 1 in the multicriteria


















i.e., x¤ is a minimax strategy in the serial game S(®1A(1);:::;®kA(k)).
Ghose's proof takes about eight pages. Following Fernandez and Puerto (1996), who use
methods from multicriteria linear programming, a much clearer and shorter proof can
be given. See Section 14.3.
Observe that a serial game has only one criterion, but is not a standard matrix game,
since the second player does not choose a probability distribution over his pure strategies,
but rather a k-tuple of mixed strategies.
We de¯ne a function p :
Qk
l=1 ¢(S2) ! ¢(
Qk
l=1 S2) from the k-fold Cartesian product
of probability distributions on player 2's set of pure strategies S2 to the set of probability
distributions on the k-fold Cartesian product of his pure strategies S2 as follows:
8 (y1;:::;yk) 2
Qk




8 c = (c(1);:::;c(k)) 2
Qk
l=1 S2 : pc =
Qk
l=1 yl;c(l);
where yl;c(l) is the probability that mixed strategy yl assigns to the pure strategy c(l) 2
S2. Notice that this function is one-to-one and assigns to each k-tuple of probability
distributions over S2 the probability distribution it induces on the Cartesian product of
pure strategies. Using p, we can consider
Qk
l=1 ¢(S2) as a subset of ¢(
Qk
l=1 S2). It is
clear that this last set includes more probability distributions than those induced by p.
Example 14.4 Take k = 2, S2 = f1;2g, y1 = (1=4;3=4), and y2 = (1=3;2=3). Then
p(y1;y2) assigns probability 1/12 to (1,1), 2/12 to (1,2), 3/12 to (2,1), and 6/12 to (2,2).
The element q 2 ¢(S2 £ S2) which assigns probability 1/3 to (1,1), (1,2), and (2,1) and
probability 0 to (2,2) is not the image p(y) of any y = (y1;y2) 2 ¢(S2) £ ¢(S2). /
Consider a multicriteria matrix game B = (B(1);:::;B(k)) where each matrix B(l) has
m rows and n columns. This induces a matrix game M(B), where M(B) is a matrix
with m rows, labeled i = 1;:::;m, and nk columns, labeled c = (c(1);:::;c(k)) with
c(l) 2 f1;:::;ng for each l = 1;:::;k. The entry in row i and column c = (c(1);:::;c(k))
of M(B) equals
Pk
l=1 B(l)i;c(l). Notice that the order of the columns is not important.
Clearly, the set of mixed strategies of player 1 in M(B) is ¢(S1) and the set of mixed
strategies of player 2 in M(B) is ¢(
Qk
l=1 S2). If the ¯rst player, the minimizer, plays
strategy x 2 ¢(S1) and the second player, the maximizer, plays strategy q 2 ¢(
Qk
l=1 S2),
the payo® to the ¯rst player equals, with a minor abuse of notation assuming a given
order of the columns, xM(B)q.160 Pareto-Optimal Security Strategies
Example 14.5 Consider a two-criterion matrix game B = (B(1);B(2)) in which both
players have two pure strategies. Let the matrices B(1) and B(2) be as in Figure 14.1.









Figure 14.1: A two-criterion matrix game
M(B) =
(1;1) (1;2) (2;1) (2;2)
1 0 ¡2=3 2=3 0
2 ¡1 1=3 ¡4=3 0
Figure 14.2: The associated matrix game
If the ¯rst player plays each row with equal probability, i.e. x = (1=2;1=2) and the
second player chooses column (1,1) with probability 1/12, column (1,2) with probability
2/12, column (2,1) with probability 3/12, and column (2,2) with probability 6/12, i.e.,
q = (1=12;2=12;3=12;6=12), the payo® to player 1 equals xM(B)q = ¡11=72. /
Proposition 14.6 Given a multicriteria matrix game B = (B(1);:::;B(k)) and a stra-
tegy combination (x;y1;:::;yk) 2 ¢(S1) £
Qk
l=1 ¢(S2), the following two claims are
equivalent:
(i) (x;y1;:::;yk) 2 ¢(S1) £
Qk
l=1 ¢(S2) is a Nash equilibrium in the serial game S(B),
i.e.,
8 x 2 ¢(S1) :
Pk







l=1 xB(l)yl > =
Pk
l=1 xB(l)yl:
(ii) (x;p(y1;:::;yk)) 2 ¢(S1) £ ¢(
Qk
l=1 S2) is a Nash equilibrium in the matrix game
M(B), i.e.,
8 x 2 ¢(S1) : xM(B)p(y1;:::;yk) < = xM(B)p(y1;:::;yk);
8 q 2 ¢(
Qk
l=1 S2) : xM(B)p(y1;:::;yk) > = xM(B)q:
Proof. See Borm et al. (1996), Proposition 1. 2Characterizations of POSS 161
14.3 Characterizations of POSS
This section provides several characterizations of Pareto-optimal security strategies. The
main result is Theorem 14.9, in which by combining the results from the previous section,
we obtain a characterization of Pareto-optimal security strategies in terms of minimax
strategies of suitably weighted matrix games.
Let us start with some remarks on multicriteria linear programming. A general
multicriteria linear programming problem is formulated as follows:
Minimize Cx
subject to Ax < = b
x > = 0;
(14.1)
where C 2 I R
p£q;A 2 I R
r£q;b 2 I R
r;x 2 I R
q. A feasible solution x¤ of (14.1) is an e±cient
solution if there is no feasible x such that Cx · Cx¤.
Proposition 14.7 A feasible point x¤ is an e±cient solution to (14.1) if and only if there
exists a vector ® 2 ¢0
p of weights such that x¤ solves the following linear programming
problem:
Minimize ®Cx = h®;Cxi
subject to Ax < = b
x > = 0
(14.2)
The proof of this proposition is analogous to the proof of Theorem 10.1.
Theorem 14.8 Consider a multicriteria matrix game A = (A(1);:::;A(k)). Let x¤ 2
¢(S1);v¤ = v(x¤). Then x¤ is a POSS for player 1 if and only if (v¤;x¤) is an e±cient
solution to the following multicriteria linear programming problem:
Minimize v1;:::;vk
subject to xA(l) < = (vl;:::;vl) l = 1;:::;k
x > = 0;
Pm
i=1 xi = 1;v 2 I R
k:
(14.3)
Proof. Strategy x¤ is POSS if and only if (v¤;x¤) is an e±cient solution of
Minimize v1;:::;vk
subject to vl = maxy2¢(S2) xA(l)y l = 1;:::;k
x > = 0;
Pm
i=1 xi = 1;v 2 I R
k:
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It is easy to see that:
² if (v;x) is feasible in (14.4), then (v;x) is feasible in (14.3).
² if (v;x) is an e±cient solution to (14.3), then for each criterion l 2 f1;:::;kg there
is a pure strategy s 2 S2 such that xA(l)es = vl (otherwise vl could be decreased),
so v = v(x). But then (v;x) is feasible in (14.4).
Hence (v¤;x¤) is e±cient in (14.3) if and only if it is e±cient in (14.4). 2
The following claims are equivalent:
(a) A strategy x¤ 2 ¢(S1) is a POSS for player 1 in the multicriteria matrix game
A = (A(1);:::;A(k)).





subject to vl = maxy2¢(S2) xA(l)y l = 1;:::;k
x > = 0;
Pm
i=1 xi = 1;v 2 I R
k
(14.5)






















for some ® 2 ¢0
k.
Here (a) , (b) follows from De¯nition 14.2, (b) , (c) follows from Proposition 14.7,
and (c) , (d) , (e) is a matter of rewriting. This proves Proposition 14.3.
The next theorem is the main result of this chapter. It characterizes Pareto-optimal
security strategies as minimax strategies of a standard matrix game.
Theorem 14.9 A strategy x¤ 2 ¢(S1) is a POSS for player 1 in the multicriteria matrix
game A = (A(1);:::;A(k)) if and only if there exists a vector ® 2 ¢0
k such that x¤ is a
minimax strategy in the matrix game M(®1A(1);:::;®kA(k)).Characterizations of POSS 163
Proof. By Proposition 14.3, a strategy x¤ 2 ¢(S1) is a POSS for player 1 in the
multicriteria matrix game A = (A(1);:::;A(k)) if and only if there exists a vector ® 2 ¢0
k
such that x¤ 2 ¢(S1) is a minimax strategy in the serial game S(®1A(1);:::;®kA(k)).
By the compactness of the strategy spaces ¢(S1) and
Qk
l=1 ¢(S2) and the structure of
the payo® function (x;y1;:::;yk) 7!
Pk




















and the sets of minimax strategies of player 1 and maximin strategies of player 2 are
nonempty (cf. Blackwell and Girshick, 1954, Chapter 2).
Let (y1;:::;yk) 2
Qk
l=1 ¢(S2) be a maximin strategy of player 2 in the serial game.
Then x¤ 2 ¢(S1) is a minimax strategy if and only if (x¤;y1;:::;yk) is a Nash equilibrium
of S(®1A(1);:::;®kA(k)). Equivalently, by Proposition 14.6: (x¤;p(y1;:::;yk)) is a Nash
equilibrium of the matrix game M(®1A(1);:::;®kA(k)). Since this is a matrix game,
this is equivalent to stating that p(y1;:::;yk) is a maximin strategy of player 2 and
x¤ 2 ¢(S1) is a minimax strategy of player 1 in M(®1A(1);:::;®kA(k)). 2
As a corollary, we obtain the Pareto-optimal security strategies as solutions to a para-
metric linear programming problem.
Corollary 14.10 A strategy x¤ 2 ¢(S1) is a POSS for player 1 in the multicriteria
matrix game A = (A(1);:::;A(k)) if and only if there exists a vector ® 2 ¢0
k such that
(v¤;x¤) solves the linear program LP(®) given below:
Minimize v
subject to xM(®1A(1);:::;®kA(k)) < = (v;:::;v)
x 2 ¢(S1)
v 2 I R;
where





l=1 S2) minx2¢(S1) xM(®1A(1);:::;®kA(k))q
is the (minimax or maximin) value of M(®1A(1);:::;®kA(k)).164 Pareto-Optimal Security Strategies
Proof. For multicriteria matrix games with only one criterion, the notion of POSS and
minimax are equivalent for player 1. Hence, the result follows from Theorems 14.8 and
14.9. 2
Moreover, Ghose (1991, p. 476) observes that in his type of games only ¯nitely many
scalarizations su±ce to ¯nd all Pareto-optimal security strategies. According to the
proof of Theorem 14.9, this result carries over to our type of scalarized games, since we
use exactly the same vectors of weights.









In Ghose and Prasad (1989), the set of POSS for player 1 was computed to be the
set f(p;1 ¡ p) j p 2 [1=3;2=3]g. Consider the vector ® = (1=3;2=3) of weights. Then
(1=3)A(1) equals the matrix B(1) and (2=3)A(2) equals the matrix B(2) in Example
14.5. Hence M((1=3)A(1);(2=3)A(2)) is the matrix M(B). The minimax strategies of
player 1 in M(B) are the strategies f(p;1 ¡ p) j p 2 [1=3;2=3]g, which is the set of
Pareto-optimal security strategies of player 1: in this example a single vector of weights
su±ces. /
14.4 Conclusions
Previous papers have introduced the notion of Pareto-optimal security strategies in mul-
ticriteria matrix games and obtained a characterization in terms of minimax strategies of
weighted games with a single criterion, in which one of the players chooses a mixed strat-
egy for each of the criteria separately. The purpose of the current chapter has been to
characterize Pareto-optimal security strategies as minimax strategies of standard matrix
games, one of the cornerstones of game theory, where each player is allowed to choose
only one mixed strategy.
The aim was not to facilitate computation. In fact, the de¯nition of the matrix
game of Theorem 14.9 points out that the strategy space of the second player grows
exponentially with the data input: if this player has n pure strategies in the multicriteria
game and there are k criteria, he has nk pure strategies in the weighted matrix game of
Theorem 14.9.Chapter 15
Cooperative Multicriteria Games
with Public and Private Criteria
15.1 Introduction
In matters of con°ict, players frequently evaluate situations on the basis of several crite-
ria. Still, games with multiple criteria and in particular cooperative games with multiple
criteria have received relatively little attention in game theoretic literature. Some ex-
ceptions are Bergstresser and Yu (1977), Zhao (1991), and Lind (1996).
In the current chapter, based on Voorneveld and van den Nouweland (1998a, 1998b,
1999), we introduce a new class of cooperative multicriteria games. Two fundamentally
di®erent types of criteria are considered: private criteria and public criteria. Private
or divisible criteria share the characteristics of the criterion one usually works with
when studying games with transferable utility, the characteristics of money: the amount
obtained can be divided over coalition members so that one member consumes a di®erent
quantity than another member, and that which is consumed by one member cannot be
consumed by another. In economic terms, these criteria are rival and excludable. Public
or indivisible criteria have the same value for all members of a coalition; they are non-
rival and non-excludable. Examples of such criteria are global warming, investment in
medical research, or, on a di®erent scale, the national rate of unemployment and its
e®ect on the economy, political stability, and the safety in your country.
The introduction of public criteria is new to cooperative game theory, presumably
because it is assumed that some central authority takes a (socially optimal) decision on
such criteria. However, the value of a public criterion is often in°uenced by decisions
made on private criteria by individual agents (think of pollution levels, for example).
Hence, it seems that decisions on private and public criteria should not be treated sep-
arately. An integrated view on private and public criteria might expose the trade-o®s
faced by individuals not only between criteria in the same category, but also between
criteria in di®erent categories.
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The `value' of a coalition is usually interpreted as that which its members can guar-
antee themselves by joining forces. If multiple criteria are involved, then improvement
in one criterion (number of ¯sh caught) may well have detrimental e®ects on other cri-
teria (environmental issues like biodiversity). So, the relative importance of di®erent
criteria plays a signi¯cant role. But the relative importance of two criteria may dif-
fer with their values. For example, rich countries attach relatively more importance to
controlling pollution levels than to increasing production since production levels and
pollution levels are already high. For developing countries with low production levels,
however, increasing production is more important than controlling pollution levels. We
believe that `collapsing' the di®erent criteria to one number by means of a utility func-
tion ignores some of the most interesting issues associated with multicriteria decision
situations. By leaving the di®erent criteria in their own right, one can investigate what
kind of trade-o®s players face between the criteria. Moreover, such an approach respects
the incommensurability of some attributes: in many cases agents may be incapable of or
morally opposed against aggregating the value of money and the value of | for instance
| a human life to a common scale. In cooperative multicriteria games we therefore
consider it natural to assign a set of vector values to each coalition, i.e., we consider
characteristic correspondences instead of single valued characteristic functions and an
obtainable `value' is a vector that speci¯es the value of all the criteria for a particular
alternative that is feasible to a coalition.
Cooperative multicriteria games with public and private criteria as de¯ned and stud-
ied in the current chapter generalize the games used in Bergstresser and Yu (1977) and
Lind (1996). These authors do not discriminate between several types of criteria; they
only use what we call private criteria. Moreover, the characteristic functions in their
games are single-valued instead of set-valued.
After de¯ning multicriteria cooperative games with public and private criteria, the
obvious next step is the search for reasonable solutions to such games. This chapter con-
centrates on core concepts, which rule out those outcomes which are in a sense unstable
because subcoalitions of agents are able to reach agreements that are better for all their
members. Taking into account the features of the model, the distinction between private
and public criteria and the introduction of set-valued characteristic functions, we de¯ne
two concepts: the dominance outcome core and the core.
The current chapter di®ers fundamentally from other papers that study the core con-
cept of cooperative games with externalities such as Shapley and Shubik (1969), Starrett
(1973), and Chander and Tulkens (1997). These papers all start with a game in strate-
gic form or an economy and then discuss how to appropriately de¯ne a corresponding
cooperative game. Because of the externalities, the behavior of the players or agents
in complementary coalitions has to be taken into account when deciding on the value
of a coalition of players. Di®erent assumptions about the behavior of the other players
lead to di®erent formulations of an associated cooperative game and, correspondingly,
to di®erent core concepts, such as the ®-core and the ¯-core. The quest for the \right"Introduction 167
core concept is the main issue in these papers. In the current chapter, we abstract from
this issue and start with a cooperative game. Our contribution is that we provide a
framework to explicitly deal with multiple criteria in cooperative games. We do not
use a utility function to reduce a decision with many dimensions to a one-dimensional
decision but expose the trade-o®s between di®erent dimensions faced by the players.
Well-known axiomatizations of core concepts for single-criterion cooperative games
(see Peleg, 1985, 1986, 1987) use a consistency or reduced game property. The consis-
tency principle for cooperative games | which is very similar to the consistency principle
for noncooperative games discussed in Chapter 11 | essentially means that if the grand
coalition of players reaches an agreement, then no subcoalition of players has an incen-
tive to renegotiate within the coalition after giving the players outside the coalition their
part of the solution, because the proposed agreement is also a part of the solution of the
reduced game played within the subcoalition.
The current chapter investigates consistency properties of the proposed core for co-
operative multicriteria games. We provide three axiomatic characterizations of the core
that are based on the notion of consistency. One of these characterizations uses converse
consistency, a property that postulates that a proposed agreement must be in the solu-
tion of a game if for every subcoalition it holds that the restriction of this agreement to
the subcoalition is in the solution of the reduced game. A second axiomatization of the
core uses a converse consistency requirement that restricts attention to subcoalitions of
two players. The two axiomatizations of the core of cooperative multicriteria games that
use converse consistency properties are similar to the axiomatizations of core concepts
for cooperative games with or without transferable utility by Peleg (1985, 1986, 1987).
The third axiomatization of the core provided in this chapter di®ers signi¯cantly
from the previous two. It uses a new de¯nition of reduced games, one that stresses the
fact that there are players outside each subcoalition that cannot be ignored altogether
by requiring players in a subcoalition to cooperate with at least one outside player.
Consistency with respect to this new de¯nition of reduced games is used to give an
axiomatic characterization of the core for multicriteria games with an enlightenment
property (see Section 15.5) instead of converse consistency. It is shown by means of a
counterexample that this characterization does not hold if the old de¯nition of reduced
games is used.
The set-up of the chapter is as follows. Cooperative multicriteria games with public
and private criteria are de¯ned in Section 15.2, along with the core and the dominance
outcome core. In Section 15.3 we prove that the dominance outcome core always con-
tains the core and that both concepts coincide for games satisfying some additional
assumptions. In the next two sections, Sections 15.4 and 15.5, we provide several ax-
iomatizations of the core based on the notion of consistency. In Section 15.4 converse
consistency is used to characterize the core and in Section 15.5 we give the new de¯ni-
tion of reduced games that was mentioned before and use this to characterize the core
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to standard transferable utility games in Section 15.6, which is based on Voorneveld and
van den Nouweland (1998b).
The ¯nal section of this chapter, Section 15.7, based on Voorneveld and van den
Nouweland (1999), provides additional motivation for the core concept. This is done by
showing that core elements naturally arise as strong equilibria of associated noncooper-
ative claim games in which players independently state coalitions they want to form and
a payo® they want to receive. Related work can be found in von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1947) who introduce claim games for TU-games, in which players only claim
coalitions and the value of a ¯tting coalition is split equally over its members. Borm and
Tijs (1992) introduce claim games for NTU-games.
15.2 De¯nitions
For a set A µ I R
m, we de¯ne its Pareto edge by Par(A) := fx 2 A j there is no y 2
A with y > xg. Recall that for an arbitrary set A we denote by I R
A the vector space of
all real-valued functions on A.
Let U be an in¯nite set of players. A cooperative multicriteria game with public and
private criteria, or a game for ease of notation, is described by
² A ¯nite set D of divisible or private criteria;
² A ¯nite set P of indivisible or public criteria;
² A ¯nite, nonempty set N ½ U of players;
² A correspondence v : 2N n f;g! ! I R
D[P;
such that D \ P = ;, D [ P 6= ; and v(S) 6= ; for each coalition S 2 2N n f;g. The
sets D and P that de¯ne a certain game will not be mentioned explicitly and a game is
simply denoted (N;v). For one-person coalitions we write v(i) instead of v(fig). Let ¨
denote the set of games as de¯ned above.
Example 15.1 Two neighboring countries, A and B, negotiate to reduce CO2 levels
in the air. The marginal costs of reducing CO2 levels increase as abatements increase:
there are relatively cheap methods that can be used to reduce CO2 levels at ¯rst, but to
e®ect higher reductions, more expensive methods have to be employed as well. Suppose
country A on its own can abate in a low-cost way by spending 100 to reduce the level of
CO2 in the air by 1, and it can abate more, a reduction of 3, at a cost of 600. Country
B on its own can reduce the CO2 level by 2 at a cost of 150 and by 7 at a cost of 900.
If the countries cooperate, they can realize all the above mentioned possibilities but also
pro¯t from each other's expertise and abate relatively cheaper. They can reduce CO2
levels by 3 at a cost of 200 and by 10 at a cost of 1200.De¯nitions 169
The cooperative multicriteria game describing this situation has one private criterion,
minus the cost of the abatements, and one public criterion, the decrease in the CO2 level
in the air. The player set is N = fA;Bg, the characteristic function is given by
v(A) = f(0;0);(¡100;1);(¡600;3)g;
v(B) = f(0;0);(¡150;2);(¡900;7)g;
v(fA;Bg) = v(A) [ v(B) [ f(¡200;3);(¡1200;10)g:
/
Several subsets of ¨ correspond to well-known classes of games.
Example 15.2 A game (N;v) with P = ;, jDj = 1, and jv(S)j = 1 for each coalition
S 2 2N n f;g is essentially a TU-game. /
Example 15.3 A game (N;v) with P = ; and v(S) a compact and comprehensive (in
the sense that b 2 v(S) and 0 < = a < = b implies a 2 v(S)) subset of I R
D
+ is a multi-
commodity game as studied by van den Nouweland et al. (1989). /
The characteristic function of NTU-games is also set-valued and vector-valued, but de-
scribes for a coalition the payo® for each separate member, so that the value of a coalition
S is a subset of I R
S. This di®ers from our cooperative multicriteria games, where the
correspondence v maps the coalitions to a ¯xed vector space I R
D[P.
Cooperative multicriteria games with public and private criteria generalize the co-
operative multicriteria games used by Bergstresser and Yu (1977) and Lind (1996) in
the sense that these authors do not use set-valued characteristic functions and do not
discriminate between di®erent types of criteria.
In what follows, we need a de¯nition of an allocation. In a game (N;v) 2 ¨, an
allocation takes an element of the set of values attainable by the grand coalition N and
divides it among the players in accordance with the characteristics of the criteria: when
restricted to divisible criteria everything is divided, whereas for indivisible criteria every
player gets the same ¯xed amount. Before formally de¯ning allocations, some more
notation is needed.
Consider a game (N;v) 2 ¨ and a vector x = (xi)i2N with xi 2 I R
D[P for each
i 2 N. Let S 2 2N n f;g. Then xS denotes the vector (xi)i2S, i.e., x restricted to the
components of the members of coalition S and x(S) denotes the sum of the elements
(xi)i2S, x(S) :=
P
i2S xi. For a vector (or function) y 2 I R
D[P the restriction of y to P
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De¯nition 15.4 Given a game (N;v) an allocation is a vector x = (xi)i2N with xi 2
I R




jD = yjD and
xi
jP = yjP for each i 2 N:
The set of allocations of (N;v) is denoted A(N;v). /
A coalition can improve upon an allocation if there is an outcome it can guarantee itself
which | when distributed over its members in a feasible way | is at least as good for
each member and better in some criterion for at least one coalition member. Formally, a




jD < = yjD and
xi
jP < = yjP for each i 2 S;
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (·). Such a vector y is said to dominate
x via S. An allocation in a game (N;v) is individually rational if one-player coalitions,
i.e. individual players, cannot improve upon it and it is an imputation if neither N nor
individual players can improve upon it. The set of individually rational allocations and
the set of imputations of a game (N;v) are denoted by IR(N;v) and I(N;v), respectively.
A solution concept ¾ on the class ¨ is a map that assigns to each game (N;v) 2 ¨ a
(possibly empty) set of allocations ¾(N;v). Hence, ¾(N;v) µ A(N;v) for all (N;v) 2 ¨.
This chapter concentrates on core concepts, i.e. concepts that rule out allocations
that are in some sense unstable. We de¯ne two di®erent core concepts.
De¯nition 15.5 The core C(N;v) of a game (N;v) is the set of allocations upon which
no coalition can improve:
C(N;v) = fx 2 A(N;v) j there exist no S 2 2N n f;g and y 2 v(S) s.t.
P
i2S xi
jD < = yjD and
xi
jP < = yjP for each i 2 S
with at least one of the inequalities being strict (·)g
/
De¯nition 15.6 The dominance outcome core DOC(N;v) of a game (N;v) is the set
of imputations for which there is no coalition S and another imputation y such that yi is
better than xi for each player i 2 S and such that the players in S can jointly guaranteeThe core and dominance outcome core 171
themselves at least what they get according to the allocation y:
DOC(N;v) = fx 2 I(N;v) j there exist no S 2 2N n f;g;y 2 I(N;v);
and z 2 v(S) s.t.
yi ¸ xi for each i 2 S;
P
i2S yi
jD < = zjD and
yi
jP < = zjP for each i 2 S g
/
15.3 The core and dominance outcome core
In this section we prove that the core of a game is always included in the dominance
outcome core. Moreover, we prove that the core equals the dominance outcome core
under some mild conditions.
Proposition 15.7 For each game (N;v) 2 ¨ it holds that C(N;v) µ DOC(N;v).
Proof. Let (N;v) 2 ¨. If C(N;v) = ; we are done. So, assume C(N;v) 6= ; and let
x = (xi)i2N 2 C(N;v). Then x is an allocation upon which neither N nor individual
players can improve, so x 2 I(N;v). Now suppose x = 2 DOC(N;v). Then let S 2
2N n f;g;y 2 I(N;v), and z 2 v(S) be such that
yi ¸ xi for each i 2 S;
P
i2S yi
jD < = zjD;
yi
jP < = zjP for each i 2 S:






jD < = zjD
xi
jP < = yi
jP < = zjP for each i 2 S
with at least one strict inequality since yi ¸ xi for all i 2 S, i.e., S can improve upon x,
contradicting x 2 C(N;v). 2
In general, the core is not equal to the dominance outcome core. In the following example
both cores do not coincide.172 Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria
Example 15.8 Consider a three-player, bicriteria game (N;v) where the ¯rst criterion
is divisible and the second public. De¯ne v(i) = f(1;10)g for all i 2 N and v(f1;2g) =
v(f1;3g) = v(f2;3g) = v(f1;2;3g) = f(3;10)g. Then







However, C(N;v) = ;, since every two-player coalition can improve upon the unique
imputation. For instance, for S = f1;2g and y = (3;10) 2 v(S): x1
1 + x2
1 < 3 = y1 and
x1
2 = x2
2 = 10 = y2. /
Under some restrictions, however, the two cores coincide.
Proposition 15.9 Let (N;v) 2 ¨ be a game for which the following four properties
hold:




for all i 2 N and all a 2 v(i) : fx 2 I R
D[P j x < = ag µ v(i)
for all a 2 v(N) : fx 2 I R





for all i 2 N and all a 2 v(i) : (fag + I R
D[P
+ ) \ v(i) is compact
for all a 2 v(N) : (fag + I R
D[P
+ ) \ v(N) is compact




for all i 2 N and all a;b 2 Par(v(i)) : if a > = b; then a = b
for all a;b 2 Par(v(N)) : if a > = b; then a = b
4. A superadditivity condition:
For each S 2 2N nf;g;y 2 v(S), and zi 2 v(i) for each i 2 N nS it holds
that if yjP > = zi
jP for all i 2 N n S, then a 2 v(N), where a 2 I R
D[P is
de¯ned as follows:
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Remark 15.10 The de¯nition of nonlevel sets given above is a standard de¯nition. In




for all i 2 N; all b 2 Par(v(i)); and all a 2 I R
D[P : if a ¸ b; then a = 2 v(i)
for all b 2 Par(v(N)) and all a 2 I R
D[P : if a ¸ b; then a = 2 v(N)
/
Proof (Prop. 15.9). By Proposition 15.7: C(N;v) µ DOC(N;v). To prove that
DOC(N;v) µ C(N;v), let x = (xi)i2N 2 I(N;v) and assume that x = 2 C(N;v). Then






jD < = yjD
xi
jP < = yjP for each i 2 S
(15.1)
where at least one inequality is strict (·). For each i 2 N n S, let zi 2 v(i) be such
that zi
jP < = yjP and zi 2 Par(v(i)), the Pareto edge of v(i). Such zi exist: let i 2 N n S
and a 2 v(i), which is possible by nonemptiness of v(i). Either ajP < = yjP or, using
comprehensiveness of v(i), one can lower the coordinates in fk 2 P j ak > ykg without
leaving v(i). So let b 2 v(i) be such that bjP < = yjP. By assumption the set fc 2 v(i) j
c > = bg is compact and hence the set fc 2 v(i) j c > = b;cjP = bjPg is compact. De¯ne
u 2 I R
D[P such that uk = 1 for k 2 D and uk = 0 for k 2 P. By nonemptiness and
compactness of fc 2 v(i) j c > = b;cjP = bjPg, we know that
®
¤ := maxf® 2 I R+ j b + ®u 2 fc 2 v(i) j c > = b;cjP = bjPgg (15.2)
exists. We claim that b + ®¤u 2 Par(v(i)). Suppose to the contrary, that b + ®¤u is
not on the Pareto edge of v(i). Then d > b + ®¤u for some d 2 v(i). In particular,
dk > bk + ®¤uk = bk + ®¤ for each k 2 D. Take ¯ = minfdk ¡ bk j k 2 Dg. Then
¯ > ®¤ and b+¯u < = d. By comprehensiveness of v(i) it follows that b+¯u 2 v(i). Also
b + ¯u 2 fc 2 v(i) j c > = b;cjP = bjPg. Hence by (15.2), ¯ · ®¤ must hold. This yields a
contradiction. So b + ®¤u 2 fc 2 v(i) j c > = b;cjP = bjPg \ Par(v(i)). Since bjP < = yjP, we
can now de¯ne the desired zi by zi := b + ®¤u.
By the superadditivity condition the vector a 2 I R




and ajP = yjP is an element of v(N). Using the comprehensiveness of v(N) and the
compactness assumption on v(N), it follows in a similar manner as demonstrated above,
that the set fc 2 v(N) j c > = a;cjP = ajPg contains an element b on the Pareto edge of
v(N). Take such a b 2 v(N). This b is used to construct an imputation ^ x that dominates174 Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria
imputation x via coalition S. De¯ne ^ x = (^ xi)i2N 2 (I R
D[P)N as follows:
^ xi




jNnSj(b ¡ y ¡
P











jD = bjD and ^ xi
P = bjP for all i 2 N. Since b 2 v(N), it follows that ^ x is an
allocation;
² Since b is on the Pareto edge of v(N), using the nonlevelness of v(N) yields that
the allocation ^ x cannot be improved upon by the grand coalition N;
² Since yjD > =
P
i2S xi
jD and bjP = ajP = yjP > = xi
jP for all i 2 S, we have that ^ xi > = xi
for each player i 2 S. Also, x 2 I(N;v) by assumption. Hence, singleton coalitions
fig with i 2 S cannot improve upon ^ x;
² Since b > = a;ajD = yjD +
P
i2NnS zi
jD, and bjP = ajP = yjP > = zi
jP for each i 2 N n S,
we have that ^ xi > = zi for each i 2 N n S. Using the nonlevelness of v(i) and the
fact that zi lies on the Pareto edge of v(i), we derive that singleton coalitions fig
with i 2 N n S cannot improve upon ^ x.




yjD, and ^ xi
jP = bjP = yjP for each i 2 S. Thus, by (15.1) and the construction of
^ x: ^ xi ¸ xi for each i 2 S (recall that ^ xi
jP = ^ x
j
jP for all players i;j). Conclude that
x = 2 DOC(N;v). Hence, DOC(N;v) µ C(N;v), which completes the proof. 2
15.4 Core axiomatizations with converse consistency
In this section we study some properties of the core and provide several axiomatizations,
all based on the notions of consistency and converse consistency. The consistency prin-
ciple essentially means that if the grand coalition of players reaches an agreement, then
no subcoalition of players has an incentive to renegotiate within the subcoalition after
giving the players outside it their part of the solution, because the proposed agreement
is also in the solution of the reduced game played within the subcoalition. The converse
consistency axiom requires that a proposed agreement must be in the solution of a game
if for every subcoalition it holds that the restriction of this agreement to that subcoali-
tion is in the solution of the reduced game. Hence, it provides information about the
solution of a game, given information about the solution of its reduced games, justifying
the name `converse' consistency. The axiomatizations are similar to those of Peleg (1985,
1986, 1987).Core axiomatizations with converse consistency 175
De¯nition 15.11 Let (N;v) 2 ¨;x 2 A(N;v), and S 2 2N nf;;Ng. The reduced game
(S;vx
S) of (N;v) with respect to allocation x and coalition S is the game de¯ned by
vx
S(S) = v(N) ¡ ~ x(N n S)
vx
S(T) = [QµNnS (v(T [ Q) ¡ ~ x(Q)) for all T 2 2S n f;;Sg;
where ~ x = (~ xi)i2N 2 (I R






k if k 2 D
0 if k 2 P:
/
The interpretation of the reduced game is as follows. Suppose the group of all players
initially agrees on an allocation x, and the players in N nS withdraw from the decision-
making process taking their agreed-upon share of the private goods with them. Then,
if the agents in S reconsider, they are facing the game vx
S, because in their negotiations
they take into account that they can cooperate with some of the players in N n S as
long as those are given their shares of the private goods. Note that the players who
leave the decision-making process are not guaranteed anything about the public criteria.
Since these criteria are public, their level will ultimately be determined by the players
who still take part in the decision-making process. Hence, players who leave this process
take a risk, but if the solution concept is consistent, then the remaining players will not
change their minds about the initially agreed-upon levels of the public criteria. This is
similar to the treatment of public goods in van den Nouweland et al. (1998).
Let us consider some axioms that are used in the remainder of this section. A solution
concept ¾ on ¨ satis¯es:
² One-Person E±ciency (OPE) if for each game (N;v) 2 ¨ with jNj = 1 it holds
that ¾(N;v) = IR(N;v);
² Individual Rationality (IR) if for each game (N;v) 2 ¨ it holds that ¾(N;v) µ
IR(N;v);
² Inclusion of Imputation Set for two-player Games (II2) if for every two-
player game (N;v) 2 ¨ it holds that ¾(N;v) ¶ I(N;v);
² Restricted Nonemptiness (r-NEM) if for each game (N;v) 2 ¨ it holds that
if C(N;v) 6= ;, then ¾(N;v) 6= ;;
² Consistency (CONS) if for each game (N;v) 2 ¨ it holds that x 2 ¾(N;v)
implies xS 2 ¾(S;vx
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² Converse Consistency (COCONS) if for each game (N;v) 2 ¨ with jNj > = 2
and each allocation x 2 A(N;v) it holds that if xS 2 ¾(S;vx
S) for each S 2
2N n f;;Ng, then x 2 ¾(N;v);
² Converse Consistency for Two-Player Reductions (COCONS2) if for each
game (N;v) 2 ¨ with jNj > = 3 and each allocation x 2 A(N;v) it holds that if
xS 2 ¾(S;vx
S) for each S 2 2N n f;;Ng with jSj = 2, then x 2 ¾(N;v).
The next proposition states that the core satis¯es all these axioms.
Proposition 15.12 The core satis¯es OPE, IR, II2, r-NEM, CONS, COCONS, and
COCONS2.
Proof. It is obvious that the core satis¯es OPE, IR, II2 and r-NEM.
To prove that the core satis¯es CONS, let (N;v) 2 ¨;x 2 C(N;v), and S 2 2N n
f;;Ng. Suppose that xS = 2 C(S;vx
S). Then there exist a coalition T 2 2S n f;g and a




jD < = zjD
xi
jP < = zjP for all i 2 T
with at least one strict inequality (·). Since z 2 vx
S(T), there exist a Q µ N n S and
y 2 v(T [ Q) such that z = y ¡ ~ x(Q). Observe that by de¯nition of the reduced game,









jD < = (z + ~ x(Q))jD = yjD
xi
jP < = zjP = (y ¡ ~ x(Q))jP = yjP for all i 2 T [ Q
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (·). But then x cannot be in the core
of (N;v), since T [ Q can improve upon it. Hence xS 2 C(S;vx
S) and the core satis¯es
CONS.
To prove that the core satis¯es COCONS2, Let (N;v) 2 ¨ with jNj > = 3 and x 2
A(N;v) such that xS 2 C(S;vx
S) for every two-player coalition S 2 2N nf;;Ng. We will
prove that no coalition of players can improve upon x, and hence x 2 C(N;v).
Suppose that N can improve upon x. Then, for some y 2 v(N):
P
i2N xi
jD < = yjD
xi
jP < = yjP for all i 2 N
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (·). Let S 2 2N nf;;Ng have two players.
Then, for a y as mentioned above it holds that
P
i2S xi
jD < = yjD ¡
P
i2NnS xi
jD = (y ¡ ~ x(N n S))jD
xi
jP < = yjP = (y ¡ ~ x(N n S))jP for all i 2 SCore axiomatizations with converse consistency 177
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (·). Since y ¡ ~ x(N n S) 2 vx
S(S), we ¯nd
that S can improve upon xS in (S;vx
S). This contradicts xS 2 C(S;vx
S). We conclude
that N cannot improve upon x in (N;v).
Now, let T 2 2N n f;;Ng. To prove that T cannot improve upon x in (N;v),
let i 2 T;j 2 N n T, and S := fi;jg. Then xS 2 C(S;vx
S), so in particular fig
cannot improve upon xS in (S;vx
S). Consequently, for T n fig µ N n S, there is no
z 2 v((T n fig) [ fig) ¡ ~ x(T n fig) µ vx
S(i) such that xi
jD < = zjD and xi
jP < = zjP, where at







jD < = yjD
xk
jP < = yjP for all k 2 T
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (·). Consequently, T cannot improve upon
x on (N;v). We conclude that x 2 C(N;v) and that the core satis¯es COCONS2.
Notice that COCONS is not implied by COCONS2, since COCONS2 is not applicable
to games (N;v) 2 ¨ with jNj = 2. The proof that the core satis¯es COCONS, however,
is similar to the proof that it satis¯es COCONS2 and is therefore omitted. 2
Our next proposition lays the basis for the ¯rst axiomatization of the core.
Proposition 15.13 Let Á and Ã be two solution concepts on ¨. If Á satis¯es OPE
and CONS and Ã satis¯es OPE and COCONS, then Á(N;v) µ Ã(N;v) for each game
(N;v) 2 ¨.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of players. First, let (N;v) 2 ¨ have
only one player. Then Á(N;v) = Ã(N;v) by OPE. Next, assume that the claim holds
for each game with at most n 2 I N players and let (N;v) 2 ¨ have n + 1 players.
Let x 2 Á(N;v). By CONS of Á: xS 2 Á(S;vx
S) for every S 2 2N n f;;Ng. By
induction Á(S;vx
S) µ Ã(S;vx
S) for every S 2 2N nf;;Ng. Using COCONS of Ã we obtain
x 2 Ã(N;v). 2
Applying this proposition twice gives us the following axiomatization of the core.
Theorem 15.14 A solution concept ¾ on ¨ satis¯es OPE, CONS, and COCONS, if
and only if ¾ is the core.
Proof. The core satis¯es the three axioms according to Proposition 15.12. Let ¾ be
a solution concept on ¨ that also satis¯es the axioms. Now apply Proposition 15.13.
Since ¾ satis¯es OPE and CONS and the core satis¯es OPE and COCONS, we ¯nd that
¾(N;v) µ C(N;v) for each (N;v) 2 ¨. Since the core satis¯es OPE and CONS and
¾ satis¯es OPE and COCONS, we ¯nd that C(N;v) µ ¾(N;v) for each (N;v) 2 ¨.
Hence, ¾(N;v) = C(N;v) for all (N;v) 2 ¨. 2
According to our next result, if a solution concept ¾ on ¨ satis¯es individual rationality
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Proposition 15.15 Let ¾ be a solution concept on ¨ that satis¯es IR and CONS. Then
¾(N;v) µ C(N;v) for each game (N;v) 2 ¨.
Proof. Let (N;v) 2 ¨. We discern three cases.
² If jNj = 1, then ¾(N;v) µ IR(N;v) = C(N;v) by IR of ¾;
² If jNj = 2, let x 2 ¾(N;v). Individual players cannot improve upon x by IR of ¾.
It remains to show that N cannot improve upon x. Suppose to the contrary that
N can improve upon x. Then there exists a vector y 2 v(N) such that
P
i2N xi
jD < = yjD
xi
jP < = yjP for all i 2 N
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (·). Let i 2 N. Then
xi




jD = (y ¡ ~ x(N n fig))jD
xi
jP < = yjP = (y ¡ ~ x(N n fig))jP
where at least one of the inequalities is strict (·). Since y ¡ ~ x(N n fig) 2 v(N) ¡
~ x(N nfig) = vx
fig(i), it follows that xi = 2 IR(fig;vx
fig). By IR of ¾, xi = 2 ¾(fig;vx
fig).
But x 2 ¾(N;v) and CONS of ¾ imply that xi 2 ¾(fig;vx
fig), a contradiction.
Hence, one has to conclude that N cannot improve upon x in (N;v).
This leads to the conclusion that ¾(N;v) µ C(N;v) for two-player games (N;v) 2
¨;
² If jNj > = 3, let x 2 ¾(N;v). By CONS of ¾, xS 2 ¾(S;vx
S) for each S 2 2Nnf;g with
jSj = 2. By the previous step, ¾(S;vx
S) µ C(S;vx
S) for such two-player coalitions
S. Using COCONS2 of the core, it follows that x 2 C(N;v). 2
In the part of the proof of Proposition 15.15 where we indicate that the grand coalition
N in a two-player game (N;v) cannot improve upon an allocation x 2 ¾(N;v) the use of
summation signs and notations like Nnfig seems unnecessarily complicated, since Nnfig
consists of only one player. We adopt the more general notation, however, because with
this notation it is easily seen that it also proves that the grand coalition cannot improve
upon an allocation x 2 ¾(N;v) in games with an arbitrary number of players.
Our next axiomatization applies the converse consistency axiom for two-player re-
ductions.
Theorem 15.16 A solution concept ¾ on ¨ satis¯es IR, II2, CONS, and COCONS2 if
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Proof. The core satis¯es the four axioms by Proposition 15.12. Let ¾ be a solution
concept on ¨ that also satis¯es the axioms. Proposition 15.15 shows that ¾(N;v) µ
C(N;v) for every (N;v) 2 ¨.
It remains to show that C(N;v) µ ¾(N;v) for each (N;v) 2 ¨. We consider three
separate cases in which the game has one, two, or more than two players. First we
consider two-player games, since this result is required for the argumentation in one-
player games.
² If jNj = 2, we know that ¾(N;v) µ C(N;v) from Proposition 15.15 and C(N;v) =
I(N;v) µ ¾(N;v) by II2 of ¾. So C(N;v) = ¾(N;v);
² Consider a one player game (fig;v) and let xi 2 C(fig;v). Consider j 2 U n fig
and the game (fi;jg;w) 2 ¨ de¯ned by w(i) = w(fi;jg) = v(i) and w(j) = fag
with ajD = 0 and ajP = xi
jP. Denote the allocation in (fi;jg;w) 2 ¨ which gives xi
to player i and a to player j by (xi;a). Then (xi;a) 2 C(fi;jg;w) = ¾(fi;jg;w).
Also, (fig;w
(xi;a)
fig ) = (fig;v), since w
(xi;a)
fig (i) = w(fi;jg) ¡ ~ a = v(i). By CONS of
¾, xi 2 ¾(fig;w
(xi;a)
fig ) = ¾(fig;v). Hence, C(N;v) µ ¾(N;v) if jNj = 1;
² If jNj > = 3, let x 2 C(N;v). By CONS of the core: xS 2 C(S;vx
S) = ¾(S;vx
S)
whenever jSj = 2, hence x 2 ¾(N;v) by COCONS2 of ¾.
We conclude that ¾(N;v) = C(N;v) for all games (N;v) 2 ¨. 2
15.5 A core axiomatization with enlightening
In the proofs of Theorem 15.14 and Proposition 15.15, we showed that a solution concept
¾ on ¨ satis¯es ¾(N;v) µ C(N;v) for each game (N;v) 2 ¨ by assuming that ¾
satis¯es consistency and some form of individual rationality or one-person e±ciency, i.e,
an assumption that focuses on individual players. The other inclusion, C(N;v) µ ¾(N;v)
was harder to prove. In the previous section two notions of converse consistency were
used to establish this part. In the article of Peleg (1985) on an axiomatization of the
core of NTU games, it was shown that | given an in¯nite set of potential agents from
which the ¯nite player sets are drawn | the converse consistency axiom can be replaced
by a (restricted) nonemptiness axiom to establish inclusion of the core in ¾. The same
is observed in axiomatizations of equilibria in noncooperative games (cf. Peleg and Tijs,
1996, and Norde et al., 1996), where properties like restricted nonemptiness, individual
rationality, consistency and converse consistency are studied in a di®erent set-up (see
also Chapter 11). Peleg and Tijs (1996) prove that if a solution concept on a set of
noncooperative games satis¯es consistency and a requirement on single player games, it
is a subset of the Nash equilibrium set. If, in addition, a converse consistency property
is imposed, the solution concept coincides with the set of Nash equilibria. Norde et al.180 Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria
(1996) show that in mixed extensions of ¯nite noncooperative games converse consistency
can be replaced by nonemptiness.
In the current section we slightly modify the de¯nition of reduced games of the
previous section and show that the core can be axiomatized by means of restricted
nonemptiness, consistency with respect to the new type of reduced games, and indi-
vidual rationality. A similar de¯nition of reduced games can be used to provide a new
axiomatization of the core for games with transferable utility. This is done in Section
15.6.
The section concludes with an example showing that converse consistency cannot be
replaced with restricted nonemptiness if the de¯nition of reduced games from Section
15.4 is used.
De¯nition 15.17 Let (N;v) 2 ¨;x 2 A(N;v), and S 2 2N nf;;Ng. The reduced game
(S;vx
S) of (N;v) with respect to allocation x and coalition S is the game de¯ned by:
vx
S(S) = v(N) ¡ ~ x(N n S)
vx
S(T) = [QµNnS;Q6=; (v(T [ Q) ¡ ~ x(Q)) for all T 2 2S n f;;Sg:
/
The di®erence between this de¯nition of a reduced game and the one in De¯nition 15.11
is that we require the set Q in the speci¯cation of vx
S(T) to be nonempty. This re°ects
the intuition that, although attention is restricted to the players in S, the players in
N n S do not leave the game, but strongly in°uence the game from behind the scenes.
The remaining players don't ignore those in N n S, but always cooperate with at least
some of them.
With the reduction as given in De¯nition 15.17, we obtain a new consistency axiom
CONS. A solution concept ¾ on ¨ satis¯es:
² CONS if for each game (N;v) 2 ¨ it holds that x 2 ¾(N;v) implies xS 2 ¾(S;vx
S)
for each coalition S 2 2N n f;;Ng.
The core satis¯es CONS. This is shown in the following proposition, along with other
statements concerning the core and CONS.
Proposition 15.18 The following claims are true:
1. The core satis¯es CONS;
2. Consider a game (N;v) 2 ¨ with jNj > = 3. If x 2 IR(N;v) and xS 2 C(S;vx
S) for
each S 2 2N n f;;Ng with jSj = 2, then x 2 C(N;v);
3. Let ¾ be a solution concept on ¨ that satis¯es IR and CONS. Then ¾(N;v) µ
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Proof.
1. The proof that the core satis¯es CONS is similar to the proof that the core satis¯es
consistency in Proposition 15.12;
2. Suppose x 2 IR(N;v) and xS 2 C(S;vx
S) for each S 2 2N n f;;Ng with jSj = 2.
Then individual players cannot improve upon x because x 2 IR(N;v). To show
that N and other coalitions T 2 2N with jTj > = 2 cannot improve upon x, apply
the arguments used in the proof that the core satis¯es COCONS2 in Proposition
15.12;
3. Let (N;v) 2 ¨. The proof that ¾(N;v) µ C(N;v) if jNj 2 f1;2g is completely
analogous to the corresponding part of the proof of Proposition 15.15. If jNj > = 3,
let x 2 ¾(N;v). By CONS of ¾, xS 2 ¾(S;vx
S) for each S 2 2N n f;;Ng with
jSj = 2. Hence, using the previous step of this proof, we ¯nd that xS 2 C(S;vx
S)
for each S 2 2N nf;;Ng with jNj = 2. By IR of ¾, x 2 ¾(N;v) µ IR(N;v). Then,
by part 2 of the current proposition, it follows that x 2 C(N;v). 2
The main result of this section is the following axiomatization of the core.
Theorem 15.19 A solution concept ¾ on ¨ satis¯es IR, CONS, and r-NEM if and only
if ¾ is the core.
Proof. We have already seen that the core satis¯es the three axioms. Let ¾ be a
solution concept on ¨ that also satis¯es the three axioms. From Proposition 15.18,
part 3, we know that ¾(N;v) µ C(N;v) for each (N;v) 2 ¨. It remains to show that
C(N;v) µ ¾(N;v) for each (N;v) 2 ¨.
Let (N;v) 2 ¨. If C(N;v) = ; we are done, so assume C(N;v) 6= ;, and let
x = (xi)i2N 2 C(N;v). Also, let n 2 U n N and de¯ne a game (N [ fng;w) 2 ¨ as
follows:
w(n) = fy 2 I R
D[P j there exists a k 2 D s.t. yk < 0g
[ fy 2 I R
D[P j there exists a k 2 P s.t. yk < xi
kg
w(i) = fy 2 I R
D[P j there exists a k 2 D [ P s.t. yk < xi
kg for i 2 N
w(S [ fng) = v(S) for S µ N;S 6= ;
w(S) = v(S) for S µ N;jSj > = 2:
(Recall that for public criteria k 2 P one has that xi
k = x
j
k for all players i;j 2 N.
Consequently, it does not matter which player i 2 N is chosen in the de¯nition of w(n)
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We show that C(N [ fng;w) = f(x;d)g, where (x;d) is the allocation that gives
xi 2 I R
D[P to each player i 2 N and d 2 I R
D[P to player n, with djD = 0 and djP =
xi
jP (for arbitrary i 2 N, as above). Obviously, (x;d) 2 C(N [ fng;w). Now, let
(bi)i2N £ fbng 2 C(N [ fng;w). Using the de¯nitions of (w(j))j2N[fng, we see that it
must hold that bi > = xi for each player i 2 N and bn > = d, to make sure that individual












jP > = xi
jP for each player i 2 N [ fng;
with at least one strict inequality. This would contradict (x;d) 2 C(N [fng;w). Hence,
(bi)i2N = (xi)i2N and bn = d and this proves that (x;d) is the unique core element of
(N [ fng;w).
Also, we claim that (N;w
(x;d)
N ) = (N;v). Namely,
w
(x;d)
N (N) = w(N [ fng) ¡ ~ d = w(N [ fng) ¡ 0 = v(N)
w
(x;d)
N (S) = w(S [ fng) ¡ ~ d = w(S [ fng) ¡ 0 = v(S) for S = 2 f;;Ng:
By r-NEM of ¾ we know that ¾(N [fng;w) 6= ; and we already saw that ¾(N [fng) µ
C(N [ fng;w) = f(x;d)g. So, ¾(N [ fng;w) = f(x;d)g. Hence, by CONS of ¾:
x = (x;d)N 2 ¾(N;w
(x;d)
N ) = ¾(N;v). This proves that C(N;v) µ ¾(N;v). 2
The main step in the proof, showing that C(N;v) µ ¾(N;v) for each game (N;v) 2 ¨,
proceeds by `enlightening' core elements. In this procedure, one considers a game with
a nonempty core and an arbitrary allocation in this core. Then, a game is constructed
with a player set that strictly includes the players of the original game in such a way
that this larger game has a unique core element and such that this new, enlarged, game
and its unique core element reduced to the original player set are the original game and
core element. Restricted nonemptiness is then used to derive the desired inclusion.
We conclude this section by showing that the analogon of Theorem 15.19 does not
hold if we replace CONS by consistency with respect to the old de¯nition of reduced
games. In particular, we construct a solution concept ¾ on ¨ that satis¯es IR, CONS,
and r-NEM, which is not equal to the core.
Let T ½ ¨ be the class of games with a nonempty core, one divisible criterion, and
zero public criteria:
T := f(N;v) 2 ¨ j C(N;v) 6= ;;jDj = 1;P = ;g:
Since for each game (N;v) 2 T the core is nonempty, there is only one criterion, and v
takes nonempty values (see Section 15.2), we conclude that the function v is boundedA core axiomatization with enlightening 183
from above. Hence, the function supv, where supv(S) is the supremum of v(S) for each





C(N;v) if (N;v) = 2 T
fNu(N;supv)g; the nucleolus of (N;supv) if (N;v) 2 T
If (N;v) 2 T , then C(N;v) = C(N;supv). The game (N;supv) is a TU-game. Recall
(cf. Schmeidler, 1969) that the nucleolus of a TU-game with a nonempty core is always
included in the core. The solution concept ¾ satis¯es r-NEM because the nucleolus exists
for TU-games.
To prove IR of ¾, we distinguish between (N;v) 2 T and (N;v) = 2 T . If (N;v) = 2 T ,
it is clear that ¾(N;v) = C(N;v) µ IR(N;v) by IR of the core. If (N;v) 2 T , then
C(N;v) = C(N;supv). Consequently,
¾(N;v) = fNu(N;supv)g µ C(N;supv) = C(N;v) µ IR(N;v)
by IR of the core and inclusion of the nucleolus in the core if the core of a TU-game is
nonempty.
The solution concept ¾ also satis¯es CONS. If (N;v) = 2 T , then (S;vx
S) = 2 T for each
x 2 A(N;v) and S 2 2N n f;;Ng and hence it follows from consistency of the core that
xS 2 ¾(S;vx
S) for each x 2 ¾(N;v) and S 2 2N nf;;Ng. So, suppose (N;v) 2 T , so that
¾(N;v) = fNu(N;supv)g. Let S 2 2N nf;;Ng and x 2 ¾(N;v), i.e., x = Nu(N;supv).
Notice, ¯rst of all, that the reduced game (S;vx
S) is again an element of T . It is
clear that the reduced game has no public and exactly one private criterion. Also,
x 2 ¾(N;v) = fNu(N;supv)g µ C(N;supv) = C(N;v) and the core satis¯es CONS.
This shows that xS 2 C(S;vx
S) and, hence, C(S;vx
S) 6= ;.
We know by consistency of the nucleolus for TU-games (cf. Peleg, 1986) that xS is
the nucleolus of (S;w), where the reduced game w is de¯ned by
w(S) = (supv)(N) ¡ x(N n S)
w(T) = maxQµNnSf(supv)(T [ Q) ¡ x(Q)g for T 2 2S n f;;Sg:
Notice that
w(S) = (supv)(N) ¡ x(N n S)




and for T 2 2S n f;;Sg:
w(T) = max
QµNnS
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= max
QµNnS
fsup(v(T [ Q) ¡ x(Q))g




So xS = Nu(S;w) = Nu(S;supvx
S) 2 ¾(S;vx
S), completing our proof that ¾ satis¯es
CONS.
To show that ¾ 6= C, consider the two-player game (f1;2g;v) 2 T with v(1) =
v(2) = f0g and v(f1;2g) = f1g. Then ¾(f1;2g;v) = fNu(f1;2g;v)g = f(1
2; 1
2)g 6=
C(f1;2g;v) = f(x1;x2) 2 I R
2 j x1 > = 0;x2 > = 0;x1 + x2 = 1g.
As an aside, notice that the solution concept ¾ also satis¯es OPE. This follows from
OPE of the core and ¾(N;v) = C(N;v) if jNj = 1. This implies that in Theorem
15.14 the converse consistency axiom cannot be replaced by restricted nonemptiness and
individual rationality.
15.6 Application to TU-games
Applying the reduced games as de¯ned in Section 15.5 to single-criterion games with
transferable utility, one obtains an axiomatization of the core which di®ers from Peleg's
(1986) axiomatization in the sense that it does not require Peleg's superadditivity axiom.
Again, let U be an in¯nite set. A game with transferable utility, or a (TU) game for
ease of notation, is a tuple (N;v) with N ½ U a ¯nite set of players and v : 2N ! I R
a map which assigns to each coalition S µ N of players a value v(S) 2 I R. We assume
that v(;) = 0. The set of all TU games is denoted by ¨TU.
For a vector x 2 I R
N and a coalition S 2 2N, we denote x(S) :=
P
i2S xi. The empty
sum x(;) is zero by de¯nition. The vector xS is the vector x restricted to the components
in S.
A payo® vector in a game (N;v) 2 ¨TU is a vector x 2 I R
N such that x(N) < = v(N).
The set of all payo® vectors of (N;v) is denoted P(N;v). A payo® vector is individually
rational if xi > = v(i) for each player i 2 N. The set of all individually rational payo®
vectors is denoted IR(N;v).
A solution ¾ on ¨TU is a map that assigns to each game (N;v) 2 ¨TU a subset
¾(N;v) µ P(N;v) of payo® vectors.
We study a particular solution. The core of a game (N;v) is the set of payo® vectors
upon which no coalition can improve:
C(N;v) = fx 2 P(N;v) j x(S) > = v(S) 8S 2 2
Ng:
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We provide a new axiomatization of the core of TU games based on consistency with
respect to reduced games analogous to De¯nition 15.17, which di®er slightly from those
de¯ned by Peleg (1986). This modi¯cation allows us to omit the superadditivity axiom
and characterize the core with one axiom less than Peleg (1986).
We start by introducing the properties we use to characterize the core. A solution ¾
on ¨TU satis¯es
² Restricted Nonemptiness (r-NEM) if for each (N;v) 2 ¨TU with C(N;v) 6= ;
we have that ¾(N;v) 6= ;;
² Individual Rationality (IR) if for each (N;v) 2 ¨TU we have that ¾(N;v) µ
IR(N;v).
In order to introduce consistency we need to de¯ne reduced games.
De¯nition 15.20 Let (N;v) 2 ¨TU;x 2 P(N;v), and S 2 2N n f;;Ng. The reduced
game (S;vx





S(S) = v(N) ¡ x(N n S)
vx
S(T) = maxQµNnS;Q6=; fv(T [ Q) ¡ x(Q)g 8T 2 2S n f;;Sg
/
Consequently, in the reduced game (S;vx
S), the players in N n S do not leave the game,
they only leave the decision making process. They are paid according to xNnS and
no longer play against the players in S. But considering that they are still needed to
distribute the remainder v(N)¡x(NnS) of the value of the grand coalition, the remaining
players are required to cooperate with at least some of them. A solution concept ¾ on
¨TU satis¯es
² Consistency (CONS) if for each game (N;v) 2 ¨TU and each coalition S 2
2N n f;;Ng we have that x 2 ¾(N;v) implies xS 2 ¾(S;vx
S).
Proposition 15.21 The core satis¯es r-NEM, IR, and CONS.
Proof. It is obvious that the core satis¯es r-NEM and IR. It remains to show that the
core satis¯es CONS. Let (N;v) 2 ¨TU;x 2 C(N;v);S 2 2N n f;;Ng, and T 2 2S n f;g.
If T = S, then vx
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< = max
QµNnS;Q6=;





where the inequality follows from x 2 C(N;v). Thus, xS 2 C(S;vx
S). 2
Proposition 15.22 Let (N;v) 2 ¨TU with jNj > = 3. If x 2 IR(N;v) and xS 2 C(S;vx
S)
for each S 2 2N with jSj = 2, then x 2 C(N;v).
Proof.
² Since x 2 IR(N;v) we have that xi > = v(i) for each i 2 N;
² Let S ½ N have two players. Since xS 2 C(S;vx
S) we know that x(S) = vx
S(S) =
v(N) ¡ x(N n S), so x(N) = v(N);
² Now let T 2 2N n fNg with jTj > 1. Take i 2 T; j 2 N n T; S = fi;jg. Since
xS 2 C(S;vx
S):





fv(fig [ Q) ¡ x(Q)g
> = v(fig [ T n fig) ¡ x(T n fig)
= v(T) ¡ x(T n fig);
where the second inequality follows from the observation that T nfig µ N nS, and
T n fig 6= ;. So x(T) > = v(T).
Consequently, x(S) > = v(S) for each coalition S 2 2N, so x 2 C(N;v). 2
Proposition 15.23 Let ¾ be a solution on ¨TU that satis¯es IR and CONS. Then
x(N) = v(N) for each x 2 ¾(N;v).
Proof. If jNj = 1, then x(N) < = v(N) since x is a payo® vector and x(N) > = v(N) by
IR. So assume jNj > = 2. Let x 2 ¾(N;v); i 2 N. By CONS: xi 2 ¾(fig;vx
fig). By our
previous step: xi = vx
fig(i) = v(N) ¡ x(N n fig), so x(N) = v(N). 2
Proposition 15.24 Let ¾ be a solution on ¨TU that satis¯es IR and CONS. Then
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Proof. Let (N;v) 2 ¨TU.
² If jNj = 1, then ¾(N;v) µ IR(N;v) = C(N;v) by IR;
² If jNj = 2, then ¾(N;v) µ C(N;v) by IR and Proposition 15.23;
² If jNj > = 3, let x 2 ¾(N;v). By CONS, xS 2 ¾(S;vx
S) for each two-player coalition
S ½ N. By the previous step, ¾(S;vx
S) µ C(S;vx
S) for each two-player coalition S.
By IR we know that x 2 IR(N;v). So by Proposition 15.22: x 2 C(N;v). 2
Theorem 15.25 A solution ¾ on ¨TU satis¯es IR, r-NEM, and CONS if and only if ¾
is the core.
Proof. We showed in Proposition 15.21 that the core indeed satis¯es the three axioms.
Now let ¾ be a solution on ¨TU that also satis¯es the three axioms. By Proposition
15.24 we have that ¾(N;v) µ C(N;v) for each (N;v) 2 ¨TU. Remains to show that
C(N;v) µ ¾(N;v) for each (N;v) 2 ¨TU. Let (N;v) 2 ¨TU. If C(N;v) = ; we are
done, so assume that this is not the case and let x 2 C(N;v). Take n 2 U nN and de¯ne
a game (N [ fng;w) 2 ¨TU as follows:
w(i) = xi 8i 2 N
w(n) = 0
w(S) = v(S) if jSj > = 2 and n 62 S
w(S) = v(S n fng) if jSj > = 2 and n 2 S:
Obviously C(N [ fng;w) = f(x;0)g, where (x;0) 2 I R
N[fng is the payo® vector that
gives xi to each player i 2 N and 0 to player n. By r-NEM and Proposition 15.24:
(x;0) 2 ¾(N [ fng;w).
The reduced game (N;w
(x;0)
N ) equals (N;v). Namely: w
(x;0)
N (N) = w(N [ fng) ¡
xn = v(N) ¡ 0 = v(N) and for an arbitrary coalition S 2 2N n f;;Ng we ¯nd that
w
(x;0)
N (S) = maxQµ(N[fngnN);Q6=; w(S [Q)¡x(Q) = w(S [fng)¡xn = v(S)¡0 = v(S).
Hence, by CONS: x = (x;0)N 2 ¾(N;w
(x;0)
N ) = ¾(N;v), which ¯nishes our proof. 2
Like the proof of Theorem 15.19, the main step of the proof above, showing that ¾
includes the core, proceeds by `enlightening' core elements. Peleg (1985, 1986) also
applies this procedure. It is easy to show that the three axioms are independent.
Example 15.26 De¯ne ¾1 on ¨TU by ¾1(N;v) = IR(N;v) for each (N;v) 2 ¨TU.
Then ¾1 satis¯es r-NEM and IR, but not CONS. De¯ne ¾2 on ¨TU by ¾2(N;v) = fx 2
I R
N j x(N) = v(N)g for each (N;v) 2 ¨TU. Then ¾2 satis¯es r-NEM and CONS, but
not IR. De¯ne ¾3 on ¨TU by ¾3(N;v) = ; for each (N;v) 2 ¨TU. Then ¾3 satis¯es IR
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The only respect in which our de¯nition of a reduced game di®ers from that of Peleg
(1986) is that we require the players in the reduced game (S;vx
S) to cooperate with at
least one of the players in N n S. This seems a plausible assumption if we take into
account that the players in N n S do not leave the game. They are paid according to
some payo® vector and no longer take part in the decision making process. However,
considering that they are still needed to distribute the remainder of the value v(N) of
the grand coalition, the players in S are required to take account of the players in N nS
and to cooperate with at least some of them.
For antimonotonic solutions our notion of consistency is implied by Peleg's notion of
consistency. A solution ¾ on ¨TU is called antimonotonic if for two games (N;v) and
(N;w) 2 ¨TU with v(N) = w(N) and v(S) > = w(S) for each coalition S we have that
¾(N;v) µ ¾(N;w). This property is intuitive if a solution is based on objections: the
more powerful the coalitions are, the more they can reject, so the smaller the solution of
the game will be. Thus, the core satis¯es consistency with respect to our de¯nition of a
reduced game because of its consistency with respect to Peleg's de¯nition of a reduced
game and its antimonotonicity: in our de¯nition of reduced games, the maximum is
taken over a smaller collection of coalitions.
Moreover, our axiomatization di®ers from Peleg's result by the absence of the super-
additivity axiom.
Using a reduced game for NTU-games similar to the reduced game de¯ned in this
paper, we can also provide an axiomatization of the core of games with non-transferable
utility in terms of individual rationality, restricted nonemptiness, and consistency. This
result is similar to the result of Peleg (1985).
15.7 Claim games
In this section, based on Voorneveld and van den Nouweland (1999), the core allocations
of a cooperative multicriteria game with public and private criteria are related with the
equilibria of a noncooperative multicriteria game. For our analysis, a slightly extended
de¯nition of noncooperative or strategic form multicriteria games is required.
A generalized noncooperative multicriteria game is a tuple
G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni;
where
² N is a ¯nite set of players,
² Xi is the set of strategies of player i 2 N,
² ui :
Q
i2N Xi! ! I R
r(i) is a payo® correspondence that maps each strategy pro¯le
x = (xi)i2N 2
Q
i2N Xi to a nonempty subset ui(x) of r(i)-dimensional EuclideanClaim games 189
space, where r(i) 2 I N denotes the number of criteria taken into account by player
i 2 N,
² ºi is a binary relation on (a superset of) fui(x) µ I R
r(i) j x 2
Q
i2N Xig, denoting
the preferences of player i 2 N over his outcome sets.
This generalizes the noncooperative multicriteria games de¯ned in Chapter 10 in two
ways. First of all, set-valued payo® functions are admitted. Secondly, in the usual
de¯nition one omits the ºi. De¯nitions of several solution concepts are as follows.
De¯nition 15.27 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni be a generalized noncoopera-
tive multicriteria game. A strategy pro¯le x 2
Q
i2N Xi is
² an equilibrium if there does not exist a player i 2 N and a strategy yi 2 Xi such
that ui(yi;x¡i) Âi ui(x);
² an undominated equilibrium if it is an equilibrium and, moreover, there does not
exists a strategy pro¯le y 2
Q
i2N Xi such that
8j 2 N : uj(y) ºj uj(x);
9i 2 N : ui(y) Âi ui(x):
² a strong equilibrium if there does not exist a coalition S 2 2N n f;g and pro¯le
yS 2
Q
i2S Xi such that
8j 2 S : uj(yS;xNnS) ºj uj(x);
9i 2 S : ui(yS;xNnS) Âi ui(x):
The set of equilibria, undominated equilibria, and strong equilibria of the game G are
denoted by E(G), UE(G), and SE(G), respectively. /
Let (N;v) 2 ¨ be a cooperative multicriteria game with public and private criteria.
De¯ne the claim game G(N;v) = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni as follows:
² The player set, as speci¯ed, equals N,
² Player i 2 N has strategy space Xi := fS 2 2N j i 2 Sg £ I R
D[P,
² Player i's payo® correspondence ui :
Q
j2N Xj! ! I R
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(Si;ti)i2N 2
Q
i2N Xi as follows:
ui(x) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
ftig if 8j 2 Si : Sj = Si and








jD < = yjD;t
j
jP < = yjP
v(i) otherwise
² For each player i 2 N the dominance relation ºi is the partial order on the subsets
of I R
D[P de¯ned as follows. Let A;B µ I R
D[P. Then
A Âi B :, 8b 2 B 9a 2 A : a ¸ b; and
A ºi B :, [A Âi B or A = B]:
In a claim game, each player i 2 N states a coalition Si of which he wants to be a
member of and claims a payo® ti 2 I R
D[P he wants to receive for joining. He receives
his claim if this is feasible, i.e., if all other players in Si also want to form this coalition,
they agree on the public criteria, and there is a feasible payo® y 2 v(Si) that can be
used to ¯nance the claims. In this case, the claimed coalition Si is called ¯tting.
Formally, let G(N;v) be a claim game and x = (Si;ti)i2N 2
Q
i2N Xi a strategy
pro¯le. The ¯tting Fx is the partition of the player set N de¯ned as follows. For S 2 2N
with jSj > = 2 we have that S 2 Fx if




jP for all i;j 2 S




jD < = zjD and
ti
jP < = zjP for each i 2 S
Further, for i 2 N, we have that fig 2 Fx if and only if
fig = 2
[
fS 2 Fx : jSj > = 2g:
Coalitions in the ¯tting are called ¯tting coalitions.
The ¯rst proposition shows that each imputation in a game (N;v) coincides with an
equilibrium payo® in the claim game.
Proposition 15.28 Let (N;v) 2 ¨ and a 2 I(N;v). There exists an x 2 E(G(N;v))
such that ui(x) = faig for all i 2 N.Claim games 191
Proof. De¯ne x = (N;ai)i2N. Obviously ui(x) = faig for all i 2 N. Suppose x = 2
E(G(N;v)). Then some player i 2 N can pro¯tably deviate to yi = (Si;ti). Since i
had an individually rational payo® ai, fig cannot be ¯tting in (yi;x¡i). If it was, it
would mean that ui(yi;x¡i) either equals v(i) or ftig if ti < = z for some z 2 v(i). This is
clearly not a pro¯table deviation. So it must be the case that Si = N and there exists









jD < = zjD
8j 2 N : ti
jP = a
j
jP < = zjP;
where the inequality · follows from the fact that ti ¸ ai in order for i to be better o®
after deviating. But then N can improve upon a, contradicting a 2 I(N;v). 2
The next proposition shows that each core element of a game (N;v) coincides with a
strong equilibrium payo® in its claim game.
Proposition 15.29 Let (N;v) 2 ¨ and a 2 C(N;v). There exists an x 2 SE(G(N;v))
such that ui(x) = faig for all i 2 N.
Proof. De¯ne x = (N;ai)i2N. Obviously ui(x) = faig for all i 2 N. Suppose x = 2
SE(G(N;v)). Then there exist a coalition S 2 2N n f;g, a player i 2 S, and a pro¯le




8j 2 S : uj(yS;xNnS) ºj uj(x) = fajg;
9i 2 S : ui(yS;xNnS) Âi ui(x) = faig:
(15.3)
As in Proposition 15.28, fig cannot be ¯tting in (yS;xNnS) by individual rationality of
a. Hence Si 2 F(yS;xNnS) and jSij > = 2. The fact that Si is ¯tting implies that all its
members receive their claimed payo®. Discern two cases.
Case I: Si µ S.




jD < = zjD
t
j












jP < = t
j
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with at least one strict inequality (·). But then z dominates allocation a via coalition
Si, contradicting a 2 C(N;v).
Case II: Not Si µ S.
Let j 2 (N n S) \ Si. Since Si 2 F(yS;xNnS): Sj = Si. Since j 2 N n S: Sj = N. So








jD < = zjD
t
j
jP < = zjP for each j 2 S
a
j




















jP < = t
j
jP for each j 2 S
with at least one strict inequality (·). But then z dominates allocation a via coalition
N, contradicting a 2 C(N;v).
Conclude that (N;ai)i2N is indeed a strong equilibrium of the claim game (N;v). 2
Proposition 15.30 Let (N;v) 2 ¨ and a 2 A(N;v). Allocation a is an element of
C(N;v) if and only if there exists an x 2 SE(G(N;v)) such that ui(x) = faig for all
i 2 N.
Proof. The `only if' part was shown in Proposition 15.29. To prove the converse, let
x 2 SE(G(N;v)) be such that ui(x) = faig for all i 2 N and suppose that a = 2 C(N;v).
Then there exists a coalition S 2 2N n f;g and a y 2 v(S) such that
P
i2S ai
jD < = yjD and
ai
jP < = yjP for each i 2 S
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Then uj(yS;xNnS) = ftjg Âj fajg = uj(x) for all j 2 S, contradicting the assumption
that x 2 SE(G(N;v)). 2
What is it we showed in the previous proposition? We already knew that core elements
induce strong equilibrium payo®s. The basic content of the proposition is that no coali-
tion can pro¯tably deviate from payo® vectors induced by strong equilibria in the claim
game. Combining this with the assumption that these payo® vectors constitute an al-
location in the game (N;v) gives rise to the conclusion that this allocation is in the
core.
The assumption that the payo®s a constitute an allocation becomes obsolete if the
game (N;v) is assumed to be superadditive, as is done in the following result. A game
(N;v) 2 ¨ is superadditive if 8S;T 2 2N n f;g with S \ T = ;:




sjD + tjD < = ujD
maxfsk;tkg < = uk for each k 2 P:




Then a 2 C(N;v) if and only if there exists an x 2 SE(G(N;v)) such that ui(x) = faig
for all i 2 N.
Proof. The `only if' part follows from Proposition 15.29. Conversely, assume there exists
an x 2 SE(G(N;v)) such that ui(x) = faig for all i 2 N. Proposition 15.30 implies
that no coalition can improve upon a = (ai)i2N. Remains to show that a 2 A(N;v).
Consider the ¯tting Fx = (N(1);:::;N(k)) and N(m) 2 Fx. Discern two cases.
Case I: jN(m)j = 1, say N(m) = fig.
There are two possibilities. Either ui(x) = faig = v(i), or ai < = z(m) for some z(m) 2
v(N(m)). In either case, there exists a z(m) 2 v(N(m)) such that ai < = z(m).
Case II: jN(m)j > = 2.




jD < = z(m)jD and
a
j
jP < = z(m)jP for each j 2 N(m)
By superadditivity and the existence of the z(m) as above, it follows that there is a
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and for each i 2 N and each l 2 P:
a
i
l < = max
m=1;:::;k
fz(m)lg < = zl:
So we have that P
i2N ai
jD < = zjD and
ai
jP < = zjP for each i 2 N:
If any of these inequalities is strict, N can pro¯tably deviate from a, contradicting the
result that no coalition can pro¯tably deviate. Hence the inequalities are all equalities,
¯nishing the proof that a 2 A(N;v) and hence a 2 C(N;v). 2
Similar to Proposition 15.31 one can prove:




Then a 2 I(N;v) if and only if there exists an x 2 UE(G(N;v)) such that ui(x) = faig
for all i 2 N.
This chapter is concluded with two simple examples. Example 15.33 indicates that even
if the game is superadditive and has a nonempty core, there may be strong equilibria
of the claim game in which the payo® to each player i is set-valued, i.e., equals v(i).
Example 15.34 indicates that in cooperative games with an empty core, the set of strong
equilibria of its claim game need not be empty.
Example 15.33 Take jDj = 1;P = ;;N = f1;2g, and v(f1g) = v(f2g) = v(f1;2g) =
(¡1;0]. This is a superadditive game with a nonempty core: (0;0) 2 C(N;v). The
strategy combination (x1;x2) with xi = (fig;1) in which each player wants to be on
his own and claims payo® 1 yields ui(x) = v(i) for all i 2 N and is clearly a strong
equilibrium of the claim game. /
Example 15.34 Take jDj = 1;P = ;;N = f1;2g, and v(f1g) = v(f2g) = v(f1;2g) =
f1g. Then C(N;v) = ;. The strategy combination (x1;x2) with xi = (fig;1) yields
ui(x) = f1g and is clearly a strong equilibrium of the claim game. /Chapter 16
Best-Reply Matching in Ordinal
Games
16.1 Introduction
In multicriteria games it is common that a good outcome in one criterion coincides
with a bad outcome in another criterion. This can cause outcomes to be incomparable.
Moreover, in Example 9.1 we saw that plausible decision making procedures may lead to
nontransitive order relations. In both cases it is natural to consider ordinal games, games
where the preferences of the players are not represented by real-valued utility functions,
but by binary relations over the strategy space. This chapter, based on Droste, Kosfeld,
and Voorneveld (1998a), considers such ordinal games in which | in addition | the
common rationality assumptions are abandoned.
How rational should agents be? Or at least how rational should they be modelled?
This question plays a substantial role in decision theory and game theory. Pioneering
work in this ¯eld goes back to Simon in the mid 50's (Simon, 1957). Since then many
di®erent views and conceptions have been °oating around, partly competing or contra-
dicting each other. See Selten (1991) for a good description of the discussion upto the
late 80's. The debate is still far from being settled. Recently, the topic of `bounded
rationality' has attracted a lot of interest again. Important research includes the work
on psychology and economics, focusing on behavioral assumptions which can be based
on psychological evidence (Camerer, 1997; Rabin, 1998). A related project is on evolu-
tion (Weibull, 1995; Vega-Redondo, 1996; Samuelson, 1997; Young, 1998) and learning
(Fudenberg and Levine, 1998), where concepts from biological and social evolution are
explored together with ideas on individual learning and adaptation.
Further research contains the work of Rubinstein (1998), who similar to the psy-
chological literature argues that bounded rationality can not simply mean to assume
players make mistakes but requires a new understanding of how players actually behave
in decision making situations.
195196 Best-Reply Matching in Ordinal Games
The present chapter follows these lines in proposing a new model for boundedly ra-
tional behavior of players in interactive situations that are captured by a noncooperative
game. Our main idea focuses on the role of best replies, forming the set of actions a player
can not improve upon given an action pro¯le of his opponents. Roughly said, if players
end up playing an action that was not a best reply to the actions of their opponents,
they may feel regret of not having done the right thing. Consequently, the anticipation of
regret may in°uence their decision making and determine their own behavior, i.e. their
own mixed strategy. Our model studies a possible way of how this in°uence can work.
The assumptions are as follows. Firstly, players focus on best replies only. This leads
to an ordinal equilibrium concept, ignoring any cardinal issues as, e.g., actual payo®
di®erences. Secondly, the anticipation of regret induces a player to compose his mixed
strategy by matching the probability of playing an action to the (subjective) probability
that this action is a best reply. The resulting behavior is called best-reply matching.
That regret may play an important role in situations of decision making is hardly a
new point. Articles of Loomes and Sudgen (1982, 1987) and Bell (1982) have explored
the possibility to incorporate regret considerations into the rational choice framework of
standard decision theory under uncertainty. However, as far as interactive situations are
concerned, upto now no analysis of behavior that is in°uenced by regret has been given.
This chapter ¯lls the gap. Yet, in contrast to the suggestions of Loomes and Sudgen
(1982) or Bell (1982), where decision makers maximize a modi¯ed utility function, we
do not propose a model of utility maximizing behavior. As explained above our model
takes a bounded rationality approach, studying alternative procedures of how players
actually behave. The main deviation we pursue is to assume `matching'.
Over the past 25 to 30 years a mass of empirical evidence has been accumulated
supporting the observation that individuals, both human beings and animals, produce
behavior which obeys a pattern of so-called `probability matching' or simply `matching'.
See, e.g., Davison and McCarthy (1988), Williams (1988), and Herrnstein (1997) for
recent collections of these ¯ndings. In a general way matching says that an individual
chooses an alternative from a given set of alternatives with a probability proportional
to the value derived from that alternative. That is, if S is the set of alternatives and
v(s) denotes the `value' of alternative s 2 S, the probability of choosing s is equal to
v(s)=
P
s2S v(s). When we consider best-reply matching behavior, the individuals are the
players of the game, the set of alternatives is given by the set of pure strategies of each
player, and the value of each alternative is determined by the fact whether, ex post, the
action is a best reply to the choice pro¯le of the opponents or not.
Best-reply matching explicitly studies players that are clever enough to understand
the strategic issues involved in a noncooperative game. That is, we do not consider
players to ignore the fact that their payo® depends on the decisions of other players, as
it is done, for example, in Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) and Rustichini (1998), where
players simplify their situation by regarding it as a game against nature.
With respect to matching behavior in games, it should be noted that a prominentIntroduction 197
explanation of the matching phenomenon says that decision makers do not believe that
the mechanism that causes the uncertainty is genuinely random and may therefore try to
decipher the pattern (Cross, 1983, p.10). This explanation is particularly convincing in
interactive situations, where players are confronted with other players making strategy
choices rather than nature.
In order to prepare our general model we start with a simple example, which is in
fact a game theoretic modi¯cation of a lottery given in Loomes and Sudgen (1982, p.
822). Consider the following situation. Player 1 faces a one-shot game against player 2
that is described by the payo® matrix in Figure 16.1. Payo®s given are in dollars and are
to player 1, who chooses between A and B. In this example we ignore all strategic issues
with respect to player 2, therefore payo®s to this player are neglected. Suppose that
player 1 believes that player 2 ¯rst rolls a die and then chooses the respective column
indicated by the roll of the die. Thus, beliefs of player 1 are such that all actions of his
opponent have the same probability equal to 1
6. Which row will player 1 choose, A or
B?
1 2 3 4 5 6
A 1 2 3 4 5 6
B 6 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 16.1: A First Example
Suppose ¯rst that player 1 is a neo-classical expected utility maximizer. Then, ob-
viously, he is indi®erent between A and B since both give the same expected payo®
3:5.
Suppose now that player 1 follows a di®erent procedure. Comparing payo®s of actions
A and B for each individual choice of player 2, he realizes that although both actions
give indeed the same expected payo®, action A is a best reply for every action from 2 to
6, while action B is a best reply only in case player 2 chooses 1. Thus, in terms of player
1's beliefs the probability to play a best reply is ¯ve times higher when choosing action
A than when choosing action B. Following this reasoning player 1 may choose action
A with a higher probability than action B. Now suppose that the precise probability is
determined as follows. For each of the individual choices of player 2, if the choice was
known beforehand, player 1 would easily be able to decide between A and B. If player 2
was known to choose 1 he takes B, in all other cases he takes A. Now, of course player 1
does not know beforehand which action player 2 is going to choose. But using his beliefs
he can calculate that the probability for being called to play B is 1
6 and the probability
for being called to play A is 5
6. So this is what he does: he matches the probability of
playing an action to the probability that this action is a best reply. With probability 1
6
he plays B, with probability 5
6 he plays A.
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study in this chapter. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next
section speci¯es the class of games under consideration. Section 16.3 formally de¯nes the
notion of best-reply matching and best-reply matching equilibrium. We give a deeper
motivation of the concept in Section 16.4. Section 16.5 proves existence of equilibria and
analyzes the concept in more detail. Section 16.6 looks at the size and structure of the
set of best-reply matching equilibria. Section 16.7 illustrates its properties by means of
well-known examples. Finally, Section 16.8 concludes.
16.2 Preliminaries
We give the de¯nition of some standard game theoretic notions which are used hereafter.
An (ordinal noncooperative) game is a tuple G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni, where N =
f1;:::;ng is a ¯nite set of players; each player i 2 N has a ¯nite set Xi of pure strategies,
henceforth called actions, and a binary relation ºi over
Q
i2N Xi, re°ecting his preferences
over the outcomes. The binary relation ºi is assumed to be re°exive and its asymmetric
part Âi, de¯ned for all s;t 2
Q
i2N Xi by
s Âi t , [s ºi t and not t ºi s];
is assumed to be acyclic. In the following we also consider cases in which the preference
relations ºi induce von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions ui :
Q
i2N Xi ! I R and
denote the corresponding game by G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni.




j2Nnfig Xj, etc. We denote by




the set of mixed strategies, henceforth called strategies, for player i. Analogously to the
action case, we use notations ¢ =
Q
i2N ¢i, ¢¡i =
Q
j2Nnfig ¢j, ¾ = (¾i;¾¡i). For a
strategy pro¯le ¾¡i 2 ¢¡i, we write ¾¡i(x¡i) :=
Q
j2Nnfig ¾j(xj), the probability that the
opponents of player i play the action pro¯le x¡i 2 X¡i. Thus, in particular we restrict
attention to independent strategy pro¯les.
Consider a game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni. Denote for each player i 2 N and each pro¯le
x¡i 2 X¡i of actions of his opponents the set of pure best replies, i.e., the actions that
player i cannot improve upon, by Bi(x¡i):
Bi(x¡i) := fxi 2 Xi j6 9~ xi 2 Xi : (~ xi;x¡i) Âi (xi;x¡i)g:
Of course, for games hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni with utility functions we have:
Bi(x¡i) := fxi 2 Xi j 8~ xi 2 Xi : ui(xi;x¡i) > = ui(~ xi;x¡i)g:
Since Xi is ¯nite and Âi is acyclic, Bi(x¡i) is nonempty. An action xi 2 Xi in a game
G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni is a never-best reply if
fx¡i 2 X¡i j xi 2 Bi(x¡i)g = ;:De¯nition 199




for each x¡i 2 X¡i. An action xi 2 Xi is weakly dominated by a strategy ¾i 2 ¢i if
8x¡i 2 X¡i : ui(¾i;x¡i) > = ui(xi;x¡i)
with strict inequality for at least one x¡i, and strictly dominated if all inequalities are
strict. A strictly dominated action is clearly a never-best reply. We next de¯ne best-reply
matching behavior and best-reply matching equilibrium.
16.3 De¯nition
As the title of this chapter suggests, our approach focuses on two things: `best reply'
and `matching'. Let us start with the ¯rst. Consider a game G and some player i 2 N.
Then, we assume that to every action xi 2 Xi player i associates the set
fx¡i 2 X¡i j xi 2 Bi(x¡i)g;
which gives all opponents' action pro¯les to which xi is a best reply. The collection of
these sets is obtained directly from the game G. It contains all relevant information
concerning player i's best-reply structure. Note that in games with utility functions a
lot of information may be ignored by focusing simply on the best-reply structure of the
game. In particular, all cardinal issues do not enter a player's consideration. Best-reply
matching is an ordinal concept.
The second expression, `matching', captures how players use the information on their
best-reply structure in order to determine their own behavior, i.e. the strategy being
played. We assume that additional to the information on the game a player has beliefs
about the opponents' behavior. The belief of player i is given by a strategy ^ ¾¡i 2 ¢¡i
determining for each action pro¯le x¡i 2 X¡i the probability ^ ¾¡i(x¡i) with which player
i believes that particular pro¯le to occur. Now, our assumption says that a player
builds his own strategy by matching his individual probabilities to play an action to the
probabilities that these actions are a best reply. We obtain the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 16.1 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni be a game. Consider a player i 2 N.
Denote by ^ ¾¡i 2 ¢¡i the strategy pro¯le player i believes his opponents to play. Player
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As we have to take care of multiple best replies, dividing by jBi(x¡i)j in (16.1) ensures
that ¾i is well-de¯ned, i.e. that probabilities sum up to one. Thereby we implicitly as-
sume that all multiple best replies are weighted equally. However, it should be clear that
any other weighting rule would be ¯ne, too, though changing, of course, the probabilities
that are assigned to actions. If best replies are unique the weighting rule is obviously
irrelevant.
In a best-reply matching equilibrium every player matches best replies and beliefs
are correct, i.e. for all i 2 N; ^ ¾¡i = ¾¡i.
De¯nition 16.2 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni be a game. A mixed strategy pro¯le








The set of BRM equilibria of a game G is denoted by BRM(G). /
Having de¯ned the notion of best-reply matching and the equilibrium concept based on
this notion, we now provide two interpretations of the new concept.
16.4 Motivation and interpretation
We give two di®erent interpretations of best-reply matching behavior and BRM equilib-
rium. One interpretation of best-reply matching is based on the idea that a player wants
to feel content after having played the game. That is, after the game is over a player
would like to be able to say that `he has done the right thing' in the sense that he has
chosen `the right action'. In a game the only reasonable ex post criterion for `a right
action' is the criterion of a best reply. Once the game is over and strategies are realized,
the action pro¯le of the opponents is ¯xed and can no longer be changed. Yet given a
¯xed action pro¯le of the other players the best a player can do is indeed to play a best
reply. They form the reference value to which any action has to be compared after the
game is over.
Therefore intuitively our approach can be seen as saying that, in order to feel no
regret after the game is over, players have an ex ante aspiration level of playing a best
reply. Note that this assumption does not necessarily disagree with the basic idea of
rational utility maximizing behavior. In fact, on the action level, i.e. whenever a player
has deterministic beliefs, best-reply matching behavior is rational.
So suppose that beliefs of a player i are mixed, i.e., that several of his opponents'
action pro¯les x¡i (possibly all) are believed to be played with positive probability. In this
situation our behavioral assumption di®ers from rationality. The idea is the following.
Since a player knows what to do in each of the single cases x¡i that can occur, namely
play a best reply to the pro¯le x¡i, he refers to these situations as the basis for hisMotivation and interpretation 201
behavior. Firstly, he determines his mixed strategy by restricting its support to actions
xi that would be played in any of these single cases. Secondly, he weighs these individual
actions by the probability with which they would be played if only the realized pro¯le
of the opponents would be known beforehand. The result is matching. Each action xi
is played with exactly the probability that this action would be played, i.e. that it is a
best reply, given the beliefs of player i.
The reason why we assume the behavior of a player to be non-rational in case of
uncertainty is that we presume it to be too complicated for a player to maximize over the
set of mixed strategies, which is a continuum of alternatives. Although, or even because
he is able to maximize over the set of actions, he fails to do so in case he must determine
a mixed strategy. Similarly, best-reply matching is not based on expected payo®s, since
these can never be observed in a one-shot setting. In particular, we assume that players
do not aggregate an uncertain situation by summing up products of probabilities and
payo®s. Instead, we propose that a player views an uncertain situation as a combination
of several possible situations, in each of which he would know precisely what to do. He
then weighs the reactions to each separate situation with the probability he assigns to
the occurrence of this situation.
The notion of equilibrium in this setting is based on the usual static approach. Every
player behaves according to the best-reply matching assumption and individual beliefs
are correct. In other words, the interaction between players forms a ¯xed point.
An alternative motivation for the equilibrium concept is based on a repeated situation
of play, where each single player myopically adapts his strategy from one period to the
other. The description of this second motivation is brief; the reader is referred to Droste,
Kosfeld, and Voorneveld (1998b) for details.
Suppose the game G is repeated in¯nitely often in discrete time. At any time t a
player is assumed to play an action drawn from the distribution given by his mixed
strategy ¾t
i at that time. Players behave myopically and update their strategy each
period based only on the realization of play in that period. As in the one-shot setting
the updating is based on best replies. However, contrary to above the updating procedure
does not involve any matching but, as we will see, will imply matching behavior in every
steady state, i.e. in equilibrium.
Consider a given period t and suppose that in this period action pro¯le x 2 X was






i (xi) + µ




where 0 < µ < 1 is a parameter that is exogenously ¯xed.
Intuitively, the adjustment procedure speci¯ed in (16.3) says that a player i 2 N after
the t-th repetition of the game adjusts his strategy by ¯rst proportionally decreasing all
probabilities by a fraction µ. This then leaves the player with a probability µ that is
reallocated to the actions that are best replies to the action pro¯le of his opponents in202 Best-Reply Matching in Ordinal Games
the t-th repetition of the game. Hence, similar to the one-shot setting a player focuses on
optimal behavior in terms of best replies. After each round he shifts his behavior towards
strategies that are best replies to the last observation, where the degree of adjustment
is determined by 0 < µ < 1. Note that, while the action currently played by player
i does not directly in°uence how he adjusts his strategy, the action does in°uence the
updating process of all of his opponents. Consequently, the action currently played does
in°uence the future strategy pro¯les of his opponents and therefore it will in°uence his
own adjustment process indirectly.
Alternatively, the adjustment process (16.3) can be motivated by a multipopulation
model (cf. Weibull, 1995, Chapter 5). Suppose there exist n = jNj large (technically
in¯nite) populations of agents. Each agent in population i 2 N is programmed to an
action in Xi. The share of agents in population i 2 N programmed to action xi 2 Xi
at time t is given by ¾t
i(xi). In each period t a fraction µ 2 (0;1) of the agents in each
population is randomly drawn to play the game. The agents who are called to play the
game are randomly matched in n-tuples such that each agent is matched with exactly one
agent from every other population. After all n-tuples of agents have played the game,
the participating agents leave the system and are replaced by new agents who learn
something about the prevailing states of the n populations. Suppose, in particular, that
a randomly selected outcome x 2 X of one of the games played in period t is publicly
announced. In other words, the probability of sampling a pro¯le x 2 X equals its share
in the current populations.
Now consider a new agent, replacing an agent that leaves population i 2 N. This
agent once and for all commits to an action xi 2 Xi, which he does by adopting a
best reply against the publicly announced action pro¯le x¡i. In case of multiple best
replies, the new agent is assumed to adopt each of the best replies with equal probability.
Obviously, the fraction ¾
t+1
i (xi) of agents in population i programmed to action xi 2 Xi
in period t + 1 then equals (1 ¡ µ)¾t
i(xi) + µ
jBi(x¡i)j if xi 2 Bi(x¡i) and (1 ¡ µ)¾t
i(xi)
otherwise, which is exactly the adjustment rule (16.3).
For a given initial random variable ¾0 2 ¢ and a given parameter µ, the adjust-
ment rule in (16.3) de¯nes a discrete time Markov process (¾t)
1
t=0 on the state space
¢. Without going into details, some key results from Droste, Kosfeld, and Voorneveld
(1998b) are mentioned. If the Markov process is approximated by a dynamical system in
continuous time, which follows the expected movement of the original stochastic process,
then its steady states are exactly the best-reply matching equilibria of the underlying
game G. Every pure-strategy best-reply matching equilibrium is an absorbing state of
the stochastic process (¾t)
1
t=0; every absorbing state of (¾t)
1
t=0 is a best-reply matching
equilibrium, possibly in mixed strategies. Thus, with repeated play matching turns out
to be a stationarity property of the adjustment process of the players. For every game
it holds that whenever the adjustment process settles down, players must match best
replies.Analysis 203
16.5 Analysis
A fundamental question with respect to any equilibrium concept concerns its existence.
The ¯rst proposition shows that BRM equilibria exist for every game.
Proposition 16.3 Let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni be a game. Then BRM(G) 6= ;.
































r : ¢ ! ¢
¾ 7! r(¾)
with r(¾)i(xi) = ri(xi;¾¡i) is well-de¯ned. In the de¯nition of the function ri neither the
index set in the summation sign nor the number jBi(x¡i)j of pure best replies depends on
the strategy combination ¾. Hence, this mapping is obviously continuous. Application
of the Brouwer ¯xed-point theorem yields the existence of a strategy pro¯le ¾ 2 ¢ such
that ¾ = r(¾), which is a BRM equilibrium. 2
Remark 16.4 It follows from the proof of Proposition 16.3 that
P
xi2Xi ¾i(xi) = 1 =
P
xi2Xi ri(xi;¾¡i) for each ¾ 2 ¢;i 2 N. As a consequence, when computing BRM
equilibria, one of the conditions ¾i(xi) = ri(xi;¾¡i) of player i is redundant. /
A game H is said to be obtained by iterated elimination of never-best replies from a game
G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni if there exists a number k 2 I N of elimination rounds and for
each player i 2 N a collection of sets X0
i ;X1
i ;:::;Xk





1. For each player i 2 N : Xi = X0
i ¶ X1
i ¶ ¢¢¢ ¶ Xk
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2. For each player i 2 N and each l = 0;1;:::;k: ºl
i is the preference relation ºi of








never-best replies of player i in the game hN;(Xl
i)i2N;(ºl
i)i2Ni and there exists at




4. H is the game hN;(Xk
i )i2N;(ºk
i)i2Ni;
5. In the game H, no player i 2 N has never-best replies.
The behavior of the BRM equilibrium concept with respect to dominated actions and
elimination thereof is summarized in the next result.
Proposition 16.5 The following results hold:
(i) In a BRM equilibrium ¾¤ of a game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni never-best replies are played
with zero probability.
Moreover,
(ii) the set of BRM equilibria of a game G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni equals | up to zero
probability assigned to eliminated actions | the set of BRM equilibria of a game
that is obtained by iterated elimination of never-best replies.
Finally,
(iii) let G = hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni be a game with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions and let ¾¤ be a BRM equilibrium of G. If player i's action xi is weakly
dominated by the strategy ¾i, then:





Proof. The proof of (i) is easy: if xi 2 Xi is a never-best reply, then the set fx¡i 2
X¡i j xi 2 Bi(x¡i)g is empty and hence according to (16.2): ¾¤
i(xi) = ri(xi;¾¤
¡i) = 0.
To prove (ii), it su±ces to prove that the ¯rst round of eliminations does not change
the equilibrium set, since the proof can then be repeated for the additional rounds.
Assume for simplicity that in the ¯rst elimination round we eliminate all the never-best
replies
NBi := fxi 2 Xi j xi is a never-best reply of player i in Gg
of each player i 2 N, thus obtaining a smaller game G0. The equilibrium conditions in
the game G are that for each i 2 N and each xi 2 Xi:

































By (i), actions xj 2 NBj are played with zero probability in a BRM equilibrium. Hence
the second sum in the last equality above equals zero. What remains, for each player
i 2 N and each action xi 2 Xi n NBi, are exactly the equilibrium conditions for the
game G0.
To prove (iii), let x¡i 2 X¡i and assume that xi 2 Bi(x¡i). Since ¾i weakly dominates
xi and xi 2 Bi(x¡i), for every xi 2 Xi such that ¾i(xi) > 0 we must have that xi 2
Bi(x¡i). Hence for every xi 2 Xi with ¾i(xi) > 0:
fx¡i 2 X¡i j xi 2 Bi(x¡i)g µ fx¡i 2 X¡i j xi 2 Bi(x¡i)g;
which together with the de¯nition of ri(¢;¾¤
¡i) implies the result:




















Notice that the result above does not rule out that weakly dominated actions are played
with positive, even quite large probability.
Example 16.6 Consider the game in Figure 16.2. T weakly dominates B and L strictly
dominates R. Both T and B are a best reply against L, and T is a unique best reply








Figure 16.2: The game from Example 16.6
The condition for ¾1(B) is redundant, since the probabilities have to add up to one.
Similarly, for player 2 we see that L is a unique best reply to both T and B, so that his
equilibrium condition becomes
¾2(L) = ¾1(T) + ¾1(B) = 1:
Solving these equations and taking into account that (¾1;¾2) 2 ¢ we ¯nd that the unique
BRM equilibrium equals ((1
2; 1
2);(1;0)). Observe that the weakly dominated action is not
only played with positive probability, but that there is not even an alternative action
with a higher probability. /
Despite the relatively prudent behavior with respect to (weakly) dominated actions as
expressed in Proposition 16.5, the set of BRM equilibria and Nash equilibria have no













Figure 16.3: The Nash and BRM equilibrium concept di®er
We can, however, indicate a relation with the notion of strict equilibria introduced
by Harsanyi (1973) as those strategy pro¯les ¾ satisfying the condition that each player
plays his unique best reply to the strategies of the opponent:
8i 2 N : f¾ig = f¿i 2 ¢i j6 9~ ¿i : ui(~ ¿i;¾¡i) > ui(¿i;¾¡i)g:
It is clear that a strict Nash equilibrium is always a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and
(consequently) that strict Nash equilibria do not always exist. However, if they exist,
they are exactly the pure-strategy BRM equilibria of the game.
Proposition 16.7 The set of strict Nash equilibria of a game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ui)i2Ni co-
incides with the set of pure strategy BRM equilibria.
The proof is straightforward and left to the reader.
The results with respect to the iterated elimination of never-best replies in Proposi-
tion 16.5 call to mind the notion of rationalizability introduced in Bernheim (1984) andSize and structure 207
Pearce (1984). Without going into the formal de¯nitions, it follows immediately from
Proposition 16.5 and Bernheim (1984, pp. 1015-1016) that every action that is played
with positive probability in a BRM equilibrium is rationalizable. However, in a BRM
equilibrium ¾, the mixed strategies ¾i themselves need not be rationalizable. This shows
again that the bounded rationality concept of best-reply matching agrees with standard
rationality on the action level but disagrees with respect to mixed strategies.
16.6 Size and structure
The size of an equilibrium set can be seen as a measure of the cutting power of an
equilibrium concept: if an equilibrium set contains many candidates, it can be seen as a
weak concept, not ruling out many strategy pro¯les. With respect to the size of the set
of BRM equilibria of a game hN;(Xi)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni, remark that it is always a relatively
small subset of ¢. A strategy tuple ¾¡i 2 ¢¡i completely determines ri(¢;¾¡i) and hence
in an n-player game it su±ces to know only n ¡ 1 components of a BRM equilibrium
to compute the equilibrium strategy for the remaining n-th player. This implies that
BRM(G) is always of lower dimension than ¢. In particular, it is impossible that
BRM(G) = ¢.
The structure of the set of Nash equilibria has been studied by several authors,
including Winkels (1979) and Jansen (1981), who show that in two-person games the set
of Nash equilibria has a nice decomposition into a ¯nite number of polytopes. Concerning
the structure of the set of best-reply matching equilibria, we see that if the game G has
only two players, then BRM(G) is a polytope, since the set of BRM equilibria is then
determined by ¯nitely many linear equations and linear weak inequalities in the variables
(¾i(xi))i2N;xi2Xi. If the game has at least three players, its set of BRM equilibria is
determined by a set of polynomial equations over a Cartesian product of simplices. This
leads to the observations that | analogous to the set of Nash equilibria | the set of
BRM equilibria may be curved or disconnected. The following two examples indicate
that both possibilities may indeed occur.
Example 16.8 Consider the three-player game in Figure 16.4. Here we denote by
p;q;r 2 [0;1] the probability with which player 1 chooses his ¯rst row, player 2 chooses
his ¯rst column, and player 3 chooses his ¯rst matrix, respectively. Considering Remark
q 1 ¡ q
p 1;1;1 1;0;0
1 ¡ p 0;1;1 0;0;0
r
q 1 ¡ q
p 1;0;0 0;1;1
1 ¡ p 0;0;0 1;1;1
1 ¡ r
Figure 16.4: A game with a curved set of BRM equilibria
16.4, it su±ces to determine an equilibrium constraint only for p;q, and r, since those for208 Best-Reply Matching in Ordinal Games
1¡p;1¡q;1¡r will follow immediately. The ¯rst strategy (the top row) of player 1 is a
unique best response to three combinations of pure strategies of his opponents, namely
to those in which player 2 chooses either his ¯rst or his second column and player 3
chooses the ¯rst matrix, which occurs with probability qr+(1¡q)r, and to the strategy
in which player 2 chooses his ¯rst column and player 3 chooses the second matrix, which
occurs with probability q(1¡r). Together with the constraints for the other two players,
we ¯nd that the conditions for a BRM equilibrium are
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
p = qr + (1 ¡ q)r + q(1 ¡ r) = q + (1 ¡ q)r
q = pr + (1 ¡ p)r = r
r = pq + (1 ¡ p)q = q
p;q;r 2 [0;1]
Consequently, the set of BRM equilibria equals
f((p;1 ¡ p);(q;1 ¡ q);(r;1 ¡ r)) j p = q(2 ¡ q);r = q;q 2 [0;1]g;
which is a curved equilibrium set. /
Example 16.9 Consider the three-player game in Figure 16.5. The conditions for a
q 1 ¡ q
p 1;1;1 0;0;0
1 ¡ p 0;0;1 1;1;0
r
q 1 ¡ q
p 0;0;0 1;1;1
1 ¡ p 1;1;0 0;0;1
1 ¡ r
Figure 16.5: A game with a disconnected set of BRM equilibria
BRM equilibrium are
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
p = qr + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ r) = 2qr ¡ q ¡ r + 1
q = pr + (1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ r) = 2pr ¡ p ¡ r + 1
r = pq + (1 ¡ p)q = q
p;q;r 2 [0;1]
This is equivalent with (after substitution of r = q):
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
p = 2q2 ¡ 2q + 1
q = 2pq ¡ p ¡ q + 1
r = q
p;q;r 2 [0;1]
Subtracting the ¯rst equality from the second, we ¯nd:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
p = 2q2 ¡ 2q + 1
pq = q2
r = q
p;q;r 2 [0;1]Examples 209
Hence
8
> > > > <
> > > > :






> > > > <
> > > > :
























consisting of three components. /
16.7 Examples
In this section we apply the concept of a BRM equilibrium to several classes of games,
including two-person coordination games and a class of Hawk-Dove games. Moreover, one
can apply the concept of a BRM equilibrium to the reduced strategic form of extensive
form games. We present one brief example and one more elaborate case, in which we
solve a T-choice centipede game.
Example 16.10 Consider the Rock, Scissors, Paper game in Figure 16.6, where R, S, P,
have the obvious meaning and the corresponding probabilities with which these strategies
are played are denoted by pi;qi.
R;q1 S;q2 P;1 ¡ q1 ¡ q2
R;p1 0;0 1;¡1 ¡1;1
S;p2 ¡1;1 0;0 1;¡1
P;1 ¡ p1 ¡ p2 1;¡1 ¡1;1 0;0
Figure 16.6: Rock, Scissors, Paper
The conditions for a BRM equilibrium are
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
p1 = q2
p2 = 1 ¡ q1 ¡ q2
q1 = p2
q2 = 1 ¡ p1 ¡ p2
p1;p2;q1;q2 2 [0;1]
p1 + p2 < = 1
q1 + q2 < = 1
Simple calculus leads to the conclusion that the unique BRM equilibrium equals the
unique Nash equilibrium in which both players choose each of their pure strategies with
probability 1
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Example 16.11 A two-player game is a coordination game if both players have the
same set of actions and the unique best reply to an action of the opponent is to play the





Figure 16.7: Battle of the Sexes; a coordination game
From the de¯nition of a coordination game it is clear that a pro¯le of strategies is a BRM
equilibrium if and only if both players play the same mixed strategy. This illustrates
an important di®erence from the Nash equilibrium concept: The pure Nash equilibria
of a coordination game are the combinations of pure strategies in which the players
indeed coordinate (choose the same pure strategy). Since these Nash equilibria are strict,
they are also BRM equilibria. However, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in
which players do not coordinate exactly. In the example above, the mixed strategy




5)). This equilibrium is not a BRM equilibrium, since
it is not symmetric. For example, player 1 puts more probability on `boxing' than he
believes player 2 does, which is not in accordance with matching. Intuitively, in a BRM
equilibrium in order to avoid miscoordination players want to do exactly the same as
their opponent. If the opponent goes `boxing' with probability p they will go `boxing'
with the same probability p, too. /
Example 16.12 In this example we consider a class of Hawk-Dove games with the
structure of the payo® matrix given in Figure 16.8. Here V and W are real numbers
satisfying the condition W < V . We consider several cases.
q 1 ¡ q
p V;V 0;2V
1 ¡ p 2V;0 W;W
Figure 16.8: A class of Hawk-Dove games
1. If W > 0, we have a Prisoner's dilemma; the second action of both players strictly
dominates the ¯rst, so the unique BRM equilibrium equals ((0;1);(0;1)).


















p = 1 ¡ q
q = 1 ¡ p
p;q 2 [0;1]
The set of BRM equilibria is f((p;1 ¡ p);(1 ¡ p;p)) j p 2 [0;1]g.





2q + (1 ¡ q)
q = 1
2p + (1 ¡ p)
p;q 2 [0;1]





5. If V < 0, the ¯rst action of both players strictly dominates the second, so the
unique BRM equilibrium is ((1;0);(1;0)).
/
Example 16.13 Consider the extensive form game in Figure 16.9. In this game, player
1 is given the choice to stop (S) or continue (C). If he continues, player 2 is given the
same choice. The game ends if either player decides to stop or both decide to continue.












Figure 16.9: An extensive form game
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Denote by p the probability that player 1
chooses to stop and by q the probability that player 2 chooses to stop. By Remark 16.4,
it su±ces to determine the equilibrium conditions for p and q. Player 2's choice to stop
is not a best reply to player 1's strategy to continue. If player 1 stops, it is of no concern
what player 2 chooses: either strategy is a best reply. Hence the equilibrium condition





The equilibrium condition for player 1 is either p = q or p = 1
2q or p = 0, depending
on whether he ¯nds a better than, equivalent to, or worse than outcome b. In the ¯rst212 Best-Reply Matching in Ordinal Games
two cases, i.e., if a º1 b, there is a Nash equilibrium yielding outcome a which is never
played in a BRM equilibrium. No matter what preferences player 1 has over a and b,
the unique BRM equilibrium is that both players continue with probability one. /
Example 16.14 In the T-choice centipede game, introduced by Rosenthal (1981), play-
ers 1 and 2 alternately move. In any of the 2T periods, the player whose turn it is to
move can decide to stop the game (S) or to continue (C). Consequently, both players
have T +1 actions: stopping at any one of the T opportunities, or continue all the time.
The game ends if one of the players decides to stop or if neither player has decided to
do so after each of them has had T opportunities. For each player, the outcome when
he stops the game in period t is better than that in which the other player stops the
game in period t + 1 (or the game ends), but worse than any outcome that is reached if
in period t + 1 the other player passes the move to him. Therefore:
Player 2's action to stop at his k-th opportunity is a best reply to the following actions
of player 1:
² player 1 stops immediately; then all of player 2's T + 1 actions are a best reply;
² if k = T the unique best reply to player 1's choice to continue always is to stop at
the ¯nal stage;
² player 1 decides to stop at opportunity k + 1.
Player 1's action to stop at his k-th opportunity is a best reply to exactly one action of
player 2:
² player 2 decides to stop in the next period, at his k-th opportunity.
































Figure 16.10: A 3-choice centipede game
the probability of player 1[2] to stop at his i-th opportunity, once this opportunity is
reached (i = 1;:::;T). Thus, our computations are in behavioral, rather than in mixed
strategies. We show that the unique BRM equilibrium satis¯es for each number T 2 I N
of choices and each k 2 f0;:::;T ¡ 1g:




In particular, if the number of choices T approaches in¯nity, the probability for each
player to stop at the ¯rst (and by the same argument at any ¯nite) opportunity, converges
to zero. Osborne and Rubinstein (1998), who obtain a similar result, conclude that their
equilibrium notion makes sense only if both players fail to understand the structure of the
game. In our equilibrium notion, the equilibrium conditions form an almost immediate
translation of the structure of the game, where it is a unique best reply to stop exactly
one period ahead of your opponent's intent to do so. Still, we ¯nd a potential resolution of
the paradox posed by the centipede game: The players play the unique Nash equilibrium
of stopping immediately with positive probability, but the solution in (16.4) indicates
that there is a strong urge to continue playing, thus providing the possibility to achieve
more preferable outcomes.
The solution in (16.4) also indicates that players continue with positive probability
at every node, but the probability to stop increases as players reach further nodes in
the game. This feature is mentioned as the most obvious and consistent pattern in the
experimental study of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), who remark that `any model to
explain the data should capture this basic feature' (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992, p.809).
Thus, while no standard game theoretic solution concept can predict this outcome, the
best-reply matching equilibrium concept does a good job. Moreover, the surprising result
that a player continues with positive probability at his ¯nal node, even though this action
is strictly dominated by stopping at that node, is observed in the experimental sessions
of McKelvey and Palfrey as well.
We now show that (16.4) holds. The description of the T-choice centipede game in
terms of best replies (emphasized above) immediately gives rise to the following equilib-
rium conditions for player 1:
p1 = q1 (I:1)
(1 ¡ p1)p2 = (1 ¡ q1)q2 (I:2)
¢¢¢
(1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ pT¡1)pT = (1 ¡ q1)(1 ¡ q2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ qT¡1)qT; (I:T)




+ (1 ¡ p1)p2 (II:1)
(1 ¡ q1)q2 =
p1
T + 1





+(1¡p1)(1¡p2)¢¢¢(1¡pT¡1)pT (II:T ¡ 1)
(1 ¡ q1)(1 ¡ q2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ qT¡1)qT =
p1
T + 1
+ (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ pT): (II:T)
The conditions that arise from always continuing are redundant (see Remark 16.4).214 Best-Reply Matching in Ordinal Games
We prove ¯rst of all, that in the T-choice centipede game we have for each i =
1;:::;T ¡ 1:
pi = qi;pi = 2 f0;1g: (16.5)
We know from condition (I.1) that p1 = q1. Suppose p1 = 1. Substitution in (II.1)
yields 1 = 1
T+1, a contradiction. Suppose p1 = 0. Then p2 = q2 by (I.2) and p2 = 0 by
(II.1). Hence p3 = q3 by (I.3) and p3 = 0 by (II.2). Proceeding in this fashion yields that
pk = qk = 0 for all k = 1;:::;T, which contradicts (II.T). Hence p1 = q1;p1 = 2 f0;1g.
Now assume that we have shown for some k 2 f1;:::;T ¡ 2g:
8n < = k : pn = qn;pn = 2 f0;1g:
We proceed to show that the same holds for k + 1. First of all, we have from (I.k+1)
that pk+1 = qk+1. Consider condition (II.k+1):
(1 ¡ q1)(1 ¡ q2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ qk)qk+1 =
p1
T + 1
+ (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ pk+1)pk+2 | {z }
¸0
:
If qk+1 = 0, then its left hand side equals zero, which would imply that p1 < = 0, whereas





a contradiction. This ¯nishes the proof of (16.5). This part was necessary to avoid
division by zero in the following solution of the game.
Substitute the left-hand side of player 1's conditions in the left-hand side of player




+ (1 ¡ p1)p2
(1 ¡ p1)p2 =
p1
T + 1
+ (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)p3
¢¢¢
(1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ pT¡2)pT¡1 =
p1
T + 1
+ (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ pT¡1)pT
(1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ pT¡1)pT =
p1
T + 1
+ (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ pT)
The ¯rst equation is equivalent to
T
T + 1
p1 = (1 ¡ p1)p2:






+ (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)p3;Examples 215
which is equivalent to
T ¡ 1
T + 1
p1 = (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)p3:




p1 = (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)(1 ¡ p3)p4:
Continuing in this way, we get the following equivalent system of T equations:
T
T + 1
p1 = (1 ¡ p1)p2
T ¡ 1
T + 1




p1 = (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ pT¡1)pT
1
T + 1
p1 = (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ pT¡1)(1 ¡ pT):




p1 = (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)¢¢¢(1 ¡ pT¡1): (16.6)
In combination with the second to last equation and (16.5), which assures that we do





Now start with equation (16.6) and ¯rst, add the third to last equation, and second,
divide in a similar way. This yields ¯rst,
6
T + 1
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It is easy to see that






Empirical evidence shows that matching behavior occurs in many decision theoretic
situations with uncertainty. See, e.g., Davison and McCarthy (1988), Williams (1988),
and Herrnstein (1997). In decision theoretic situations the uncertainty is caused by
`nature'. In a game theoretic framework players face uncertainty from a di®erent source:
the strategic behavior of their opponents.
A common explanation of matching behavior says that people do not believe that
the mechanism, which produces the uncertainty, is genuinely random and therefore they
may try to decipher the pattern. This explanation is particularly convincing in an
interactive situation, where players are confronted with other players rather than nature.
Consequently, matching behavior may play an even more important role in games. In
this chapter we have analyzed an equilibrium concept for boundedly rational players
which deals with matching behavior in interactive situations.
A main issue for future work would be to gather empirical evidence to determine the
extent to which matching behavior actually occurs in strategic games. Another direction
for future research is to make the concept applicable directly to games in extensive form,
without seeking recourse to the reduced normal-form game, as was done in Section 16.7.
Finally, in a slightly di®erent set-up, assuming the existence of payo® functions, it is
of interest to investigate if best-reply matching equilibria can be extended to a cardinal
equilibrium concept that takes payo® di®erences into account.Chapter 17
Random Games
17.1 Introduction
A common feature of interactive decisions with multiple criteria is that they are based
on an aggregate of con°icts: con°icts between the players, but also between the criteria
a speci¯c player takes into account, i.e., the relevant characteristics by which a decision
maker evaluates his strategic possibilities. This ¯nal chapter looks at an aggregate of
games that arises through the uncertainty of players about the game being played.
Noncooperative games in which players have incomplete information about the char-
acteristics of the participating players are commonly modelled using the Bayesian games
of Harsanyi (1967-1968). The private information players have about the uncertainties
is captured by possible di®erent types of each player. A prior random move by nature is
assumed to select each player's type. Underlying assumptions are that at least the num-
ber of players is commonly known | even though there may be uncertainty about their
characteristics (types) | and that the action space of a player is the same, irrespective
of the state of nature.
Although useful for modelling many practical con°ict situations with incomplete
information, there are interactive real-life situations in which players have to decide on
their course of action before the exact number of players and/or their action spaces are
known. Consider the following examples:
1. Suppose several animal species share a common area like a forrest. On a given day,
it is not clear which animals and how many of them will be out in the ¯eld and for
what purpose (moving to a di®erent shelter, foraging/hunting, mating).
2. Each commuter going from home to work in the morning is uncertain about the
number of other people participating in tra±c and about their opportunities to
travel to work, due to possible unannounced strikes in public transportation, sud-
denly defective cars, and road blocks caused by accidents.
3. The (partial) deregulation of markets causes uncertainty among incumbent ¯rms
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about the identity and number of potential market entrants. Moreover, although
the market has been opened for other ¯rms, there will typically still be some
government interference. Firms will not be certain about the speci¯c form this
interference will take.
4. A generation of students has to choose an education, thus selecting certain career
opportunities and ruling out others. None of the students knows in advance what
the labor market at the moment of their graduation will look like: which type of
jobs will be available and with whom they will compete for jobs.
5. A coach has to prepare a sports team for its next match. He has to decide on
matters like training for defensive and o®ensive tactics, surprise maneuvers, and
which players to employ in the match. Moreover, he has to do this before knowing
the line-up of the opposing team and whether or not players in his team with
special skills that are of crucial importance to speci¯c types of play will be without
injury at the time of the match.
This chapter introduces a model of `random games' in which the actual game being played
| its player set, the action sets of the involved players, as well as their preferences | is
determined by a stochastic state of nature. It is assumed that all potential players have
beliefs about these states of nature.
After introducing some notation and preliminary results in Section 17.2, the formal
de¯nition of random games is given in Section 17.3. Play of a random game proceeds as
follows: a state of nature is realized and all potential players, unaware of this state of
nature and consequently of the exact strategic game that corresponds with this state of
nature, simultaneously and independently choose an action. The actual players that are
selected to play the game that corresponds with the realized state of nature implement
their action choices. In case of infeasible action choices, the game ends in an outcome that
is not explicitly modelled. The random game and all these rules are common knowledge
among the potential players.
Many problems in economics and operations research involve a planning stage, where
decision makers have to plan their behavior under the uncertainty whether unforeseen
contingencies will make their choices impossible to implement. This is the main feature
that random games are meant to capture: players know they may be involved in the game
corresponding to the stochastic state of nature and will have to take a single action in
this randomly selected game. What, then, is the appeal at the planning stage of such
pro¯les of single actions?
The potential players have no additional information on which to condition their
action choice. Still, a certain pro¯le of actions x may be better than another pro¯le
y in the sense that the probability that a state of nature arises in which x (restricted
to the appropriate set of selected players) yields a Nash equilibrium is larger than the
probability that a state of nature arises in which y yields equilibrium play. This leadsPreliminaries 219
us in Section 17.4 to de¯ne maximum likelihood equilibria, action pro¯les x which are
such that the probability of ending up in a state where x restricted to the set of selected
players yields a Nash equilibrium, is maximal. For this equilibrium concept an existence
result is provided.
Borm, Cao, and Garc¶ ³a-Jurado (1995) consider a special class of Bayesian games,
where the private information of the players is always the same, irrespective of the state
of nature; equivalently, this can be seen as an incomplete information game in which
the players have no private information. Instead of searching for its Bayesian equilibria,
they introduce maximum likelihood equilibria in a similar vein to this chapter. Two
signi¯cant di®erences are, ¯rstly, that in the paper of Borm et al. (1995) there was
no apparent need to introduce a new equilibrium concept, since they study a class of
Bayesian games, whereas in the random games introduced in the present chapter it was
motivated by players seeking to avoid possibly infeasible action choices, and, secondly,
that the games of Borm et al. (1995) form only a small subclass of the random games
in this chapter: they keep both the set of selected players and their action sets ¯xed.
17.2 Preliminaries
For clarity and easy reference, this section contains de¯nitions of some standard notions
which are used in the remainder of the chapter and lists some preliminary results.
Let A be a nonempty set. A preference relation on A is a complete, re°exive, and
transitive binary relation º on A. If a º b and not b º a, write a Â b. We write a ¹ b
if b º a. Assuming a given topology on A, a preference relation º is continuous if the
existence of two sequences (ak)1
k=1 and (bk)1
k=1 in A with limk!1 ak = a, limk!1 bk = b,
and ak º bk for all k 2 I N implies a º b.
A strategic game is a tuple hN;(Ai)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni, where
² N is a ¯nite set of players;
² each player i 2 N has a set Ai of actions;
² each player i 2 N has a preference relation ºi over the set £j2NAj of action
pro¯les.
Let a = (aj)j2N 2 £j2NAj be a pro¯le of actions, i 2 N, bi 2 Ai, and S µ N. We
sometimes write:
² a¡i = (aj)j2Nnfig to indicate the action pro¯le of i's opponents;
² (bi;a¡i) to indicate the strategy pro¯le in which player i chooses action bi and his
opponents j 2 N n fig action aj;
² ajS = (aj)j2S to indicate the action pro¯le a restricted to the players in S.220 Random Games
An action pro¯le a = (aj)j2N 2 £j2NAj is a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game
hN;(Ai)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni if
8i 2 N;8bi 2 Ai : a ºi (bi;a¡i);
i.e., if no player can achieve a better outcome by unilateral deviation.
Recall that I N = f1;2;3;:::g denotes the set of positive integers, I N0 = I N [ f0g
denotes the set of nonnegative integers. For a set A, 2A = fB j B µ Ag denotes the
collection of all subsets of A, A denotes the closure of A, and Ac denotes the complement
of A.
A set A contained in a ¯nite dimensional Euclidean space, say A µ I R
n, is separable
if it contains a countable subset C such that C = A. In this case, it is said that A is
separable through C. Notice that a separable set is closed. For instance, I R is separable
through Q, but I R n Q is not separable.
Lemma 17.1 Let hN;(Ai)i2N;(ºi)i2Ni be a strategic game. Assume that for each i 2
N: ºi is continuous and Ai µ I R
n(i) is separable through Ci. Then:
(a) The set of Nash equilibria is closed.
(b) For each i 2 N;a¡i 2 £j2NnfigAj, and ai 2 Ai:
8bi 2 Ai : (bi;a¡i) ¹i (ai;a¡i) , 8bi 2 Ci : (bi;a¡i) ¹i (ai;a¡i)
Proof.
(a) If the set of Nash equilibria is empty, it is closed by de¯nition. If Nash equilibria
exist, let (ak)1
k=1 be a sequence of Nash equilibria converging to a strategy combination
a 2 £i2NAi. Then a has to be a Nash equilibrium: Let i 2 N and bi 2 Ai. For each
k 2 I N, ak is a Nash equilibrium, so ak ºi (bi;ak
¡i). By continuity of ºi: a ºi (bi;a¡i).
(b) ()) Trivial, since Ci µ Ai.
(b) (() Assume (bi;a¡i) ¹i (ai;a¡i) for all bi 2 Ci. Let bi 2 Ai. Since Ci = Ai, there
is a sequence (bk
i)1
k=1 in Ci converging to bi. This is a sequence in the set fci 2 Ai j
(ci;a¡i) ¹i (ai;a¡i)g, which is closed by continuity of ¹i. Hence its limit bi is in this set:
(bi;a¡i) ¹i (ai;a¡i). 2
17.3 Random games
In this section, random games are formally introduced. In a random game, the actual
strategic game that is played | its player set, the action sets of the involved players, as
well as their preferences | is determined by a stochastic state of nature; the potential
players are assumed to have common beliefs about these states of nature.Random games 221
Formally, in a random game a stochastic variable taking values in a nonempty set
­ of `states of nature' determines the actual game that is played. In a given play of
the random game, a certain state of nature ! 2 ­ is realized. This state determines a
strategic game, i.e., a set of players, a set of actions available to each of the players, and
the preferences of the players over the action pro¯les. Let us discuss each of these in
turn.
A ¯nite, nonempty set U speci¯es the potential players. The players in U have
common beliefs over the states of nature, described by a probability space (­;§;p),
where § is a ¾-algebra on ­ and p is a probability measure w.r.t. this ¾-algebra. A
function N : ­ ! 2U determines the set of players. If ! 2 ­ is the state of nature, the
set of players that is selected to play the game is N(!) µ U.
A nonempty set A speci¯es the potential actions. If ! 2 ­ is the state of nature,
each selected player i 2 N(!) has a set Ai(!) µ A of actions.
Given state !, each player i 2 N(!) has preferences over the set of action pro¯les
£j2N(!)Aj(!). But player i 2 N(!) has no precise information about the exact state
of the world. To incorporate preferences over such uncertain situations, it is assumed
that each player i 2 U has preferences over lotteries (probability distributions) on the
outcomes and states in which he is selected to play. Formally, let i 2 U and let ­(i) µ ­
denote the set of states in which player i participates in the game:
8i 2 U : ­(i) := f! 2 ­ j i 2 N(!)g:









. If ! 2 ­ is the state of nature, then the
preference relation ºi;! of player i 2 N(!) over the action space £j2N(!)Aj(!) is just
his preference relation ºi restricted to the set (£j2N(!)Aj(!)) £ f!g:
8! 2 ­;8a;b 2 £j2N(!)Aj(!) : a ºi;! b , (a;!) ºi (b;!):
The function that maps each state of nature ! 2 ­ to its associated strategic game, is
called G:
G : ! 7! hN(!);(Ai(!))i2N(!);(ºi;!)i2N(!)i:
The above is summarized in the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 17.2 A random game consists of
² a nonempty set ­ of states;
² a probability space (­;§;p), where § is a ¾-algebra on ­ and p a probability
measure w.r.t. this ¾-algebra, specifying the beliefs of the players over the states
of nature;
² a nonempty, ¯nite set U of potential players;222 Random Games
² a nonempty set A of potential actions;








² a function G on ­ which maps each state ! 2 ­ to a game
hN(!);(Aj(!))j2N(!);(ºj;!)j2N(!)i;
where N(!) µ U is nonempty, and for each i 2 N(!) the set Ai(!) µ A is
nonempty and ºi;! equals ºi restricted to (£j2N(!)Aj(!)) £ f!g:
8a;b 2 £j2N(!)Aj(!) : a ºi;! b , (a;!) ºi (b;!):
A random game is denoted ¡ = h­;§;p;U;A;(ºj)j2U;Gi. /
Play of a random game ¡ = h­;§;p;U;A;(ºj)j2U;Gi proceeds as follows: a state of
nature ! 2 ­ is realized and all players i 2 U, unaware of this state of nature, simul-
taneously and independently choose an action from A. The players in N(!) implement
their action choices in the game G(!). In case of infeasible action choices, the game ends
in an outcome that is not explicitly modelled. The random game and all these rules are
common knowledge.
We make the additional assumption that the set U of potential players contains no
super°uous players. This is an innocent assumption: players that are not involved in
any of the games (G(!))!2­ are not taken into account. Formally this means that
8i 2 U : ­(i) = f! 2 ­ j i 2 N(!)g 6= ;;
or equivalently:
Assumption 1 U = [!2­N(!).
Secondly, we assume that there are only ¯nitely many action sets that a potential player
can be o®ered. Formally, let i 2 U and let
A(i) := fAi(!) j ! 2 ­g
denote the collection of action sets player i can be o®ered.
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17.4 Maximum likelihood equilibria
Although the random game and its rules of play are assumed to be common knowledge,
no additional information is provided to the potential players. In particular, they are not
informed about their action sets. This captures a common problem in decision making,
namely the situation in which players or decision makers have to plan their course of
action while still uncertain about contingencies that may make their choices impossible
to implement.
Without being informed about actual action sets, potential players cannot condition
their strategic choices on such information. Therefore, a strategy simply selects an action.
De¯nition 17.3 Let ¡ = h­;§;p;U;A;(ºj)j2U;Gi be a random game. A strategy of
player i 2 U is an element ai 2 A. /
This de¯nition of a strategy is in line with the intuition: players know they may be
involved in the game corresponding to the stochastic state of nature and in that case
will have to take a single action in this randomly selected game. In their planning stage,
players will ask themselves how to evaluate pro¯les of such single actions. Not every
action of a given player is feasible in each of the games in which he is selected to play.
It is therefore natural to consider strategy pro¯les which are more likely than others to
yield equilibrium play in the random game. Maximum likelihood equilibria are the topic
of this section.
Informally, a maximum likelihood equilibrium of a random game is a strategy pro¯le
a = (aj)j2U 2 £j2UA that maximizes the probability that a state of nature occurs in
which pro¯le a, restricted to the set of players selected to play the game, is a Nash
equilibrium: it is a strategy pro¯le that is most likely to yield equilibrium play.
De¯nition 17.4 Let ¡ = h­;§;p;U;A;(ºj)j2U;Gi be a random game and a = (aj)j2U 2




1 if ajN(!) is a Nash equilibrium of G(!);
0 otherwise.
(Recall that ajN(!) is the strategy pro¯le a restricted to the players in N(!).) /
Notice that a strategy pro¯le a 2 £j2UA may fail to be a Nash equilibrium of G(!) for
two reasons:
1. ajN(!) is feasible in G(!), but there is a player i 2 N(!) with a pro¯table deviation,
2. one of the players i 2 N(!) plays an infeasible strategy: ai = 2 Ai(!).
Let a 2 £j2UA be a strategy pro¯le. An event of interest is f! 2 ­ j NIa(!) = 1g,
the set of states in which the strategy pro¯le a yields a Nash equilibrium. To make sure224 Random Games
that this is a measurable set, i.e., an element of the ¾-algebra §, we make some further
assumptions.
We assume that A contains no redundant elements. Just like Assumption 1, this
entails no loss of generality.
Assumption 3 A = [j2U [Aj2A(j) Aj.
Each possible action set is required to be separable. This is formulated in a slightly
di®erent, yet equivalent way.
Assumption 4 A µ I R
n is separable through C µ A and for each i 2 U and each
Ai 2 A(i): Ai is separable through Ai \ C.
Proposition 17.5 Under Assumptions 2 and 3, Assumption 4 is equivalent with the
following statement:
For each i 2 U and each Ai 2 A(i) : Ai is separable. (17.1)
Proof. Assumption 4 implies (17.1). To see that (17.1) implies assumption 4, recall
that each A(i) is ¯nite by Assumption 2. Write A(i) = fAi1;Ai2;:::;Aim(i)g, where
m(i) 2 I N is the number of elements of A(i). Assume that Aik is separable through
Cik µ Aik. Then [i2U [
m(i)




k=1 Cik = [i2U [
m(i)
k=1 Cik = [i2U [
m(i)
k=1 Aik = A;
¯nishing the proof. 2
The ¯fth assumption concerns the measurability of the functions N, (Ai)i2U, and (ºi)i2U.
Assumption 5 The following measurability conditions hold:
(a; on N) 8S µ U : f! 2 ­ j N(!) = Sg 2 §.
(b; on Ai) 8i 2 U;8bi 2 A : f! 2 ­ j i 2 N(!);bi 2 Ai(!)g 2 §.
(c; on ºi) 8i 2 U;8bi 2 A;8a 2 £j2UA :
f! 2 ­ j ajN(!) 2 £j2N(!)Aj(!); i 2 N(!); bi 2 Ai(!); ajN(!) ºi;! (bi;a¡i)jN(!)g 2 §:
Lemma 17.6 Let i 2 U;bi 2 A;a 2 £j2UA. De¯ne three sets:
X(i) = f! 2 ­ j i = 2 N(!)g
Y (i;bi) = f! 2 ­ j i 2 N(!);bi = 2 Ai(!)g
Z(i;bi;a) =
f! 2 ­ j ajN(!) 2 £j2N(!)Aj(!); i 2 N(!); bi 2 Ai(!); ajN(!) ºi;! (bi;a¡i)jN(!)g
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(a) Assumption 5a is equivalent with the assumption that 8i 2 U : f! 2 ­ j i 2 N(!)g 2
§. Therefore X(i) 2 §.
(b) Y (i;bi) 2 §.
(c) Z(i;bi;a) 2 §.
Proof.
(a) Let i 2 U. To see that assumption 5a implies f! 2 ­ j i 2 N(!)g 2 §, rewrite
f! 2 ­ j i 2 N(!)g = [SµU:i2Sf! 2 ­ j N(!) = Sg:
This is a ¯nite union of measurable sets, hence measurable. To see the converse,
let S µ U and write
f! 2 ­ j N(!) = Sg = [\i2Sf! 2 ­ j i 2 N(!)g]
\
[\i2UnSf! 2 ­ j i = 2 N(!)g]:
This is a ¯nite intersection of measurable sets, hence measurable.
That X(i) 2 § follows from the ¯rst part of the proof.
(b) Write
Y (i;bi) = [f! 2 ­ j i = 2 N(!)g [ f! 2 ­ j i 2 N(!);bi 2 Ai(!)g]
c:
As the complement of the ¯nite union of measurable sets, this is a measurable set.
(c) This is simply Assumption 5c. 2
Proposition 17.7 Let ¡ = h­;§;p;U;A;(ºj)j2U;Gi be a random game that satis¯es
Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Let a 2 £j2UA be a strategy pro¯le. Then the set
f! 2 ­ j NIa(!) = 1g is an element of the ¾-algebra §.
Proof. De¯ne the sets X(i), Y (i;bi), and Z(i;bi;a) as in Lemma 17.6 and let C be as
in Assumption 4. Then
f! 2 ­ j NIa(!) = 1g =
f! 2 ­ j ajN(!) 2 £j2N(!)Aj(!) and
8i 2 N(!);8bi 2 Ai(!) : ajN(!) ºi;! (bi;a¡i)jN(!)g =
f! 2 ­ j ajN(!) 2 £j2N(!)Aj(!) and
8i 2 N(!);8bi 2 Ai(!) \ C : ajN(!) ºi;! (bi;a¡i)jN(!)g = (17.2)
\i2U \bi2C [X(i) [ Y (i;bi) [ Z(i;bi;a)]: (17.3)226 Random Games
The ¯rst equality follows from the de¯nition of a Nash equilibrium, the second equality
follows from Assumption 4 and Lemma 17.1. Remains to show the third equality.
Let ! be in the set in (17.2), i 2 U, and bi 2 C. There are three possibilities:
1. If i = 2 N(!), then ! 2 X(i);
2. If i 2 N(!) and bi = 2 Ai(!), then ! 2 Y (i;bi);
3. If i 2 N(!) and bi 2 Ai(!), then ajN(!) 2 £j2N(!)Aj(!) and ajN(!) ºi;! (bi;a¡i)jN(!)
by assumption, so ! 2 Z(i;bi;a).
Hence ! 2 X(i) [ Y (i;bi) [ Z(i;bi;a). Since i 2 U and bi 2 C were taken arbitrarily,
this proves that the set in (17.2) is contained in the set in (17.3).
Now let ! 2 \i2U \bi2C [X(i) [ Y (i;bi) [ Z(i;bi;a)], i 2 N(!), and bi 2 Ai(!) \ C.
Since ! 2 X(i)[Y (i;bi)[Z(i;bi;a) and ! = 2 X(i)[Y (i;bi), it follows that ! 2 Z(i;bi;a),
which implies that ajN(!) 2 £j2N(!)Aj(!) and ajN(!) ºi;! (bi;a¡i)jN(!). Since i 2 N(!),
and bi 2 Ai(!) \ C were taken arbitrarily, this proves that the set in (17.3) is contained
in the set in (17.2). This establishes the third equality.
Since each of the three sets X(i), Y (i;bi), and Z(i;bi;a) is measurable by Lemma
17.6, their union is measurable. Since U is ¯nite and C is countable, the set in (17.3) is
a countable intersection of measurable sets and hence measurable. 2
De¯nition 17.8 Let ¡ = h­;§;p;U;A;(ºj)j2U;Gi be a random game that satis¯es
assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. De¯ne the likelihood function L : £j2UA ! [0;1] by
L(a) = p(f! 2 ­ j NIa(!) = 1g). A strategy pro¯le a 2 £j2UA is a maximum likelihood
equilibrium of the random game if it maximizes L:
8b 2 £j2UA : L(a) > = L(b):
The set of maximum likelihood equilibria of ¡ is denoted MLE(¡). /
Proposition 17.7 shows that the function L is well-de¯ned.
Proposition 17.9 Let ¡ = h­;§;p;U;A;(ºj)j2U;Gi be a random game that satis¯es
assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Let (an)1
n=1 be a sequence in £j2UA with limit a0 2 £j2UA.
If the sequence (L(an))1
n=1 converges, then L(a0) > = limn!1 L(an).
Proof. De¯ne for each n 2 I N0:
B
n := f! 2 ­ j NIan(!) = 0g:
The complement of Bn is f! 2 ­ j NIan(!) = 1g and was shown to be measurable in
Proposition 17.7, so Bn is measurable.
If B0 = ;, the statement in the proposition is trivial, since then L(a0) = p(­) =
1 > = limn!1 L(an). So take ! 2 B0. By de¯nition, a0 is not a Nash equilibrium ofMaximum likelihood equilibria 227
G(!). The set of Nash equilibria of G(!) is closed by Lemma 17.1. Hence, there exists
a neighborhood O of a0 such that
8a 2 O : NIa(!) = 0: (17.4)
Convergence of (an)1
n=1 to a0 implies
9k 2 I N such that 8n > = k : a
n 2 O: (17.5)
Combining (17.4) and (17.5):
9k 2 I N such that 8n > = k : NIan(!) = 0:
Since ! 2 B0 was arbitrary, it follows that
8! 2 B



















n) = 1 ¡ lim
n!1L(a
n);
so L(a0) > = limn!1 L(an). 2
This completes the preliminary work for the existence theorem of maximum likelihood
equilibria. One additional assumption is made.
Assumption 6 A is a compact set.
Theorem 17.10 Let ¡ = h­;§;p;U;A;(ºj)j2U;Gi be a random game that satis¯es
assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Then ¡ has a maximum likelihood equilibrium:
MLE(¡) 6= ;.
Proof. The strategy space £j2UA is compact in the product topology. The set fL(a) j
a 2 £j2UAg is nonempty and bounded above by one, so it has a supremum M. Hence,
there is a sequence (an)1
n=1 in £j2UA with limn!1 L(an) = M. By compactness of
£j2UA, the sequence has a convergent subsequence (ank) with limit a0. From Proposition
17.9 it follows that
L(a




Then a0 is a maximum likelihood equilibrium of ¡. 2
A random game as in Theorem 17.10 satis¯es assumptions 1 through 6. Let us have a
closer look at the assumptions and the role they play in the existence result for maximum
likelihood equilibria.228 Random Games
As observed before, assumptions 1 and 3 are made without loss of generality: they
just get rid of unnecessary ingredients.
Assumptions 4 and 6, concerning separability and compactness of A are topological
conditions on the set of potential actions. Compactness is a standard assumption. Sep-
arability is only a weak condition. Typical examples of action sets that come to mind
are strategy simplices (probability distributions over ¯nitely many pure strategies), an
interval [0;1) of prices, or a subset of I N denoting possible quantities (for instance of
production). All these sets are separable, so Proposition 17.5 would imply separability
of A.
Assumption 2, concerning the ¯niteness of the sets A(i) was used in the proof of
Proposition 17.5.
Assumption 5 concerns the measurability of certain sets and was needed to guarantee
the measurability of the set of states on which a certain strategy pro¯le yielded a Nash
equilibrium.
Remark 17.11 Random games were de¯ned such that its players have a common prior
p. This prior was used to de¯ne a likelihood function L that measures for all players
simultaneously how likely it is, according to this prior, that a selected strategy pro¯le
yields equilibrium play in the random game. Without imposing the restriction that the
players have a common prior, each player would have his own likelihood function, not
necessarily coinciding with that of the others. In such a case, there will typically not be
a strategy pro¯le that simultaneously maximizes the likelihood function of all players,
thereby making it di±cult to single out a desirable strategy pro¯le. /
Borm et al. (1995) consider random games ¡ = h­;§;p;U;A;(ºj)j2U;Gi that satisfy
the following structural assumptions:
² The player set is ¯xed: 8! 2 ­ : N(!) = U.
² The action sets are ¯xed: 8i 2 U 9Ai µ A 8! 2 ­ : Ai(!) = Ai.
This clearly implies that assumptions 1 and 2 are satis¯ed. Moreover, they require each
Ai to be separable and £i2UAi to be compact. Notice that this coincides with our
assumptions 3, 4, and 6. Assumptions 5a and 5b are automatically ful¯lled. Borm et al.
(1995) also capture assumption 5c by requiring that for each i 2 U, each a 2 £j2UAj,
and each bi 2 Ai the set f! 2 ­ j a ºi;! (bi;a¡i)g is measurable.References
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Speltheorie is een wiskundige theorie die methodes ontwikkelt en gebruikt voor het
bestuderen van de interactie tussen beslissers. Dit proefschrift behandelt een tweetal
onderwerpen uit de speltheorie. In het eerste deel wordt gekeken naar potentiaalspelen;
het tweede deel van het proefschrift handelt over multicriteriaspelen.
Potentiaalspelen zijn niet-coÄ operatieve spelen | spelen waarin de spelers onderling
geen bindende afspraken kunnen maken | waar de informatie over de strategische mo-
gelijkheden van alle betrokken spelers tegelijk kan worden samengevat in een enkele
reÄ eelwaardige functie op de strategieÄ enruimte van het spel. Deze strategische informatie
bestaat eruit hoe de uitbetaling van een speler verandert wanneer deze afwijkt van zijn
huidige strategie, hierbij de keuzes van de overige spelers constant veronderstellend. Een
hogere uitbetaling gaat gepaard met een hogere waarde van de potentiaalfunctie. Strate-
gieÄ encombinaties waar de potentiaalfunctie een maximum aanneemt, zijn evenwichten
van het spel: geen enkele speler kan door afwijken een hogere uitbetaling realiseren,
omdat dit gepaard zou gaan met een toename in de potentiaal, die echter bij aanname
maximaal is. Een belangrijke eigenschap van potentiaalspelen is dus, dat potentiaalspe-
len waarin er maar eindig veel zuivere strategieÄ encombinaties zijn, zuivere evenwichten
hebben: evenwichten waarin elke speler een eenvoudige zuivere strategie kan spelen en
niet zijn toevlucht hoeft te zoeken tot het gebruik van gerandomizeerde strategieÄ en.
Er zijn diverse typen potentiaalspelen. Een belangrijke vraag is naar de structuur
van deze spelen: wat zijn noodzakelijke en voldoende voorwaarden voor het bestaan van
een bepaald type potentiaalfunctie? Dit onderwerp komt aan bod in hoofdstukken 2, 5,
7 en 9. De relatie tussen deze hoofdstukken is dat in alle gevallen een conditie op cykels
in de strategieÄ enruimte van het spel van centraal belang is. De vorm van deze conditie
is misschien het best te begrijpen aan de hand van de litho Klimmen en dalen uit 1960
van Maurits C. Escher. In deze litho kunnen we een groep monniken op een trap volgen,
die bij iedere stap een traptrede omhoog gaan, maar desondanks na verloop van tijd
terugkeren naar een punt waar ze al eerder zijn geweest. Het uitsluiten van soortgelijke
`stijgende cykels' is nodig om het bestaan van een potentiaal in een niet-coÄ operatief spel
te garanderen.
In eindige potentiaalspelen leveren maxima van een potentiaalfunctie evenwichten
in zuivere strategieÄ en. Zuivere evenwichten hoeven niet te bestaan in potentiaalspelen
waarin spelers oneindig veel strategieÄ en hebben. Er kunnen evenwel situaties zijn waarin
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spelers een hoge uitbetaling krijgen, waarmee ze tevreden zijn, of door af te wijken van
hun keuze er maar in geringe mate op vooruit kunnen gaan. Het bestaan van zulke
bijna-evenwichten wordt bestudeerd in hoofdstuk 8, waar blijkt dat de aanwezigheid van
hooguit ¶ e¶ en speler met een oneindige verzameling zuivere strategieÄ en voldoende is om
het bestaan van bijna-evenwichten te garanderen.
Toepassingen van potentiaalspelen komen aan bod in hoofdstukken 2, 3, 4 en 6. In
hoofdstukken 2 en 3 worden congestiemodellen bestudeerd, waar spelers gebruik maken
van verschillende faciliteiten en het nut dat ze aan dit gebruik ontlenen afhangt van
het aantal andere gebruikers. Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert processen waarin produktie van
goederen in verschillende stappen plaatsvindt en de kosten van een produktie-afdeling
uitsluitend afhangen van de gekozen produktietechnieken van afdelingen die bij het pro-
duktieproces in voorgaande stappen of dezelfde stap betrokken zijn. Hoofdstuk 6 behan-
delt een methode voor het ¯nancieren van publieke goederen met de eigenschap dat spe-
lers, die individuele bijdragen leveren aan de ¯nanciering van de publieke goederen, door
het nastreven van hun eigen belang tegelijkertijd handelen in het belang van de sociale
welvaart, de welvaart van de gehele groep betrokkenen. Bovendien legt dit hoofdstuk
relaties tussen het niet-coÄ operatieve probleem en een coÄ operatief probleem, waar spelers
in samenwerking een bijdrage leveren aan door hen te ¯nancieren en te kiezen publieke
goederen.
Bij het nemen van beslissingen evalueert een beslisser situaties over het algemeen aan
de hand van verschillende criteria. Deze criteria kunnen moeilijk met elkaar te vergelij-
ken zijn en het kan voorkomen dat een situatie die aantrekkelijk is volgens ¶ e¶ en criterium
onaantrekkelijk is volgens een ander criterium. Het tweede deel van het proefschrift
handelt over de hiermee samenhangende multicriteriaspelen, waarin spelers meerdere
criteria tegelijkertijd hanteren. Een speler in een multicriteriaspel kan bijvoorbeeld wor-
den gezien als een organisatie met verschillende leden, ieder met een eigen doelfunctie.
Gegeven deze interpretatie van een speler als een organisatie ontstaat er een aggregatie
van con°icten, enerzijds tussen de verschillende organisaties, anderzijds binnen een or-
ganisatie, waar de leden gezamenlijk moeten beslissen over een strategieÄ enkeuze. Dit is
een gemeenschappelijk kenmerk van alle spelen in het tweede deel van het proefschrift:
ze zijn gebaseerd op een opeenstapeling van con°icten.
Het evenwichtsconcept voor niet-coÄ operatieve spelen vereist dat spelers een beste
antwoord spelen op de strategieÄ en van de tegenstanders. Als een speler ¶ e¶ en reÄ eelwaardige
criteriumfunctie heeft, is een beste antwoord ondubbelzinnig gede¯nieerd als een stra-
tegie die zodanig is dat een afwijking daarvan geen hoger nut kan opleveren. Maar
als een speler meerdere criteria tegelijkertijd hanteert, is het niet zo duidelijk wat een
beste antwoord is. Verschillende antwoorden op deze vraag leveren verschillende even-
wichtsconcepten op voor multicriteriaspelen. Dit onderwerp komt aan bod in hoofd-
stukken 11 en 13. In de Pareto-evenwichten in hoofdstuk 11 zijn beste antwoorden
gede¯nieerd als strategieÄ en die een Pareto-optimale uitbetaling leveren. In dit hoofd-
stuk worden eigenschappen van het Pareto-evenwicht beschreven en axiomatiseringenSamenvatting 245
van het Pareto-evenwichtsconcept gegeven. Hoofdstuk 12 bestudeert de structuur van
de verzameling Pareto-evenwichten in twee-persoons multicriteriaspelen. Hoofdstuk 13
introduceert een drietal evenwichtsconcepten, waarbij aspecten aan bod komen uit de
multicriteria optimalisering, de niet-coÄ operatieve en de coÄ operatieve speltheorie. In een
compromis-evenwicht probeert elke speler een uitkomst te realiseren die zo dicht mogelijk
ligt bij een ideale uitkomst. Dit concept is nauw gerelateerd aan de compromiswaarden
uit de literatuur over multicriteria optimalisering. In Nash bargaining evenwichten, gere-
lateerd aan de speltheoretische literatuur over bargaining, proberen spelers juist een on-
derhandelingsoplossing te genereren die ver van een onaangename oplossing verwijderd
is. Perfecte evenwichten, geÄ ³nspireerd door de literatuur over evenwichtsver¯jningen,
tenslotte, vormen een ver¯jning van het Pareto-evenwichtsconcept en houden rekening
met het feit dat spelers fouten kunnen maken bij het uitvoeren van hun keuzes.
Hoofdstuk 14 bekijkt Pareto-optimal security strategies in twee-persoons nulsomspe-
len met meerdere criteria. Pareto-optimal security strategies zijn `veilige' strategieÄ en in
de zin dat een speler voor elk van zijn strategieÄ en nagaat wat het ergste is wat hem kan
overkomen in ieder van zijn criteria afzonderlijk. Zo kent een speler aan elke strategie
een `security vector' toe die het worst-case scenario beschrijft als deze strategie wordt
gekozen. Een Pareto-optimal security strategy is een strategie waarvoor dit worst-case
scenario het minst onaangenaam is. Verschillende karakteriseringen van Pareto-optimal
security strategies worden gegeven. In het bijzonder wordt aangetoond dat ze samen-
vallen met minimax strategieÄ en in een standaard twee-persoons matrixspel, waar elk van
de spelers maar ¶ e¶ en criterium heeft.
CoÄ operatieve multicriteriaspelen worden bestudeerd in hoofdstuk 15. Er wordt on-
derscheid gemaakt tussen ondeelbare, publieke criteria, die voor elke speler binnen een
coalitie dezelfde waarde aannemen, en deelbare, private criteria, waarvan de waarde over
de leden van een coalitie verdeeld kan worden. De nadruk wordt gelegd op een core con-
cept voor coÄ operatieve multicriteriaspelen, bestaande uit allocaties voor de afzonderlijke
spelers met de eigenschap dat geen enkele coalitie van spelers een incentive heeft om
de voorgestelde allocatie naast zich neer te leggen, omdat ze zelf geen betere uitkomst
kunnen garanderen. Dit concept wordt geaxiomatiseerd en additionele motivatie voor
het concept wordt gegeven door aan te tonen dat core elementen op natuurlijke wijze
samenvallen met sterke evenwichten in gerelateerde niet-coÄ operatieve claim spelen, waar
de spelers onafhankelijk een coalitie noemen die ze willen vormen en een uitbetaling die
ze willen.
Het feit dat een speler meerdere criteria hanteert bij het evalueren van uitkomsten,
impliceert dat hij vaak alleen een partiÄ ele ordening op de uitkomsten kan aanbrengen.
Een niet-coÄ operatief spel waarin elke speler een partiÄ ele ordening heeft over de strate-
gieÄ enruimte wordt een ordinaal spel genoemd. Hoofdstuk 16 introduceert een nieuw
model voor beperkt rationeel gedrag in ordinale spelen. Het model benadrukt de rol
van beste antwoorden. Als een speler na a°oop van het spel vaststelt dat hij geen
beste antwoord speelde op de keuzes van de tegenstanders, kan hij spijt hebben van het246 Samenvatting
maken van een onjuiste keuze. De anticipatie van spijt kan het beslissingsproces en de
daaruit voortvloeiende keuze van een speler beÄ ³nvloeden. Hoofdstuk 16 stelt matching
voor als een mogelijke manier waarop deze invloed gestalte kan krijgen. Matching wordt
waargenomen in talloze experimenten over beslissen onder onzekerheid en komt er in
essentie op neer dat een alternatief wordt gekozen met een kans die proportioneel is aan
de waarde van dat alternatief. In ordinale spelen is best-reply matching gebaseerd op
twee elementen. Ten eerste, elke speler is uitsluitend geÄ ³nteresseerd in de beste-antwoord
structuur van het spel. Ten tweede, elke speler speelt een zuivere strategie met de kans
dat deze strategie een beste antwoord zal zijn. De kansen komen voort uit de beliefs van
een speler met betrekking tot het gedrag van zijn tegenstanders. Een evenwichtsconcept
op basis van best-reply matching wordt gede¯nieerd en er wordt aangetoond dat elk
eindig ordinaal spel een best-reply matching evenwicht heeft. Enige eigenschappen van
het nieuwe evenwichtsconcept worden onderzocht en het concept wordt toegelicht aan
de hand van bekende voorbeelden. Een opvallend resultaat wordt gevonden in het Cen-
tipede spel. In het unieke best-reply matching evenwicht van dit spel zetten de spelers
het spel voort met positieve kans, waarbij deze kans groter is naarmate het spel langer
is.
In veel problemen in de economie en operations research moeten individuen hun
gedrag plannen onder de onzekerheid of bepaalde omstandigheden het implementeren
van hun keuze onmogelijk maken. Hoofdstuk 17 introduceert dit probleem in een spelthe-
oretische context door het formuleren van random games. Random games laten onze-
kerheid toe over alle ingrediÄ enten van het spel: de verzameling spelers, de acties en de
voorkeuren van de betrokken spelers. Het voorgestelde evenwichtsconcept voor random
games, maximum likelihood evenwichten, selecteert die acties, die het meest waarschijn-
lijk zijn om in het uiteindelijk gespeelde spel een goede uitkomst op te leveren.